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ABSTRACT

Nuclear %«eapons, long considered the bête noire of
human existence are examined quantitatively and
qualitatively in this dissertation to ascertain if the
heinous effects they threaten ultimately serve to promote
deterrence between pêtirs of states.

The findings suggest

that nuclear weapons do have a significant intact on
conflict when present on both sides of a dyadic dispute.

In

such symmetrical nuclear pairs conflict levels are
quantitatively shown to be reduced, suggesting that the
conflict inhibiting qualities of these weapons long espoused
by nuclear optimists are legitimate.

Further evidence is

presented in the form of a qualitative analysis of conflict
between India and Pakistan over the region of Jammu and
Kashmir.

In this individual dyad the introduction of

nuclear weapons again appears to have manifested lower
levels of conflict between these heated adversaries.

The

in^lication of this research is that the steady spread of
nuclear weapons may serve to dampen conflict throughout the
international system.

vxi
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CHAPTER ORB:

IMTRODUCTIOH:
THE THREAT AMD PROMISE
OP MUCLEAR WEAPOMS

"The reputation of power is power."
— Thomas Hobbes
Nuclear weapons promote interstate peace.

The

statement seems counter-intuitive initially, as the reader
grapples with the seemingly divergent concepts of nuclear
weaponry and peace.

Yet since their creation in 1945

nuclear weapons have not been the bane of human existence
many feared they would become.

Indeed such weapons have not

been used in conflict since the end of World War II and a
number of scholars have theorized that the destructive
potential displayed by these weapons has ensured peace
between the great powers ever since (Gallois 1961; Sandoval
1976; Waltz 1981; Bueno de Mesquita and Riker 1982;
Hearsheimer 1990; Weltman 1995).

Others are not as

sanguine, suggesting that the spread of nuclear weapons is
something to be actively and vigorously curtailed
(Morgenstern 1959; Ikle 1960; Doty 1960; Nye 1981; Bailey
1991; Spector 1990, 1995; Kraig 1999).

Still others have

called for the complete abolition of nuclear weapons (Gilpin
1962; Schell 1982, 1984; Ellsberg 1992).

This dissertation

tests the claims of the first group of scholars, sometimes
referred to as nuclear optimists, to ascertain if the
presence of nuclear weapons has led to any reduction in
conflict between pairs of states.
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The basic notion put forward by the nuclear optimists
that overWielming military strength pacifies enemies is not
a new concept.

The ancient military strategist Sun Tzu

(1963, 67) argued for the necessity of evasion when one's
opponent had overwhelming force saying that when this was
the case:

"avoid him."

Indeed nuclear pairs of states

clearly appear to have avoided one another in terms of armed
conflict, as there has never been a case of interstate
warfare between two nuclear powers.

But why?

In order to

understand why it is helpful to review how states operate
within the international system.
The fundamental dynamics of international politics
regularly act to restrict the extent to which a state can
reach its aims at the expense of other states.

Nuclear

weapons have amplified many of these characteristics.

As

observers starting with Thucydides have pointed out, in a
world of autonomous states, each will act to check the most
objectionable efforts of others. As a result, most attempts
to nicLke excessive gains have been self-defeating. This is
the basic lesson of the balance of power (Waltz 1979).

A

state that seeks domination may gain a series of successes,
but doing so will lead others to see the state as such a
menace that they must temporarily scuttle their disputes to
defeat it, lest they later be dominated by it.

This results

in a coalition of weaker forces banding together to put down
the dominant hegemon.

By seeking dominance rather than
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accepting lesser gains, Napoleon and Hitler forfeited the
positions they had previously secured. These ignoble
attempts to dominate Europe might have triumphed if the
aspiring hegemon had adopted somewhat different tactics.^
Even on a scale less grand, states that consistently
augment their power and continually intrude on the interests
of others are likely to encounter expanded opposition.
Although states sometimes bandwagon and strive to align
themselves with rising powers, more often they balance
against such threats (Halt 1985). Of course not every
action meets with a rapid and similar counteraction.

For

example, taking advantage of their rather isolated
geographic locales, both the United States and Russia
annexed their hinterlands in the nineteenth century with
minimal opposition from other states.

But such free

expamsion is not the norm within the international system.
The fact that the world consists of independent states that
seek goals that conflict with those of each other means that
states may find it difficult to gain most of what they want.
Additionally, according to Realist scholars, to succeed too
well is to invite others to increase their efforts to
combat, contain, and control the state.

Realist thinkers

such as Hans Morgenthau (1979) acknowledged these dynamics

1.
For instance, if Hitler had not decided to declare
war on Russia and the united States before he had complete
control of Western Europe his attempt to dominate Europe
might have proven more effectual (Schroeder 1987).
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when they advocated restraint, the use of quiet diplomacy,
and the sacrifice of peripheral interests when necessary in
order to display respect for the vital interests of others
and reduce conflict with them.
Security might seem like a basic mission, but even the
effort to ensure that others will not be able to threaten
the state may be self-defeating.

International politics is

characterized by the security dilemma.

Realists suggest

that absolute security for one state tends to lead to
absolute insecurity for others. Therefore, efforts aimed at
freeing the state from foreign dangers generally influence
other states to take counteractions that are likely to
reduce the other state's security to a level lower than it
was before it launched its initial effort.

In some cases,

the result can be a spiral of misperceptions, antagonism,
and war. When statesmen grasp these dynamics, they do not
try to maximize their power to make them safe, but instead
they seek to maximize their security (Waltz 1979; Luttwak
1987).
Nuclear weapons have served bo magnify these
international difficulties facing states, and thus succeed
in limiting the options available to nuclear-capable states
paired in conflict with one another.

The danger of

escalation, coupled with the clear impossibility of winning
a nuclear conflagration, means that leaders realize that
serious challenges to a nuclear adversary's vital interests
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could end in Armageddon.

Therefore, conflict stalemate is

naturally promoted between nucleêur powers because in such
pairings victory is unrealizable.
Thus, in theory at least, nucleair powers cire deterred
from escalating conflicts with one another because of the
potentially dire consequences such an escalation could
produce.

This dissertation tests that hypothesis through a

combination of quantitative and qualitative means.
The dissertation consists of six chapters.

Following

this introduction the second chapter discusses the
theoretical underpinnings of the nuclear peace.

As will be

discussed in detail in the second chapter, Kenneth Waltz
(1981), among others (Bueno de Mesquita and Riker 1982;
Hears heimer 1990) has argued that "the measured spread of
nuclear weapons is more to be welcomed than feeured. " Waltz
believes that the gradual spread of nuclear weapons will
promote peace and reinforce international stability because
nuclear weapons induce caution between adversaries who
possess them.

In short, "more may be better."

The second

chapter will explore the theoretical arguments behind this
intrepid assertion.
The third chapter is the quantitative section of the
dissertation.

It tests the hypothesis that nuclear weapons

have had a pacifying effect on conflict between pairs of
states through employment of two multiple regression models.
The dependent variable of conflict escalation
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(operationalized in terms of level of conflict and number of
fatalities) is tested against the presence of nuclear
weapons (both symmetrically and asymmetrically) in the dyad
and six other independent factors theoretically surmised to
have had a significant impact on conflict: military parity,
level of democratization, regime stability, trade,
geographic proximity amd allicuice membership.
The next two chapters provide the qualitative backbone
of the dissertation.

The fourth chapter is a case study of

the evolving relationship between India and Pakistan.

The

decades old animus between these two states has led some to
suggest that now that both sides have openly and
successfully tested nuclear weapons,^ the Indian
subcontinent is a tinderbox waiting to explode (Erlanger
1998).

For instance, following the nuclear weapons tests by

India and Pakistan in 1998 President Clinton declared, "I
cannot believe that we are about to start the twenty-first
century by having the Indian Subcontinent repeat the worst
mistakes of the twentieth century" (Hirsh and Barry 1998,
23).

This notion deserves scrutiny as the events of the

Cold War suggest that the presence of nuclear weapons may
have prevented conflict between nuclear rivals.

Indeed a

number of analysts argue that the introduction of nuclear
2.
India conducted its tests on 11 May 1998 producing
one or more blasts totaling cd)out 25 kilotons. Pakistan
responded with tests of its own on 28 May 1998 producing one
or more blasts totaling about 12 kilotons (Hirsh and Barry
1998, 24).
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weapons to the Indian subcontinent will lead to conflict
pacification.

"There is no way that there is going to be

another war here," according to Colonel Narendra Singh Mehta
of the Indian Armed Forces.

"There may be some local

exchanges of fire, the sort of thing that's been happening
here for yeeirs, but nuclear weapons have made full-scale war
unthinkable" (Bums 1998, 3). Many scholars and defense
analysts support this view of South Asia (Subrahmanyam 1986;
Harrison and Kemp 1993; Perkovich 1993; Sundarji 1993; Beg
1994; Arguilla 1997; Arif 1995; Lavoy 1995).
Thus the impact of nuclear weapons on Indo-Pakistani
conflict will be reviewed.

Through an examination of the

historical record this chapter serves to trace IndoPakistani relations over the past fifty years, beginning
with their 1947 war over control of Jammu and Kashmir, up to
the present nuclear stalemate between the two.

It focuses

on the four major conflicts between India and Pakistan over
the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir.

This

dissertation will display that the Indo-Pakistani dyad was
pacified by the introduction of nuclear weapons in 1974.
The Indo-Pakistani relationship is particularly
important because it provides a qualitative window through
which one Ccui observe the impact of all three types of
dyadic relations between states.

Over the past fifty years

the Indo-Pakistani dyad has moved from a non-nuclear one
(1947-1974 when India ascended to its present status as a
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nuclesLT capable state); to an asymmetrical dyad (1974-1986) ;
to a symmetrical dyad (though Pakistan became an official
member of the nuclear club with its overt testing of such
weapons in May of 1998, it has been considered a de facto
member since 1986 (Spector 1990)).
Armed with the results from the previous two chapters.
Chapter Five examines current US policy with respect to
nuclear proliferation and then discusses vdiat alterations
may need to be made in it as we move into the twenty-first
century.

Chapter Five attempts to apply the theories and

findings presented in the preceding chapters to real world
situations, investigating the potential impact of nuclear
weapons on two dyads of recent concern by US security
planners:

the Korean dyad and the Greco-Turk dyad.

This

chapter will examine whether or not the presence, or even
the threat of the presence of nuclear weapons has, or could
have a pacifying effect on relations in these dyads.

US

policy recommendations with respect to these dyads are
presented.

The major question for this chapter is whether

the continued proliferation of nuclear weapons will be a
hindrance or a help to maintaining stability throughout the
world and what the implications are for US foreign policy in
the future.
Chapter Six provides a brief summary of the conclusions
of the dissertation. Additionally, it elucidates the
potential impact of technological advancements in weaponry

8
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in the next millennium to ascertain v^at role nuclear
weapons will play, if any, in the arsenals of the future.
Both the qualitative and quantitative evidence presented in
the preceding chapters are drawn upon to frame a cogent
answer to this question.
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CHAPTER TWO:

CRISIS RED RUCLBAR HBAPGERX

"Since I do not foresee that atomic energy
is to be a great boon for a long time, I
have to say that for the present it is a
menace. Perhaps it is well that it should
be. It may intimidate the human race into
bringing order into its international affairs,
which, without the pressure of fear, it would
not do."
— Albert Einstein

The abrupt end to the forty-five year long Cold War
between the United States and the Soviet Union caught
everyone off guard.

Scholars of international relations

failed to forecast such a placid and sudden end to communist
control of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as occurred
between 1989-1991.

In fact, most had asserted theories that

stated only a major war between the two great powers would
ultimately leave one the victor and the other the
vanquished.

Yet this did not occur.

Why? Why did scholars

of international relations fail to predict such a peaceful
cessation of tensions? Historian John Lewis Gaddis (199293) has berated students of the discipline of international
relations for their fctilure to do so, claiming that theories
of international relations are lacking in both their
descriptive and predictive power.
This dissertation endeavors to reassert traditional
international relations theory by qualitatively and
quantitatively examining the intact of the one major element
which made the Cold War international system unique:

10
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the

presence of nuclear weapons.

The impact of nuclear weapons

on interstate relations will be examined to ascertain if
weapons have a pacifying effect on nuclear interstate
interactions.

The dissertation's central question is single

but critical to our understanding:

Does the presence of

nuclear weapons retard conflict escalation between pairs of
states ?
Nuclear

Optimism

The possible pacifying effect of nuclear weapons^ on
interstate relations has been heralded most strongly by
neorealist Kenneth Naltz.

Waltz has put forward the view

that the spread of nuclear weapons is not necessarily a
threat to world security.

Waltz (1981), among others

(Gallois 1961; Sandoval 1976; Bueno de Mesquita and Riker
1982; Mearsheimer 1990; Weltman 1995), argues that "the
measured spread of nuclear weapons is more to be welcomed
than feared." Waltz theorizes that the gradual spread of
nuclear weapons will promote peace and reinforce
international stability because nuclear weapons induce
caution between nuclear adversaries.

In short, "more may be

better."

3.
A nuclear weapon is an apparatus whose explosive
energy is a derivative of fission, fusion, or a combination
the two nuclear processes. Nuclear fission is the splitting
of the nucleus of an atom into two or more parts. Nuclear
fusion joins light isotopes of hydrogen, usually deuterium
and tritium, which lilaezrates energy and neutrons (Cochran et
al., 1984).
11
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Though Waltz may be the loudest voice of nuclear
proliferation optimism, support for the potential pacifying
effect the spread of nuclear weapons throughout the
international system might induce has existed almost as long
as the weapons have.

Jacob Viner (1946) was the first to

openly argue for the potential peace nuclear weapons might
bring. Viner (1946) theorized that the spread of nuclear
weaponry throughout the world would make conflict less
likely between states because of the high price of military
victory.

Arthur Less Burns (1957) elaborated on Viner's

theory, arguing that in the absence of a sudden
technological breakthrough, the spread of nuclear weapons
could stabilize international relations. Morton Kaplan
(1957, 52) concurred with Viner and Burns, stating that as
long as a "surprise Icnockout blow was technically
impossible" nuclear weapons dispersed among a large number
of states would ensure a more peaceful world.
The 1960s brought additional advocacy for proliferation
optimism.

F.H. Binsley (1963, 354-55 ) wrote that nuclear

weapons "constitute for the first time a true deterrent, one
that will never be relied upon so long as it exists —

and

this is likely to be forever. " French General Peter Gallois
(Dulles and Crane 1964, 215) added his support, arguing that
"If every nuclear power held weapons truly invulnerable to
the blows of the other, the resort to force by the one to
the detriment of the other would be impossible. " At the

12
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same t^iine, Richard Rosecrance (1963) suggested that worries
about the strategic consequences of nuclear proliferation
were exaggerated.

Rosecrance (1963, 188) argued: "The nth

country 'problem may not turn out to be a problem. "
Rosecrance (1969, 103) added six years later:

"If the

threat of minor war makes the two greatest states redouble
their efforts in tandem to prevent major war, it is even
conceivcible that nuclear dispersion could have a net
beneficial impact."
The 1970s brought Robert Sandoval's (1976) porcupine
theory of nuclear proliferation. According to this theory,
states even with modest nuclear capabilities would "walk
like a porcupine through the forests of international
affairs:

no threat to [their] neighbors, too prickly for

predators to swallow" (Sandoval 1976, 19).

It was only

after all of this that Kenneth Waltz (1981) added his
theories to those of the nuclear optimists, suggesting that
the mere presence of nuclear weapons leads to extreme
caution, thereby decreasing the likelihood of conflict as
more states acquire them.
Following Waltz, additional scholars have weighed in as
nuclear proliferation optimists.

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita

and William Riker (1982) contend that nuclear proliferation
serves the interests of peace.

Martin van Creveld (1993)

asserts that "nuclear weapons prevent the regional states
that have them from fighting each another."

John Weltman

13
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(1995, 219) theorizes that "the spread of nuclear
weapons...to new powers will tend over time to induce
caution and moderate conflict."

In fact, nuclear

proliferation optimists mostly agree that the presence of
nuclear weapons generates caution in military and political
decision-makers irrespective of the geographic location,
system of governance, or the political culture of the
countries in question (Freedman 1988).
Indeed all weapons, as Robert Jervis (1989) has argued,
change the status of states in ways that make them more or
less secure.

For example, as Waltz (1995) notes, "If

weapons cure not well suited for conquest, neighbors have
more peace of mind."

Likewise, nuclear weapons arguably

produce their own effects by providing a strong deterrent
against aggression (Binsley 1963; Lavoy 1995; Weltman 1995).
Nuclear weapons' deterrent value rests on their ability to
punish (Gray 1979, 1990; Waltz 1990).

Nuclear weapons

provide a state with the ability to damage or destroy things
the aggressor holds dear to such an extent that gains the
aggressor had hoped to achieve are outweighed (Waltz 1990;
Gray 1998).

It is believed that this strong punitive

aspect of nuclear weapons is what makes them such a powerful
deterrent against state aggression (Sandoval 1976; Gray
1979, 1990, 1998; Waltz 1990; Van Creveld 1993; Lavoy 1995).

14
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Paz Atomica

Thus, during the Cold War, the overwhelming destructive
capabilities of the nuclear weapons arsenals of the United
States and the Soviet Union provided each of these two
superpowers with a strong deterrent against militeiry
conflict between themselves.

Would a like peace have

existed in an international system void of such weapons?
Probably not, according to a number of scholars (Gaddis
1990; Mearsheimer 1990; Waltz 1990; Lavoy 1995; Weltman
1995; Gray 1998; Payne 1998a, 1998b).

The uncertainties of

a world made up merely of states with access to conventional
weapons are increased because conventional warfare, unlike a
nuclear conflagration, can be perceived as winnable.

For

this reason, the likelihood of warfare between states
increases "because the uncertainties of their outcomes
(wars) make it easier for the leaders of states to entertain
illusions of victory at supportéible cost" (Waltz 1990, 58).
The US-Soviet relationship is particularly important
because it represents the longest symmetrical nuclear
relationship in the history of the world.

It is

additionally unique because, despite the roughly equal
military standing between the two states during the Cold War
period, the United States and the Soviet Union never
directly engaged in warfare.

The lack of interstate warfare

during the Cold War has been attributed to the presence of
nucleêu: weapons (Jervis 1989; Gaddis 1990; Mearsheimer 1990;

15
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Waltz 1990, 1993; Glaser 1998; Harkavy 1998; Payne 1998a,
1998b). Indeed the nuclear era seems to be peerless In
modern history because of this absence of great power
conflict.
note:

Stephen Cambone and Patrick Garrity (1994-95, 77)

"The past five decades have marked a unique period in

human history (at least since the establishment of the
modem state system in 1648), in which war between the
dominant powers has not occurred and in which one of those
powers actually conceded and dissolved itself peacefully."
In eras when military victory was possible, a state
could challenge its adversary in the expectation that if the
latter did not retreat, the state could resort to war
(Jervis 1989; Lavoy 1998).

During the Cold War and

continuing through to today, the knowledge that war would be
suicide coupled with the bargaining advantage possessed by
the side defending the status quo means that would-be
expansionists should be loath to instigate confrontations.
In addition, because in the past the balance of power could
be upset if a significant actor shifted from one camp to the
other (Rosenau 1969; Waltz 1993), the security interests of
both the united States and the Soviet Union were often
deeply involved with those of their allies (Jervis 1989).
The series of pre-world War I confrontations provide
evidence of this.

The main reason why Britain supported

France in the Moroccan crises was the fear that if it did
not, France might desert the Entente and leave England

16
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dangerously Isolated (Jervis 1989).
at work in July 1914.

The same dynamics were

France had to support Russia and

Britain had to support France and Russia because a failure
to do so might break up the Entente and leave them exposed
to German dominance.

Similarly, Germany could not afford to

see Austria-Hungary leave the alliance or, more probably,
disintegrate (Betts 1987).
In the nuclear era, by contrast, security is provided
by second-strike capability; defections by allies are
therefore less damaging.

Thus, neither France's withdrawal

from the military arrangements of NATO nor China's
realignment precipitated a superpower crisis.

Therefore,

during the Cold Wau: years, the superpo%rers did not permit
their allies to drag them into excessively dangerous
situations (Betts 1987).*
However, conflict at some level still took place
between the Soviets and the United States once the advent of
mutual second-strike capability occurred (Brecher and
wilkenfeld 1989; Brecher 1993), but the crises between the
two superpowers generally were considered less serious
according to some scholars (Betts 1987; Jervis 1989; McCall
1992).5

According to Robert Jervis (1989) most of the

4. However, Richard Betts (1987) argues that even
during the 1950s American war planners acted as though the
Soviet Union did have second strike capability.
5. McCall (1992), for instance, provides case
histories for what he argues are the most serious US-Soviet
Cold War crises: Iranian crisis of March 1946; Berlin
17
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tensions were generated by third actors and were driven more
by the superpowers ' desire to project a general image of
high resolve than by any specific stake.
It has been suggested that because of the extreme
destructive potential of nuclear weapons the superpowers
during the Cold War were forced to recognize the necessity
of accommodation and cooperation.

Both the United States

and the Soviet union were compelled to engage in what David
Tarr (1991) has called adversarial cooperation,

Tarr (1991,

10) argues that for the two superpowers "the motive for
accommodating the other arose not so much from the
congruence of values and interests, but in recognition that
the alternatives to cooperation could be too costly or
dangerous to pursue." The boat of nuclear risk in which
both the United States and Soviet Union sat was kept steady,
therefore, by an adversarial cooperation.

Both superpowers,

as Thomas Schelling (1960) first suggested, shared a strong
aversion to tipping over the boat.

Thus, the United States

and Soviet Union seemed to "learn" as the years of the Cold
blockade and air lift (1948-1949); Berlin Wall crisis
(August 1961); Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962); and the
Middle East Wcur and alert (October 1973). McCall (1992^ 28)
argues that these incidents "constitute the most serious
confrontations between the United States and the Soviet
union that involved the risk of military conflict in the
post-world War II era." Of these crises, only the 1973
Middle East War occurred at a time of rough nuclear pari.ty
between the United States and Soviet Union. Even the Cuban
Missile Crisis took place, according to Robert Jervis (1989,
36) "when the Soviets had weak nuclear forces" and was "in
part motivated by the urgent Soviet need to gain something
like parity."
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War progressed that because neither side could determine its
own security unilaterally, cooperation was needed (Nye 1987,
371-402).
Thus the first implication of the nuclear age is that
military victory is perceived as not possible between
nuclear states.

From this it follows that if leaders are

rational, wars among nuclear powers should not occur.
Indeed, since 1945 they have not. This is especially
significant in the case of the United States and the Soviet
Union during the Cold War because the absence of fighting
between the two main international rivals is rare.
it seems to be unprecedented.

Indeed,

Paul Schroeder (1985) writes,

"Since the second century A.D. under the Pax Romana, the
Western world has known no long periods of general peace.
The modern record was 38 years, 9 months, and five days...
from the aftermath of Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo to the
effective beginning of the Crimean War...That record was
broken...on May 15, 1984."

Joseph Nye"s (1987) counting

rule is somewhat less stringent, but still yields merely a
previous record of forty-three years of peace (between the
Franco-Prussian Wêir and World War I), a record that
continues to be surpassed as the years continue to mount
since the end of World War II.
This is not to say that nuclear weapons are the only
possible cause of peace, they just seem to be the strongest.
Nevertheless, other hypotheses for the long peace enjoyed
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since the end of World War II have been put forward as well.
First, it has been suggested that bipolarity may have
brought peace by providing an easy and unambiguous
identification of potential enemies and by diminishing the
ability of allies to drag the leading powers into conflict
(Gaddis 1990).

When there are only two major powers in the

system, each knows that only the other one can threaten its
standing.

Yet a bipolar world in which military victory is

possible can be unstable, as the examples of Athens and
Sparta and Rome and Carthage indicate. What separated the
Cold War bipolarity from these earlier instances is the
presence of nuclear weaponry.
Second, the processes of political and economic
modernization might have brought peace even without nuclear
weapons (Gaddis 1990).

Trade provides many of the economic

benefits that previously came with conquest, as Japan's
success indicates.

Territory, the prime spoil of war, has

become at least somewhat devalued.

Indeed nuclear weapons

may have led to the refocusing of the possible spoils of war
away from territory.

Such devices make the acquisition of

territory irrelevant as use of nuclear weapons makes the
irradiated territorial gains uninhaibitable.
Finally, the most basic explanation of the SovietAmerican peace is singly that neither side had a strong
motive to change the status quo (Gaddis 1990).

While both

would have preferred a some^rtiat different world, they
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already had reached the pinnacle of superpower status.

Thus

it did not take a great deal of restraint to keep the peace.
There may be something to be said for this last
argument. But even though neither the United States nor the
Soviet Union was strongly driven to eliminate the other,
they did have important conflicts of interest and clashing
security requirements. Furthermore, the basic insight of
systems theory is that we cannot equate results with
intentions:

for wars to occur it is not required that the

actors seek such an outcome (Waltz 1955).

Previous wars

have broken out even though the major states were not
pressing to overturn the status quo; without nuclear weapons
these processes could be replicated.

John Gaddis's (1990,

56) analysis is persuasive:
Wars, in the past, have started over far lesser
provocations than have been present since 1945.
World War I itself began as the result of a
single political assassination. The Crimean War
grew out of a quarrel between France and Russia
over the custody of holy places in Palestine.
Spain and England went to war in 1739, or so we
are told, over the cutting off of a single
sailor's ear. One need only to compare these
trivialities, with all their bloody effects, to
such postwar episodes as the Iranian crisis of
1946, the Czechoslovak coup and the Berlin
blockage in 1948, the North Korean invasion of
South Korea in 1950, the fall of Dienbienphu in
1954, the Quemoy-Matsu incidents of 1954-55 and
1958, the Hungarian uprising cuid the Suez crisis
of 1956, the Berlin confrontations of 1958-59 and
1961, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the mining
of Haiphong harbor and the bombing of Hanoi in
1972, the DefCon 3 nuclear alert during the 1973
Middle East weir, the invasion of Afghanistan in
1979, and the Korean airliner incident of 1983.
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The absence of interstate warfare or any significant
conflict between the great powers following these myriad
events would seem to reinforce the proposed pacifying
effects of nuclear weapons (at least among the nuclear
powers ).

In the case of the two superpowers, nuclear

weapons seemed to foster a stalemate, where neither the
United States, nor the Soviet Union was ever willing to
challenge directly the other, in order to become the sole
power in the world.

Instead the status quo was maintained

because the risks of a nuclear conflagration were singly too
exorbitant.

In other words, both of the superpowers

preferred to deter rather than to compel one another.^
Whereas deterrence supports the status quo by merely
requiring an adversary to continue to refrain from forbidden
acts, compellence obligates an adversary to alter its
behavior, either through the discontinuance of an activity
or by initiating a behavior which otherwise would not be
undertaken.^

6. George, et al. (1971) present empirical arguments
concerning the conditions under which the superpowers
attempted to conqpel one another during the first half of the
Cold War.
7. Schelling (1960a) suggests that deterrence is
usually easier to achieve than con^llence as an adversary's
behavior is attempting to be maintained and not changed.
Thus, it is a much less overtly threatening posture and
therefore, more suited to activities between nuclear rivals.
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Crises

and Nuclear Weapons

The general effect of nuclear weapons on crises has
been to widen the gap between the value of the interests in
conflict and the potential costs of the war.

The separation

between potential costs and potential outcomes was not as
wide, or at least not as clear to prospective combatants, in
the years prior to the nuclear age.
nuclear weapons pose is clear.

The destructive power

Overall, the perceived

intact of nuclear weapons on crisis situations basically has
been twofold:

first, it is generally assumed that nuclear

weapons lead states to behave in a more prudent and
constrained fashion, and second it has been argued that
nuclear weaponry provides a tacit raising of the
"provocation threshold", thereby lengthening the crisis
escalation "ladder” adversaries must climb before arriving
at interstate warfare (Kahn 1960).
Referring to the first of these two results of the
nuclear age, it seems reasonable to suggest that states in
general have worked quite hard to keep risks low during
crises since 1945.

Physical constraints, for exan^le, are

constructed laggardly in order to receive feedback as to the
opponent's probable response before completion. A notable
case of such a gradual commitment was the East German stepby-step closure of the border between east and west Berlin
in 1961. Loopholes are also manufactured by opposing sides
to create a possible retreat as during the Cuban missile
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crisis \^en Kennedy implicitly solicited Kruschev to be the
savior for world peace, or when Kruschev proposed a US
pledge not to invade Cuba would lead to the withdrawal of
the Soviet missiles (Blight and Welch 1995).
Snyder and Diesing (1977, 452) suggest that crisis
decision-making has evolved as well because of the creation
of nuclear weapons.

They compare the crisis decision making

of July 1914 with that of the Cuban missile crisis arguing
that in 1914 "the crisis activity was almost entirely
diplomatic activity, carried on by diplomats who viewed
military forces only as instruments to be used in weu:. They
had plans only for war; they had no complex crisis
'contingency plans' such as are commonplace today."
Additionally, civilian leaders largely were uninformed
regarding the plans their military had devised.

Snyder and

Diesing (1977, 452) note that while the Russicui and the
German civilian leadership understood that mobilization
meant war, "they did not really believe this with enough
certainty to integrate it into their diplomacy because they
were not aware in detail of the logical and logistical
compulsions that made it true.

Their ignorance was one of

the primary immediate causes of World War I."
This is in sharp contrast to the mixed military and
diplomatic activities of the Cuban missile crisis.

Both

President Kennedy and Defense Secretary McNeumara exercised a
great deal of control over military planning and activity.
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Ultimately y as Graham Allison (1969) documents in his
thorough investigation of the crisis, they were able to
subordinate military activity to their "political aims and
tactics." Additionally, much more than in 1914, the United
States and Soviet Union "spoke" to one another not only
through words, but through deliberate calculated actions.
The second broad inçact of the nuclear age, the raising
of the threshold of provocation, has served to increase tiie
number of moves availêüsle to states in order to retard the
precipitation of war.

Since 1945, however, an arena of

"force short of war" has evolved wherein states may employ a
range of "physical maneuvers" to demonstrate resolve (Kahn.
1960; George and Simons 1994).
This second factor may seem to be in conflict with tbe
first development of the nuclear age, that of increased
caution in crises.

If states are particularly cautious

because of the nuclear threat, it might be expected that
they would be more wary about engaging in maneuvers that
could bring them closer to war.

This creates a notable

nuclear paradox with such weaponry not only inducing caution
within a state, but simultaneously suggesting that a
rational opponent will behave cautiously as well, "and
therefore will tolerate a considerable amount of pressure
and provocation before resorting to acts that seriously risk
nuclear war" (Snyder emd Diesing 1977, 453).
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Opaque

Proliférant#

Yet hovr can states successfully deter adversaries with
nuclear weapons when they outwardly deny their possession of
them?

Opaque proliférants succeed In their efforts to deter

by what McGeorge Bundy has called "existential deterrence."^
While Bundy first used this phrase In writing about
superpower relations during the Cold War, his description of
It clearly applies to opaque nuclear powers as well.

Bundy

(1984, 8-9), among others (Brodle 1973, Jervis 1984) argued
that conflict between the superpowers would be riddled with
"terrible and unavoidable uncertainties" which have "great
meaning for the theory of deterrence" :
They create what I will call existential deterrence.
My aim In using this fancy adjective Is to distinguish
this kind of deterrence from the kind that Is based on
strategic theories or declaratory policies or even
International commitments. As long as we assume that
each side has very large numbers of thermonuclear
weapons which could be used against the opponent, even
after the strongest pre-en^tlve attack, existential
deterrence Is strong. It rests on uncertainty about
what could happen, not what has been asserted.
For Bundy (1983, 4), existential deterrence was "strong In
every major crisis between the superpowers since massive
retaliation ' became possible for both of them In the 1950s"

8.
Though Bundy created the phrase, Trachtenberg
(1985, 139) may provide the most succinct definition for It:
"The mere existence of nuclear forces means that, whatever
we say or do, there Is a certain Irreducible risk that an
armed conflict might escalate Into a nuclear war. The fear
of escalation Is thus factored Into political calculations :
faced with this risk, states are more cautious and more
prudent than they would otherwise be."
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and was "particularly powerful during the Cuban missile
crisis."
Deterrence of any sort is dependent upon the
adversary's perception of its opponent's capabilities and
resolve to employ them.* Yet the dilemma this poses for
opaque proliférants is whether they can deter aggression
without the overt demonstration of nuclear prowess in which
the declared nuclear powers have engaged.

For Hagerty

(1995/96, 90) the answer is yes : "like all nuclear weapon
states, opaque proliférants signal resolve to one another
through a process of strategic bargaining, which runs along
a communication spectrum from formal negotiations to the
transmission of intentions via deeds rather than words."
Schelling (1960, 53) claims that signêü.ing falling into the
latter category is called tacit bargaining, "in which
communication is incomplete or impossible. " Opaque
proliférants slip into this latter category of communication
because of their desire for secrecy (Joeck 1990).

Formal

9.
There is some disagreement among theorists
regarding the relative weight that should be given to
weapons in calculations of deterrence. For instance, Bundy
(1984, 9) writes that the uncertainties which make
existential deterrence so powerful have the further
consequence that what either government says it might do, or
even believes it might do, in the event of open conflict
cannot be relied on either by friends or by opponents as a
certain predictor of what it would actually do." In
contrast, Rhodes (1989, 85) curgues "the mere existence of an
ability to inflict or withhold tremendous pain is logically
not sufficient to result in coercive power. ..For nuclear
deterrence to operate, the opponent must also believe that
the coercer is committed to a strategy that has some
unacceptable probability of resulting in nuclear war if
deterrence fails."
27
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negotiations tend to require for discussion, "exchanges of
detailed information that opaque prolifercuits are loath to
provide" (Hagerty 1995/96, 90).

Instead opaque proliférants

communicate their resolve through a variety of tacit
behaviors such as passing messages through intermediaries or
through state-controlled or state-influenced media.
Schelling (1976, 85) describes this signaling as "passive
deterrence," achieved by "just letting it be known, perhaps
through an innocent leak of information, that a
government...singly had nuclear weapons, letting every
potential addressee of this 'deterrent threat' reach his own
conclusions about what kind of misbehavior, if any, might
provoke nuclear activity." So there is not an absence of
communication between one or more opaque nuclear
proliférants.

Rather there is a less formal, less direct

communicative engagement. Hagerty (1995/96, 90) argues that
this creates a unique language for understanding between
such proliférants:

"Over the yeeirs, this discourse

establishes certain deterrent understandings that may not be
as clear as those between the transparent nuclear powers,
but which are conqpelling all the same. As these
understandings develop, it becomes exceedingly unlikely that
decision-makers in opaque nuclear states will fail to
understand the possibilities that confront them. "
While such deterrent intentions must be communicated
clearly in some fashion, just as important is the credible
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demonstration of capabilities.

This would seem to be an

impractical task for opaque proliférants, as how can they
maintain their ambiguous status without making "visible"
their capabilities (if any ). Largely this dilemma has been
solved by the nonproliferation community. Pressure is
applied by the international community to "pressure
recalcitrant proliférants into nuclear chastity... by
publicizing their nuclear transgressions"
91).

(Hagerty 1995/96,

For instance, in the case of proliferation in South

Asia, US policymakers openly have suggested in recent years
that both India and Pakistan could build and deliver nuclear
weapons rapidly in the event of a c r i s i s . S u c h
pronouncements, however driven by eui interest to pressure
proliférants into reversing course, serve instead, according
to Hagerty (1995/96, 91), to "stanç their nuclear programs
with a seal of credibility that they would otherwise lack. "
Though the likelihood of a pre-emptive nuclear strike
between new nuclear states is considered a possibility by
some security analysts (Roberts 1993? Blair 1994), the logic
of nuclear deterrence suggests that such an occurrence is
very unlikely (Hagerty 1995/96).

Preemption is viable.

10.
As examples see CIA Director Robert Gates' remarks
to the Nixon Library Conference, Washington D.C., March 12,
1992; the testimony of former CIA Director R. James Woolsey
before the House Armed Services Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Subcommittee on International Security,
International Organizations, and Human Rights, July 28,
1993; amd Davis (1994) who served as Under-Secretary of
State for International Security Affairs in the Clinton
administration.
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according to Waltz (Sagan and Waltz 1990, 15-16), "only if
the would-be attacker knows that the intended victim's
warheads are few in number, knows their exact number and
locations, and knows that they will not be moved or fired
before they are struck.

To know all of these things, and to

know that you know them for sure, is exceedingly difficult."
John J. Weltman (1981/82, 190) concurs with Waltz, noting
that nuclear weapons create uncertainty for an adversary
because they are easy to hide and move:

"Failure to

eliminate even a single deliverable weapon would thus be to
risk catastrophe and short distances mean that no
sophistication in means of delivery is required for a
successful countervalue response."
Indeed when real world events are considered the
arguments of nonproliferation seem to pale in comparison to
the logic of nuclear deterrence.

For some security analysts

(Schneider 1994; Hagerty 1995/96) the Gulf War poses the
potential obstacles any state would need to surmount in
order to achieve a successful first strike.

For instance,

UN inspectors discovered more than twenty Iraqi nuclear
installations following the war, vdiile allied bombing target
lists were able to identify only two (Hagerty 1995/96).
Also, more than 1,000 hours of allied air strikes left much
of the Iraqi nucleeu: infrastructure untouched (Schneider
1994).

Further, according to a study released by the US

House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, evidence
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cannot confirm that coalition forces destroyed even a single
SCUD missile (Gordon 1993). Such a failure Illustrates the
ease of deception In concealing nuclear delivery systems and
why opaque nuclear states may deter conflict as well as
overt nuclear capable states.
Games

of Chicken

The way that actors perceive the costs and benefits of
a crisis will have am Intact on their behavior during the
crisis.

The structure of the situation will affect the

Incentives to persist In, or seek a way out of, the
confrontation.

If the situation Is perceived as being

extremely dangerous, as Is the case In games of Chicken, the
actors Involved are likely to exercise more caution than
they might If the crisis Is seen as relatively cost-free.
It Is also possible that a perception of danger will
Increase the search for mutual accommodation.
With this In mind It Is now useful to examine the two
types of dyadic crisis Interaction known as Chicken and the
Prisoner's Dilemma.

The main difference between the two Is

that In a Prisoner's Dilemma mutual non-cooperation brings
about the second worst outcome as seen by decision makers,
while In Chicken mutual non-cooperation brings about the
worst outcome. The differing outcomes of the Prisoner's
Dilemma and Chicken are displayed In Figure One.

In

Prisoner's Dilemmas, the only way a side loses conqpletely Is
If It cooperates and Its adversary does not (producing a 5,0
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or 0,5 outcome). This makes cooperation a tenuous goal. In
games of Chicken, however, cooperation Is promoted because
persistent non-cooperation will bring e&bout a loss for both
sides (0,0).

Because nothing Is gained by persistent non-

cooperation, one or both sides often choose to swerve
thereby ending the conflict completely. Conflicts between
nuclear states are considered to be geunes of Chicken as noncooperation would bring about the potential destruction of
both competitors.
Prisoner's

Dilemma

Cooperate

Defect

Cooperate

3,3

0,5

Defect

5,0

1,1

Chicken

Swerve

Straight

Swerve

3,3

1,5

Straight

5,1

0,0

Figure One :

Prisoner's Dil

a and Chicken

In their review of International conflicts, Snyder and
Diesing (1977) note that conflicts, when portrayed as games,
can be characterized as being either symmetric or nonsymmetrlc.

Their finding of Interest Is that there was a

sharp difference In behavior between parties In Prisoner's
Dilemmas and parties In Chicken (and asymmetric games).
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Parties in Chicken and asymmetric games do not prefer the
outcomes that come with mutual firmness, and thus the party
that can show it will continue to stand firm will usually
prevail.

In Prisoner's Dilemma situations, each party

prefers war (or the non-cooperative outcome) to accepting
the other's demand.

This outcome is intuitively believable,

for as Snyder and Diesing (1977) suggest:
When this is realized [that both parties prefer war
to concession in Prisoner's Dilemma], the parties
know they must reduce their goals to something the
other can accept, or the outcome is likely to be
war. There occurs an internal reassessment of goals,
plus probing the opponent, to determine what is
essential and what can be sacrificed, and what the
opponent is willing to give up. The communication
of reduced goals to the opponent is the turning point,
after which the parties make reciprocal concessions
leading to compromise. In the Chicken cases..., one
or both parties prefer to yield than risk war.
Therefore when one party establishes superiority of
resolve it can force the other to give way completely,
and usually does so.
Thus situations that are seen by the actors as Prisoner's
Dilemmas are more likely to endure because there is less
risk that they will bring about the worst outcome.

While a

situation seen as Chicken will bring about great pressure to
either (1) convince the other party that the non-cooperative
mode will continue or (2) work to bring about the
cooperative outcome.

As an example, the Cuban Missile

Crisis can be seen as a géune of Chicken, with Kennedy's noncooperative move being continued preparations for an
invasion while Kruschev's non-cooperative move was continued
installation «md preparation of the missiles (Bundy 1988).
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If both persisted in their actions, war

was likely, and as a

result there were efforts to find a way

out of the

confrontation (Blight 1990).
When actors find themselves in a Prisoner's Dilemma,
they will attempt to avoid mutual defection and at the saune
time atteo^t to avoid being exploited.

One way to do this

is to change the stakes of the contest by increasing the
cost, or appeairing to increase the cost, to the other side
of mutual confrontation.

In a sense, one actor is trying to

convince the other that mutual confrontation is the worst
outcome rather tham mutuaü. confrontation (mutual defection)
being the second the worst outcome.

Thus, one would expect

to see actions taken with the intent of convincing an
opponent of just this, leading to a greater and more
intensive search for alternative outcomes (other than mutual
confrontation ) udien crises are seen as Chicken than when
they are seen as Prisoner's Dilemmas.

An expected corollaury

to this would be "Crises seen as Chicken will bring about a
greater search for alternative outcomes than those perceived
as Prisoner 's Dilemmas." The reason for this follows from
the earlier discussion. Mutual confrontation under Chicken
brings about the worst outcome.

Thus, parties will be more

likely to persist in confrontational behavior in the
structure of a Prisoner's Dilemma rather than Chicken.
Interstate nuclear dyads produce these games of
Chicken.

The presence of nuclear weapons serve to
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incorporate the element of deterrence and thereby aid in
preventing conflict escalation.

Thus, the conflict process

between nuclear states is different from non-nuclear dyads
as the participants in a nuclear dyad may be deterred not
only from nuclear war, but also from escalation in general.
Thomas Schelling (1966, 35) notes that common conceptions of
deterrence "seem to depend on the clean-cut notion that war
results — or is expected to result — only from deliberate
yes-no decisions.

But if war tends to result from a

process, a dynamic process in which both sides get more and
more deeply involved, more and more expectant, more and more
concerned not to be a slow second in case war starts, it is
not a 'credible first strike' that one threatens, but just
plain war."

In other words, states need not threaten an

immediate full-scale nuclear attack on the other side in
order to deter it.

Instead, they can threaten to take

actions that could lead to an undesired conflagration by a
series of steps that cannot be entirely be foreseen.
Empirical evidence bears out this argument:

Alexander

George and Richard Smoke (1974) found that one important
cause of deterrence failure was the challenger's belief that
he could control risks.
the case.

In games of Chicken, this is not

Therefore, the logic of nuclear dyads indicate

that they should be less prone to conflict than other
interstate couplings.
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Conflict

Escalation and Wuclaar Weapons

While it is clear that the deterrent value of nuclear
weapons on crises in general is impressive among all the
nuclear powers (warfare has not occurred between two nuclear
powers since the creation of such weapons of mass
destruction), it is less evident what specific intact
nuclear weapons may have had on conflict escalation.

Might

the impact of nuclear weapons be felt also in terms of their
coercive capabilities? In other words, is it reasonable to
conceptualize nuclear arms not only as deterrent weapons,
but as defensive weapons as well?

The answer might be yes

if one differentiates use from utilization.

While the

actual use of nuclear weapons would be strictly for punitive
effect, the utilization of the threat of use of nuclear
weapons could be used as a defensive measure to repel or
stop an enemy from taking further action.
Nuclear weaponry's strong punitive nature provides an
easy understanding as to why nuclear devices are often
classified under the deterrent heading.

Deterrence's goal,

after all, is to dissuade an enemy from initiating an action
by threatening a highly credible punitive response. In other
words, deterrence in most instances threatens punishment.
However, US nuclear doctrine in the 1970s and 1980s expanded
the definition of deterrence by arguing that US nuclear
doctrine should be expanded to include deterrence by denial
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as well as deterrence by punishment.The aim of deterrence
by denial is to hold at risk strategic assets (counterforce
targets ), especially those assets "Wiose destruction would
deny [the eneny] military success" (Payne 1998a).
Defense, on the other hand, is focused upon protection
once an action has begun. A state's defensive capability is
its ability to limit the costs an adversary can impose on it
(Snyder 1961; Powell 1990).

Defense seeks to stop or

reverse an action, goals nuclear weapons have not typically
been associated with.
But while nuclear weapons are best described as
deterrent weapons (Waltz 1990), when conflict does arise
between two states nuclear weapons might have some defensive
value in terms of their coercive potential (Feldman 1995).
To be clear, the actual "use" of nuclear weapons would not
be considered a defensive move, but rather a state's efforts
to "utilize" nuclear weapons as a bargaining method during a
conflict could be considered a defensive gesture.

This

latter employment could be defined as an example of coercive
diplomacy, which is limited to defensive actions (George
1991).
Alexander George (1991, 5) clearly restricts coercive
diplomacy to defensive use as he describes it as "efforts

11.
The classic description of the distinction between
deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment is
presented by Glen Snyder (1961). See also Slocombe (1981),
(Gray 1984) Sloss and Milot (1984), and Payne (1996).
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(made) to persuade an opponent to stop and/or undo an action
he is already embarked upon. "
While the threat of the use of nuclear weapons for
coercive diplomacy has rarely occurred in overt instances
(George (1994) describes the Potsdéun Declaration as one such
instance), it seems reasonable to assert that nuclear
weapons might have influenced state behavior in more subtle
ways.

The ominous threat such weapons provide might elicit

more pacific reactions, or at least a more cautionary
approach, between adversaries during a conflict as each
seeks to prevent an escalation toward Armageddon.
Thus, it is important to examine what intact the
presence, or lack thereof, of nuclear weapons might have in
conflict situations in order to identify if the
characteristics of such weapons not only may have served to
prevent interstate warfare, but also to have dulled conflict
in general among pairs of states. This study is notable in
that the impact nucleeu: weapons have had on conflict
escalation between interstate dyads (if they have had any)
has not yet been explored quantitatively at all, and
qualitatively outside of the US-Soviet dyad.
is the case for two major reasons:

This probably

first, the relative

dearth of nuclear weapons states since the first use of the
weapons in 1945; and second, their non-use following the end
of World War IX.

Since that time there have been only nine

states identified as having nuclear weaponry (Spector 1990) :
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the United States (1945); the USSR (1950); the UK (1953);
France (1960); China (1964); Israel (1970); India (1974);
the Republic of South Africa (1980); and Pakistan (1986).
Such a limited number of states has not provided scholars
much data with which to work.
This study argues that the relative scarcity of data on
dyadic relations between nuclear weapons states can be
overcome by singly cLltering the dependent variable from the
mere presence of interstate warfare between states to a
scaled interstate dispute score which serves to measure and
compare the level of conflict between states involved in
dyadic confrontations.

Thus, the intact of nuclear weapons

can be directly measured to understand if such weapons truly
have had a pacifying effect on interstate conflict.
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CHAPTER THREE:
THE IMPACT OP HUCLEAR WEAPOHS
OH COHPLICT E8CALATIOH

This chapter addresses through statistical analysis
whether or not nuclear weapons have had an identifiable and
significant impact on crisis escalation.

It is hypothesized

that the symmetrical presence of nuclear weapons in dyads
will lessen conflict escalation.

The methodology and the

means by Wiich this chapter will scientifically address this
inquiry now follow.
Methodology

The most solidly proven contribution of scholars ' of
international politics to the social science world at-large
has been the notion first asserted by Immanuel Kant (1970)
that democracies do not fight one another.

This so-called

"democratic peace" phenomenon has time and again survived
the strict rigors of quantitative analysis to ascend in the
realm of international politics as the discipline's most
identifiable law.
The democratic peace proposition, however, augurs
caution when presenting its findings regarding democracies,
by noting that while democracies refrain from warfare in
dyadic relations with one another, when faced with a state
of a differing type (i.e. autocracy, anocracy, etc.)
democracies «ire just as likely as other types of states to
engage in conflictuel behavior.

Thus, democratic states are

pacific only in their dealings with like states.
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In fact.

four of the five most conflictual states during the 170
years between 1912-1982 were democracies (Chan 1983).

Only

Russia/USSR was a non-democracy among France^ India, Israel,
and the United Kingdom.
Might the same be the case with respect to nuclear
weapons' states?

In order to ascertain If there Is a

significant difference In conflict escalation among
differing types of states three categories of dyads have
been created:

symmetrical nuclear dyads (two nuclear

states), asymmetrical nuclear dyads (only one nuclear
state), and symmetrical non-nuclear dyads (two non-nuclear
states).
The conflict observations will be taken from the
Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data set (Gochman and
Maoz 1984; Jones, Bremer and Singer 1997).

Those

disagreements between states considered to be Interstate
disputes must contain at least one of the following three
events : ”(1 ) an explicit threat to resort to military
force; (2) a mobilization, deployment, or other display of
military force ; or (3) an actual resort to military force"
(Senese 1997, 4).

For these events to be Included, they

"must be explicit, overt, non-accidental, and government
sanctioned" (Gochmaui and Maoz 1984, 586).
The current MID data set Includes Interstate dispute
data through 1992 (Jones, Bremer euid Singer 1997).

The year

1950 has been chosen as the beginning point for data
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analysis in this paper because this was the first full year
in which more than one state in the international system had
nuclear weapons.

Both the United States and the Soviet

Union had the atomic bomb in 1950, firmly rooting the two
superpowers as Cold War adverscuries. Within this time
period of 1950-1992, 1,042 conflict dyads are available for
study.
Dependent Variable:

Conflict Escalation

Escalation processes have been analyzed previously in
concert with deterrence (Bueno de Hesquita and Riker 1982;
Zagare 1992), arms races (Richardson 1960) and the
bargaining process (Schelling 1960, 1966; Kahn 1965; Young
1968; Smoke 1977).

Schelling (1960, 1966) suggests that one

of the effects of escalation is to persuade an opponent to
back down by playing on the fear that continued and/or
future escalation will lead to disastrous results.

Thus,

escalation is often conceptualized as a game of competitive
risk taking, with actors attempting to demonstrate their
superior ability to tolerate risk (Schelling 1960, 1966;
Kahn 1965, Maoz 1985, 1990; Geller 1990).
Disputes between states are rarely, if ever, static
occurrences (Ray 1974).

Such confrontations often evolve

from one stage of conflict to another involving an
augmentation in hostilities as the initial spark of the
confrontation creates a larger conflagration.

Thus, this

dissertation employs two measures for its dependent
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variables.

First it uses the highest level of conflict

reached between pairs of states as a dependent variable.
This score (see Table One), referred to as the level of
hostility, is a scaled reference point allowing the
Table One:

MID Dispute Level Codes

4 = Threat to occupy

1 = Nonmilitary act

territory
2 = Threat to use force

5 = Threat to declare war

3 = Threat to blockade

6 = Threat to use nukes

7 = Show of troops

11 = Nuclear Alert

8 = Show of ships

12 = Mobilization

9 = Show of planes

13 = Fortify border

10 = Alert

14 = Border Violation

15 = Blockade

18 = Clash

16 = Occupation of territory

19 = Raid

17 = Seizure

20 = Declaration of war
21 = Use of CB weapons
22 - Interstate warfare
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quantitative differentiation between levels of conflict.
HID dispute level types range from 1 (a nonmilitary act) to
22 (interstate warfare ).
The level of hostility in a dispute is an important
marker for distinguishing it from other disputes.

For

example f it seems reasonable to assert that a threat to
blockade an area is less hostile than an actual naval
blockade, just as a mere threat to use force is less hostile
than an actual raid into another state's sovereign
territory.

Thus, the higher a dispute escalates, the more

dire its consequences can be.
As a second marker, dispute severity also was used as a
dependent variable for conflict escalation.

The severity of

interstate disputes was measured by the number of battle
fatalities registered by both states.

An increase in the

number of fatalities is considered to display conflict
escalation because "an increase in severity is usually
associated with an increase in the intensity of actions
taken by combatants, in terms of militarized uses of force"
(Senese 1997, 7).

In other words, higher battle fatalities

are considered to be characteristic of a more serious
conflict.

The MID data set employs seven levels of

fatalities in its coding procedures:

0, 1 to 25, 26 to 100,

101 to 250, 251 to 500, 501 to 999, and >999 battle deaths.

12.
for disputes.

HID does not provide the actual fatality numbers
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Independent

Variables

Eight Independent variables are examined In this
chapter.

The first two of these directly relate to the

focus of the dissertation:

presence of nuclear weapons.

It

Is hypothesized that those dyads In vdilch both of the paired
states have nuclear weapons will produce less conflictual
outcomes than those dyads In which only one nuclear power Is
present, or In which none Is present.

This Is because In

symmetrical nuclear dyads there Is greater destructive
potential than In the other two types of dyads.

Further,

asymmetrical nuclear dyads are hypothesized to be less
conflictual thcui non-nuclear dyads again because of the
deterrent value of such weapons.
Two dummy variables have been created to measure the
effect of nuclear weapons on conflict escalations.
symmetrical dyad variable has been created.

First, a

In this

variable dyads In which two nuclear states are present are
coded as "1" and all other cases as "0". Second, an
asymmetrical dyad varléü>le has been created.

For this dummy

variable those dyads In which only one nuclear state Is
present are coded as "1" with all others coded as "0".
dummy varlcd>le need not be created for the Independent
category of non-nuclear dyads because Its value Is
determined by the first A - 1 dummies entered Into the
regression equation.

In other words, the independent
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A

category (also known as the reference category) is equal to
the Y intercept.
The data set provides 1,042 conflict dyads between the
years of 1950-1992.

56 of these conflicts involve a

symmetrical pairing of nuclear powers.
asymmetrical in nature.

291 dyads are

These dyads include one nuclear

power and one non-nuclear state.

The remaining 695 cases

are dyads in which no state with nuclear weapons was
present.
The third predictor variable to be used in this study
is democracy.

Numerous studies have been undertaken to

explore the effect of democratic institutions on conflict
resolution among states (Chan 1984; Maoz and Abdolali 1989;
Bremer 1992, 1993a, 1993b; Dixon 1993; Russett 1990,
1993,1995; Senese 1997).

Strong agreement among scholars

has arisen that democratic dyads produce more peaceful
outcomes than other dyadic groupings.

The coding of states

as being democratic or not is based on scores taken from the
Jaggers and Gurr's (1995) Polity III data set which has been
en^loyed in recent studies on the effects of democracy on
conflict (Reiter and Stam 1998; Ward and Gleditsch 1998).
Polity III rates individual states ' level of democracy on an
11-point (0-10) scale (Jagger and Gurr 1995).

This is a

continuous interval measure ranging from a score of "0"
least democratic to a score of ”10” or most democratic.
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Fourth, a variable has been created to measure the
impact of dyadic maturity on conflict escalation.

This

variable will attengt to capture the impact of stability on
interstate relations.

The assumption here is that more

mature polities will recognize the potential costs of
escalation as well as the ability to call on past experience
to reduce the likelihood of conflict severity.

Scholars

have noted a tendency for states in transition,
specifically, states whose regimes are in flux, to be more
likely to engage in military ventures than those whose
governments remain stable (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995).
The logic of this argument states that those countries which
are in a state of flux are more prone to military action
because their leaders are seeking to rally their publics
around a patriotic cause in order to save their faltering
position.

This rally around the flag effect (Miller 1995;

Levy and Vakili 1992) is intended to provide the leader with
the necessary internal support to stay in power.
Therefore, a variable of dvadic maturity (or stability)
has been created by measuring polity persistence in years.
This variable will be dichotomized, as has been common
practice in previous studies (Bremer 1992; Senese 1997), as

13.
While the findings of Mansfield and Snyder (1995)
are generally supported, a study by Gleditsch and Ward
(1997) does challenge them. However, this dissertation
finds the work of Mansfield and Snyder (1995) to be more
con^lling.
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mature/not mature based on a twenty year threshold.

Again

the data will be drawn from the Polity III data-set which
extends from 1800-1994.

If both the regimes in a dyad have

persisted for at least twenty years the dyad will be
considered mature; otherwise the dyad will be considered not
mature.
As a fifth independent variable, proximity will be
studied.

The intact of geographical proximity has been

shown in previous studies to be significeuit on the
escalation of hostilities between states not only because of
the animosity close interactions can produce, but also
because of the monetary expense of such efforts (Bremer
1992; Diehl 1985; Russett 1993; Vasquez 1993; Senese 1997).
War fighting is a costly business after all, and therefore
the monetary impact of moving troops and equipment often
serves as a strong deterrent.

Proximity serves to lessen

these costs, thereby augmenting the chances for interstate
bloodshed.

As Senese (1997) argued, "States are less

constrained for participation (in warfare) when the venue of
combat is geographically proximate."
In order to determine the effects of proximity on
conflict escalation the Correlates of War (COW) contiguity
data set has been used.

Five divisions of state-to-state

contiguity are delineated by the COW data:

contiguous by

land, or separated by 12, 24, 150, or 400 miles or less of
water (those over 400 miles are not considered contiguous).
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Geographically proximate rivals êure classified as those that
are contiguous by land or separated by 150 miles or less of
water.

proximate dyads are coded as "1" and all others as

"0” .

Sixth, the intact of alliances on Interstate relations
will be examined.

The inclusion of data on alliances is

needed and appropriate because of Its possible relation to
joint conflict. Alliance members generally have been shown
to engage infrequently in conflict with one another (Mlhalka
1976; Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Weede 1989; Kim 1991; Bremer
1992).

In order to ascertain whether dyad pairs are

alliance members the Correlates of War alliance data is used
(Small and Singer 1982).

Weede (1991) and Bremer (1992)

both find that the major effect of alliance on conflict can
be captured in an allied/not allied dichotomy.

Therefore,

allied dyads are coded as "1” and all others as "0".
Seventh, a variable measuring trade relations for each
of the dyadic pairs of states has been created.

Realist

thinkers have curgued that the relative gains of one trading
partner could ultimately threaten the survival, or at least
the international standing, of the other (Gowa and Mcuisfield
1993; Grieco 1988). Liberals, on the other hand, have
14.
This delineation is used by Senese (1997, 11) who
defends it by noting, "An earlier study (Bremer 1992) shows
the major effect of proximity on conflict to be captured by
a 'contiguous by land or sea ' versus 'not contiguous '
distinction. " In both these studies (Bremer 1992; Senese
1997) 150 miles was shown to be the proper cut-off point in
accounting for proximal significance.

49
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

suggested that the absolute gains accumulated by both
trading partners may create security externalities, which
would both increase trade and decrease conflict (Snidal
1991).
There is no strong scholarly consensus, however, on the
impact of trade on international conflict.

Several studies

of interstate conflict and trade have shown that conflict is
negatively related to international trade (Gasiorowski and
Polachek 1982; Polachek 1980; Pollins 1989).

Yet Russett

(1967) and Barbieri (1996) produce quite different findings.
Russett (1967, 198) found that trade partners were "twice as
likely to fight" than those which were not.

Barbieri (1996)

concludes that trade interdependence increases the
probability that dyads will experience militarized disputes.
These mixed findings suggest any hypothesis with respect to
the impact of trade on conflict levels between interstate is
inqperiled. Thus, it is assumed that trade will have a
significant impact on dyadic conflict, yet in what direction
remains uncertain.
The majority of trade data are derived from the
International Monetary Fund's Direction of Trade Statistics
electronic taoe.^^ Data were reconfigured from national
15.
Data are made available by Katherine Barbieri
(1996b). Data were collected for all sovereign states
within the interstate system, as defined by the Correlates
of War (COW) Project, for the period 1870-1992. Barbieri
(1996a, 31) notes concerning the data: "In many instances,
the electronic version of the IMF data tape reports trade
flows as zero or missing, but these trade values are
reported in their annual publications. Missing data were
50
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accounts to dyadic trade flows using the importing
countries' reported trade figures. When these figures were
absent, the exporter's reports were used.

The values that

each state reports to import from each partner were added to
derive the dyadic total.

Each state's total imports and

export figures were combined to arrive at each nation's
total trade.
Unlike the case of trade, one key variable affecting
the decision to escalate has reached a status of general
consensus among researchers.

A number of studies have shown

that an actor's relative military capabilities is the most
vital variable affecting the decision to escalate (Garnham
1976a, 1976b; Organski and Kugler 1980; Bueno de Mesquita
1981; Leng and Gochman 1982; Gochman and Maoz 1984; Bremer
1992; Geller 1993).

Military capcd>ilities are in^ortant to

consider because they determine the level of potential costs
which can be doled out by either side (Small and Singer
1982).

Empirical evidence suggests that states of

relatively equal military capability are more likely to go
to war with each other than states with disparate
capabilities (Bremer 1992).
So as a eighth marker, an independent variable
measuring military capabilities has been created.

This

investigated and supplemented with The International
Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics (19561998) and The Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook (19561998)."
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capability score was obtained from the Correlates of War
(COW) data set (Small «md Singer 1982).

Military

capabilities are measured by six indicators:

military

expenditures, military personnel, iron/steel production,
energy consumption, total population, and urban population.
These indicators are combined in the COW data set to create
an index reflecting a state's percentage of the total
capabilities in the world for each year.

From this index, a

variable is created to serve as a reflection of the ratio of
military capabilities of the two actors per dispute. The
stronger state is represented in the numerator and the
weaker state in the denominator.

The ratio will vary from

1.0 (the actors' capabilities are equal) to any positive
number less than 1.
These eight independent variables were regressed
against the dependent variable measures of level of
hostility cuid severity of hostility in order to ascertain
the impact of each on conflict escalation.
Results

The two-tailed regression results show (Tables Two and
Three) that nuclear dyads significantly reduce conflict
escalation between states in terms of level of conflict but
not in terms of fatalities.

The Y intercept value of 13.961

is the mean response if all the independent veuriables equal
zero.

If such was the case the model predicts an outcome of

nearly 14 on the twenty-two point MID scale.
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Table Two:

Varicd)le
INTERCEPT
Asymmetrical
Nuke Symmetry
Democracy
Maturity
Proximity
Allied
Trade
Capabilities

The Effect of Nuclear Weapona on
Conflict Level

Estimate
13.961
.605
-1.555
-.502
-1.932
.676
-1.871
.001
2.765

t-Score
16.422
1.502
2.026
.798
3.137
1.876
2.009
1.763
2.392

Significance
.01
.13
.04
.43
.01
.06
.05
.08
.02

N = 840
r 2 = .06

Table Three: The Effect of Nuclear Heapons on
Conflict Fatalities

Variable
INTERCEPT
Asymmetrical
Nuke Symmetry
Democracy
Maturity
Proximity
Allied
Trade
Capabilities

R a t i m a to

.295
.078
-.024
-.077
-.182
.449
-.147
—.001
.192

t-Score
1.643
.937
.156
.590
1.462
5.999
.775
.762
.782

Significance
.10

.34
.88

.56
.14
.01

.44
.45
.43

N = 789
r 2 = .06
Beginning with the two predictor variables of concern
to this dissertation, the nuclear symmetry varicible reduced
the level of conflict between states by 1.55 and was
significant at the .04 level.

This indicates that a pairing

of symmetrical nuclear dyads leads to a 1.55 reduction in
the level of conflict on the twenty-two point MID scale.
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In

the case of asymmetrical nuclear dyads an increase in
conflict likelihood was found, though it was not
significant.
This divergence in findings between symmetrical and
asymmetrical dyads suggests that nucleeu: deterrence is
nullified in asymmetrical situations.

This is most likely

the case because symmetrical nuclear relationships promote
extraordinary caution between countries, with both states
preferring to err on the side of caution and de-escalate the
conflict rapidly.

The heightened tension of mutual

Armageddon experienced by nucleeur pairs does not exist (at
least for the nuclear state) in an asymmetrical dyad as the
non-nuclear state can only threaten with conventional
forces.

This, in turn, may reduce the deterrent value of

the nuclear weapons altogether, as the non-nuclear side may
feel that as long as it seeks only limited objectives, the
nuclear state will not decide to employ its weapons of mass
destruction for fear of international outrage.
The 1982 invasion êuid occupation of the Falkland
Islands (referred to as the Malvinas Islands by the
Argentineans) by Argentina provides a clear excui^le of an
asymmetrical nuclear dyad which escalated to the pinnacle of
interstate warfare.

A limited aims strategy promoted by

16.
Other research has noted the 1973 Arab Israeli war
as cui instance of asymmetrical escalation, though it clearly
was not dyadic in nature. Despite Israel's "undeclared"
status, it was generally understood that it had begun
production of nuclear arms at its Dimona factory in the
Negev desert in 1968. Thus, by 1973 it was assumed that
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Argentina 's desire to recapture vrtiat it considered to be
lost sovereign territory overrode any apprehensions the
Argentinean junta in cheirge of the country might have had
about a potential nuclear response to their militeury
actions.

The Argentinean leaders expected the British not

to respond militarily to their action, and even if they did,
they believed that they could still wage a limited war
(Lebow 1985).

It has been argued that the junta believed

nuclear weapons would never be used in such a small regional
theater because of the wrath which would befall Great
Britain was it to do so (Lebow 1985).
An alternate explanation is that asymmetrical nuclear
dyads permit bullying by the nuclear power.

Nuclear

capability allows the nuclear powers to react more strongly
to conflict challenges by non-nuclear states.

Thus when the

United States decided to capture Manuel Noriega it invaded
Panama to do so.

Such a decision almost certainly would not

have been made had Panama possessed nuclear weapons.
Most of the other independent variables were found to
have a significant effect on conflict between states.

The

most powerful results were from the "Mature" variable (p =
.01) which measured regime longevity.

This variable

indicates that the likelihood of conflict is decreased in
dyads whose two states have had long eUid stable regimes.

Israel possessed twenty to twenty-five nuclear weapons (Paul
1994).
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This was expected, as previous studies have shown that
mature regimes tend to behave more prudently in conflict
situations (Bremer 1992; Senese 1997).
Surprisingly, however, the presence of democratic
institutions in dyads was not shown to produce significant
effects (p = .425) on conflict escalation, though the sign
is in the expected direction.

While this finding is

antithetical to Democratic peace research, it is important
to recall that the dependent variable in this study is
different.

Democratic peace researchers are focused upon

the presence of interstate war as a dependent varicible,
while this dissertation has expanded this to include any
sort of conflict between states.

This dissertation's

findings are similar to those of Paul Senese (1997) who
found that democratic dyads, while unlikely to escalate all
the way to war, were just as likely as other types of dyads
to escalate to threat and displays of force.
1) finds:

Senese (1997,

"Once a democratic pair has entered a militarized

dispute, it is about as likely (possibly a little more so)
to escalate that dispute through further stages of
antagonism short of war, as is a non-jointly democratic
dyad."
Geographic proximity was shown to have significant
effects (p - .06) on dyadic escalation.

This reconfirms the

earlier research mentioned previously which asserted that
states bordering one another are more likely to escalate
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conflicts than those that do not. Thus, neighbors in
conflict are more likely to esceü.ate than distal dyadic
combinations.
This clearly has io^rtant significance for current
conflictual regional dyads.

Since proximity appears to

promote conflict escalation, might nuclear weapons be
effectual in offsetting discord between neighbors,
especially when other pacifying influences such as alliance
and regime maturity are not present? This question will be
addressed in the next chapter by qualitatively exéunining the
Indo-Pakistani dyad.
Alliance membership was shown to significantly (p =
.05) reduce the likelihood of conflict escalation between
dyads.

Again, this was to be expected, as the institutional

constraints placed on alliance members were believed to
reduce the likelihood of conflict escalation between them.
Military capêüsilities were shown to have a significant
(p = .02) intact on conflict escalation as well.

As the

military capabilities of two states approach relative
equality, the likelihood of escalation increases.

This

finding confirms earlier research, suggesting that evenly
matched rivals are more likely to escalate than dyads
containing two militarily divergent states. This is most
likely the case in conventional instances because neither
side is deterred.

Relative conventional military equality

precludes either party from clearly appreciating ahead of
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time which side would prevail.
escalates.

Thus, the conflict

The symmetrical effects of nuclear dyads produce

pacifying results, though, because in such instances
escalation of the conflict would lead to both sides losing.
This is the reason why deterrence is successful in
symmetrical nuclear dyads and not in symmetrical
conventional dyads.

Trade was shown to have a very minimal impact in terms
of its marginal significance (p = .08), as well as its
magnitude of effect, on conflict escalation.

As the level

of trade between two states increased, so too did the
likelihood of conflict escalation.

These results are

somewhat counter-intuitive, but, again, some earlier
research has produced similar findings.
Employment of the second dependent variable (conflict
fatalities) largely did not produce significant results.

In

fact, the only variable displaying a significant effect on
fatality levels was geographic proximity (p = .01).

This

suggests that geographically proximal states tend to produce
higher numbers of fatalities during dyadic conflicts with
one another than other types of state couplings.

This makes

sense as proximity provides more and easier opportunities
for contact with one's adversary.
Despite the fact that the remaining v«u:iables were not
significant, their b values all were in the same direction
as was in the case vdien conflict level was the dependent
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variable, with the exception of trade.

This movement from a

positive to a negative b-value of the trade variable
Indicates that while trade may lead to marginally higher
levels of conflict escalation between Interstate dyads, the
fatality levels between trading partners are reduced (though
Insignificantly). What this may Indicate Is that trading
partners are Inclined to escalate conflicts between one
another, but rarely carry such escalation to a point of
Interstate war, where fatality levels would be higher.
Recall also that previous reseaurch has produced mixed
results with respect to trade and conflict.

Irrespective,

It seems reasonable based on the b-vales and significance
levels to assert that trade has a very minimal effect on
conflict escalation between Interstate dyads.
Summary

In total, these results suggest some positive effects
for the presence of nuclear weapons In conflict dyads, but
only when nuclecur weapons appear on both sides.

Nuclear

symmetry must exist for any pacifying effects to occur,

in

such symmetrical nuclear dyads conflict levels are
significantly reduced, though fatalities are not.

Notably,

however, asymmetrical dyads appear to be less stcKble.
Indeed the regression results show that conflict and
fatalities are Increased In asymmetrical nuclear dyads,
though these results are not significant.
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So nuclear weapons can be a successful deterrent to
conflict escalation when they occur in symmetrical
interstate relationships. Thus, nuclear weapons appear to
have played a significant role in placating relations
between the great powers during the Cold War.

Clecurly, the

presence of nuclear weapons on both sides of a dyad do not
prevent conflict, but they do appear to limit it. Thus the
spread of nuclear weapons throughout the international
system may indeed produce some of the pacifying effects
theorized.

What is in^>ortant is where these weapons spread.

Introduction of nuclear weapons to only one side of an
unstable regional rivalry (thereby creating a nuclear
asymmetry) could produce disastrous results.

Yet it appears

that should both sides of a dyadic rivalry possess nuclear
weapons, the level of conflict between the two will be
reduced.
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CHAPTER POUR:
THE HUCLEAR EVOLUTIOH OP THE IHDOPAKISTAHI REXJITZOHSHIP ZH JAMMU AMD KA8HMZR

The Indo-Paklstani dyad is most often described as one
either now imperiled by the presence of nuclear weapons on
both sides, or placated by them.

Few regions in the world,

if any, present a more consistent and concentrated period of
conflict between neighbors than in this section of southern
Asia.

Indeed international life itself was breathed into

Pakistan as a result of conflict with India.

Additional

wars followed over the next twenty-five years and several
conflicts have escalated to the brink of interstate war
since their last major conflagration in 1971.

The years of

conflict between these two rivals has bred contempt for one
another which is only exacerbated by cultural differences.
The cultural fault lines along which Samuel Huntington
(1993) has suggested will erupt the battlefields of the post
Cold War era être clearly present between Hindus in India and
Muslims in Pakistan.

Conflict has become quotidian to the

two neighbors and central to the rivalry between the two is
their dispute over control of the Himalayan region of Jammu
and Kashmir.

Indian Hindus and Pakistani Muslims each claim

ownership over this alpine boundary region and it is where
the fiercest tensions between the two antagonists have
manifested themselves.
There have been four major conflict situations between
India and Pakistan in their dyadic history over the disputed
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region of Jammu and Kashmir.

The first two of these

conflicts evolved Into Interstate warfare, while the latter
two fell short of It.

The goal of this chapter Is to

ascertain If the presence of nuclear weapons played a role
In the pacification of the latter two conflict Instances In
the Indo-Paklstanl relationship.

This will occur by means

of a case study excunlnatlon of India and Pakistan 's most
contentious territorial dispute — control over the Jammu
and Kashmir region.
Following a background presentation which discusses how
nuclear proliferation became a reality In this region of the
world, the methodology for this case study Is presented.
Then analysis of the four major conflict situations between
India and Pakistan over the Jammu and Kashmir area occurs
and conclusions presented.
Background:

Indo-Pakistani

Security

Policy

India's defense and security policy Initially rested
almost entirely In the hands of the first prime minister,
Jawaharlal Nehru (Khalld 1988).

He defined International

security In terms of economic development and saw
International Insecurity as a product of the Cold War.
Leadership of and pairtlclpatlon In the Nonallgned Movement
(NAM) seemed to Nehru to be an appropriate policy response
on both counts.

To his surprise, however, his own good

Intentions were not good enough.

War broke out with China

In 1962 after a rancorous buildup, ending the era of Hlndl-
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Chlnl bhal bhal (Hindus and Chinese are brothers), which had
followed the 1955 Bandung conference.

Nehru's vision of

International harmony led by the two largest civilizations
on Earth, India and China, was shattered.

China's nuclear

test a mere two year's later exacerbated India's sense of
vulnerability (Chellaney 1998-99).

By that time, Nehru had

died, and his vision of peace between India and China
effectively died with him.
In addition to China, India faced another serious
threat from Pakistan, \dilch launched attacks In 1947 cuid
1965 In hopes of seizing Kashmir, but the cessation of
hostilities never resolved the problem.

Six years following

the 1965 attack, India was able to reduce the security
threat from Pakistan. When, through Its own mismanagement
of Internal problems, Pakistan faced a civil war, India was
able to Intercede on East Pakistan's side, assist In the
creation of Bangladesh, and thereby eliminate what had been
a two-front threat from Pakistan.

In order to counter the

possibility that China would help Pakistan once war broke
out In 1971, India also reached a strategic agreement with
the former Soviet Union, the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and
Cooperation.

By the end of the 1971 war, Pakistan was

reduced to half Its former size, and China faced the
possibility of having to deal with the Soviet Union as well
In any future conflict with India (Khalld 1988).

63
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Through

adroit diplomacy and a judicious use of force, India had
achieved an enviably secure strategic position.
Pakistan was not so fortunate.

Throughout its history,

Pakistan's foreign policy has been dominated by the
determination to incorporate Kashmir into the republic; its
security policy, in turn, has been formed by the perceived
threat from India (Ghumman 1990).

A number of

miscalculations by both Indian and Pakistani leaders led to
the conflict over Kashmir, which occurred immediately
following partition.

Subsequently, statements by Nehru, as

well as resolutions at the United Nations, supported holding
a plebiscite within Kashmir to allow the Kashmiri people to
choose between joining India or joining Pakistan.
Pakistan's leaders convinced themselves that the Muslims of
Kashmir would choose to join Pakistan, if given the chance.
Frustrated through the 1950s by a lack of diplomatic
progress at the United Nations and with New Dehli, Pakistan
launched an attack against the Indian section of Kashmir in
1965.

India already had made it clear that it would respond

to such an attack as if it were against the Indian nation.
Once Pakistan launched the well-advertised Operation
Gibraltar, India singly made good on its warning and
counterattacked across the international border. After a
decisive Indian victory at Chawinda, a cease-fire was
negotiated which left the states of Kashmir effectively the
same as before the conflict.
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According to Pakistani analyst Neil Joeck (1997, 265),
"as neither China nor the United States assisted Pakistan in
its aims in 1965 or prevented India from breaking up
Pakistan in 1971, nuclear weapons came to be seen as the
best available means to ensure that such an Indian policy
would never become real." When India detonated a nuclear
device in 1974, Pakistan's determination to arm itself with
nuclear weapons was powerfully reinforced.

Joeck (1997,

265) continues, "Just as China's detonation of a nuclear
device 2 years following the 1962 wêu: sharpened India's
interest in nucleair weapons, so too did India's detonation
of a nuclear device in 1974 accelerate Pakistan's program."
Pakistan's security environment continues to be
characterized by the Kashmir issue and the fear that India
will try to divide Pakistan further.

Fearing that outside

assistance, whether from the United Nations, the United
States, or China, will be inadequate, Pakistan's nuclear
program has become now the focus of its security policy,
standing as a powerful symbol of Pakistani independence.
Joeck (1997, 265) concludes, "From Pakistan's view, nuclear
weapons are the only guarantee that India will not attack
again and 'finish the job' begun in 1971, either through
overt means or by exploiting Pakistcui's chronic domestic
disputes."
The 1998 overt nuclear testing by India and Paücistan
did not make them nuclear newcomers.

As was mentioned
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earlier, in 1974 New Dehli detonated a nuclear-fission
device with a yield in excess of ten kilotons (kt) — not
much less than that of the Hiroshima bomb (Singh 1998).
This was the result of a massive nuclear research effort
undertaken by India following China's 1964 nuclear test.
A.B. Vajpayee, a future Prime Minister of India, said as a
parlicunentarian in 1964 that (Sharma 1998, 30), "the emswer
to an atom bomb is an atom bomb, nothing else.” As for
Pakistan its efforts to develop a nuclear arsenal began in
earnest following its defeat in the war with India in 197071, and were accelerated following India's 1974 test.

Yet

the seeds of the efforts of such a nuclear program were
being sown in the minds of Pakistani policymakers by the
1960s (Anwari 1988).

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan's future

Prime Minister, argued (Weismer and Krosney 1981, 48), "If
Pakistan restricts (its) nuclecur programme it would...enable
India to blackmail Pakistan with (its) nuclear technology.
Our problem, in its essence, is how to obtain such a weapon
in time before the crisis begins."

17.
It is notable that China, who later became a major
supplier of nuclear technology to Pakistan, was largely
absent from providing nuclear assistance to Pakistan as its
program began. In fact, France was singled out as
Pakistan's most iji^ortant nuclear partner until American
pressure led Paris to cancel the sale of a plutoniumreprocessing plant in 1978 (Weismer éuid Krosney 1981). This
has led to suggestions that China's inability to extend
nuclear support to Pakistan in the 1965 and 1970-71 wars may
have been one of the factors prompting the Pakistani program
(Weismer and Krosney 1981). By the mid-1980s, however,
China had become a major contributor to Pakistan's nuclear
and ballistic armament programs (Gelb 1984a, 1984b).
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Thus the 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan came
long after both states initiated their military-nuclear
efforts.

These tests occurred after the production of

substantial quantities of fissile material and well after
the deployment of a first-generation of nuclear-capable
delivery vehicles.

This is not the sequence followed by the

"official" nuclear-weapon states, where nuclear testing took
place at the earliest feasible moment.

Both the Indian and

Pakistani authorities went out of their way to underline
that their tests were the capstone to long-established
weaponization and delivery-vehicle programs.

On 17 May

1998, Dr. A.P. J. Abdul Kalam, the scientific advisor to the
Indian Minister of Defense, stated that "weaponization is
now complete," adding that India's Prithvi ("Earth") emd
Agni ("Fire") ballistic missiles were capable of carrying
"any type of warhead" (Albright 1998). Similarly, Dr. A.Q.
Khan, who has been key to Pakistcui 's nuclear and ballisticmissile ambitions, indicated on 31 May 1998 that massproduction of the Ghauri intermediate-range ballistic
missile (IRBM) had started, and that Pakistan could deploy
nuclear warheads on the Ghauri within days (Albright 1998).
Both Pakistan and India have tested, with varying
degrees of success, two categories of fission bombs:

atom

bombs with power sufficient to wipe out a medium-size city
(a 12 kt weapon by India and 15 kt weapon by Pakistan); and
sub- (or very low) kiloton devices presumably serving as
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battlefield nuclear weapons (Hotz 1998).

India has also

indicated that it has tested a 43 kt hydrogen bomb.

Such a

low yield for a fully fledged thermonuclear weapon would
indicate that India has a good mastery of "down-scaling "
techniques, which make it possible to derive, from a
comparatively small test, a set of data corresponding to
that of a much more powerful explosion (Hotz 1998).
Conversely, if the device had "fizzled", further testing
could be necessary.
The number of weapons available can only be estimated
from what is known of the relevant Indian and Pakistani
sources of fissile material.

India may have produced some

400 kilograms of plutonium reprocessed from fuel irradiated
in the Cirus and Dhruva reactors, from which 70-80 nuclear
devices could have been manufactured (Heisbourg 1998-99).
Given the age, breadth and depth of the Indian nuclear
program, this should be considered a minimum, rather than a
maximum figure (Heisbourg 1998-99).

Other sources suggest

that India may dispose up to 1.95 tons of plutonium derived
from its six unsafegucurded CANDU-type nuclear reactors — in
other words, enough to produce more than 400 warheads (Steer
1998).

In comparison, in late 1998 the UK possessed fewer

than 200 operational nuclear warheads (The Military Balance
1998-99).

India also has a tritium-production capability

for hydrogen bombs.

Pakistan's nuclear weapons are

currently produced from centrifuge-generated highly enriched
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uranium at the Kahuta facility.

Kahuta, which has been in

operation since 1981, is based on a design absconded by Khan
from the Anglo-German-Dutch URENCO facility at Almelo in the
Netherlands (Leonard and Scheinman 1993). Fissile material
may amount to between 400kg and 600kg, allowing for the
manufacture of some 20-30 weapons (Albright 1998; Steer
1998).
Over the years, India and Pakistan have acquired a
broad array of aircraft which could readily be (and may, in
a number of instances, already have been) configured for
nuclear missions (The Mllltetry Balance 1997-98).

With 88

Jaguar and 147 MiG-27 fighter-bombers and an abundance of
fighters which could play an escort role (among them 64 MiG298, 35 Mirage 2000s and 238 MiG-2Is), India can afford to
dedicate a substantial number of aircraft to nuclear
missions (Bailey and Morimoto 1998).

Pakistan is not quite

so well-endowed, but it certainly has enough aircraft to
conduct a nuclear mission successfully:

34 F-16A/B and 15

Mirage IIIEP aircraft could form the nucleus of cui atomic
strike force, with a dozen squadrons of Chinese and Frenchmade aircraft providing fighter cover (Bailey and Morimoto
1998). A large proportion of these Pakistani and Indian
aircraft are based close to the border between the two
countries, in the vicinity of Lahore (Sargodha) and New
Dehli (Hindan and Ambala) (Norris and Arkin 1998).

Each

nation's capitcü. is within easy reach of the other's
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aircraft.

The largest economic centers of the two

countries, Karachi (eight million inhabitants) and Mumbai
(12 million) are also within operational range (Bailey and
Morimoto 1998).

Indeed, one of the most troubling

characteristics of the Indo-Pakistani theater is the short
distance between each potential contender's prime political,
military and economic targets.

New Dehli and Islamabad are

some 600 kilometers apart, Mumbai and Karachi around 1,000km
(Delpech 1998-99).
At the tactical level, India has created the family of
Prithvi missiles from the SA-2.

India has 75 Prithvi 1,

which has a range of 150km and a 1,000kg payload (Heisbourg
1998-99).

Several are stationed at Jullundur, less than

100km from the Pakistani border. Much of the Pakistani
Punjab, including Lahore, is within the range of these
forward-based missiles. Longer-range versions (250 km and
350 km respectively) are also being produced, though with
the trade-off of smaller payloads of 500kg (Heisbourg 199899).

Notably, this lighter payload remains sufficient for

nuclear-weapon delivery.
India is also working on a sea-borne missile called the
Sagarika ("Oceanic"), Wiich may be ballistic or airbreathing (Hill 1998). Heisbourg (1998-99) has suggested
that India may have gained submarine-missile experience
while leasing a nuclear-powered guided-missile submarine
(SSGN) from the Soviet Union between 1988-91 {The Military
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Balance 1991-92).

Despite this, Francois Heisbourg (1998-

99, 81), an Indian military expert, argues that "unless it
bought one off the shelf, it is difficult to imagine how
such a capability could become available before 2005 at
best, assuming that it would be indigenously developed.”
Pakistan 's missile program is in many respects quite
similar to India's.

Pakistan tested the road-mobile Ghauri

missile (also known as the Hatf 5), on 6 April 1998 (Fulghum
1998).

This test followed soon after the Hindu nationalist

Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)'s success in Indian elections
in March 1998.

The missile has a range of over 1100

kilometers (Sidhu 1998).

In terms of tactical ranges,

Pakistan has produced the Hatf 1 (lOOkm) and Hatf 2 (300km),
both with a 500kg payload (Norris and Arkin 1998).
In sum, India and Pakistan are both rapidly moving
towards a diversified nuclear dyad composed of aircraft and
ballistic missiles, although India will possess, for
geographical reasons, a more extensive coverage of Pakistan
than Pakistan will have of India.

Such diversified forces

on both sides enhance the deterrent capability of both
sides.
Methods

It is believed that by surveying how tensions have
evolved over the decades between India and Pakistan with
respect to the Kashmir issue that the intact nuclear weapons
have or have not had on conflict between the two neighbors
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can be assessed. Clearly in the first two conflict
instances over Jammu and Kashmir, tensions escalated to the
level of interstate warfare, while in the latter two they
did not.

But what role did nuclear deterrence play in the

two most recent conflict situations, if any, in preventing
escalation?

This question will be addressed by two methods.

First, the independent variables used in the quantitative
section of this dissertation will be examined more closely.
Alliance participation, geographic proximity, level of
trade, military capabilities, presence of nuclear weapons,
regime stability, and regime type all are considered in four
cases of conflict between India and Psücistan:

1947, 1965,

1990, and 1999. All four instances are focused around the
issue of the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir.

The

level of escalation and number of deaths again will be used
as dependent variables in order to ascertain if the presence
of nuclear weapons affected the level of conflict between
India and Pakistan.
Two of the independent variables have remained static
throughout the whole lndo-P5ücistani relationship and
therefore only will be addressed once and not for each of
the four cases in question: alliance membership and
geographic proximity.
Second, comments by decision-makers of consequence
(both political and military leaders) on both sides of the
Indo-Pakistani disputes will be included to appreciate how
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the presence of nuclear weapons affected their choices.
Such commentary by those in power provides a window to view
what the major actors in the dispute were thinking at the
time, as well as how the presence of nuclear weapons may
have inqpacted the course of the conflict.
Alliance

Membership

At no time in their history have India and Pakistan
been members of the same formal alliance.

This is notable

because as this dissertation displayed in the previous
chapter and as have other researchers have found in their
studies, like alliance membership lessens the chance for
conflict between states (Mihalka 1976; Bueno de Mesquita
1981; Weede 1989; Kim 1991; Bremer 1992).
Because India and Pakistan have been rivals throughout
their history it seems very unlikely that any alliance
pcirtnership would be forthcoming between the two.

Pcücistan,

in an effort to displace some of India's militêury advantages
in manpower cuid technology over the years, has sought and
achieved technology exchcuiges with India's other main
regional rival, China.

This has served to exacerbate

tension with India cuid further precludes the likelihood of
any Indo-Pakistani partnership.
Thus, the lack of like alliance membership between
India and Pakistan does not permit a diminution in the
likelihood of conflict such a partnership could produce.
Instead, the two remain unbound by such institutional ties
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and thereby forfeit the positive effects on conflict this
variable has displayed in past interstate relationships.
Geographic

Proximity

All wars to date have been fought in geographical
terrain and produce spatial outcomes (though this will
likely change in the next millennium as computer viruses and
other technological warfare pose new threats to state
security).

The three wars between India and Pakistan all

left spatial legacies which continue to dictate relations
among the two countries.

From the occupation of a large

territory to the control of a portion of some obscure
glacier, geographical claims have and continue to drive
tensions in South Asia.
These tensions are augmented in the case of the IndoPakistani dyad because the two rivals share a border with
one another.

As was noted in the previous chapter,

geographic proximity has been shown in this and other
studies to have a significant impact on conflict escalation
(Bremer 1992; Diehl 1985; Russett 1993; Vasguez 1993; Senese
1996, 1997).

Geographically proximal dyads are more likely

to escalate conflict than geographically distal ones.

The

salience of a territorial disagreement (in the case of India
and Pakistan their dispute over Jammu and Kashmir has served
as a spur) tends to stimulate militarized disputes between

18.
chapter.

This idea will be expanded in the concluding
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neighbors (Diehl 1992; Vasquez 1995).

Thus, conflict

situations between India and Pakistan are more likely to
escalate because they border one another.
1947-48 Dispute Over Jammu and Kashmir

Between August and September 1947 the situation in
Kashmir deteriorated rapidly when the Muslim subjects of the
Maharajah rose in open revolt and were soon joined by fellow
tribesmen from the Northwestern Frontier Provinces (Burke
1973). The Maharajah fled from Srinagar and in desperation,
agreed to accede to India on October 26, 1947.

As soon as

India received the instrument of accession, it dispatched
airborne troops to Srinagar (Morris-Jones 1982).
The rebellion was quelled and the Pakistani tribesmen
were pushed out of Srinagar.
stalemate in the conflict.

By the end of 1947 there was a
India was in control of over

two-thirds of Jammu and Kashmir, while the rest remained in
Pakistan's hands.

The government of India was convinced of

the legality of its position, arguing that India could not
have tolerated the Pakistani attempt to influence forcibly
the internal and external policies of any friendly
neighboring state (Lamb 1966).

In the case of Kashmir, the

treaty of accession had given India the responsibility for
the defense of Kashmir (Gupta 1966).

In those

circumstances, on January 1, 1948, India lodged a complaint
under Article 35 of the UN Charter to persuade Pakistan to
stop the aggression by withdrawing its regular troops and
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denying the "invaders" the access to, and use of, its
territory for operation against Kashmir (Gupta 1966).
The Security Council passed two resolutions after
hearing from both India and Psücistan. The first resolution
of January 17, 1948 asked the parties involved "not to
aggravate the situation but to do everything to improve it"
(Burke 1973, 22) The second resolution of Januetry 20, 1948,
established a mediatory commission that eventually came to
be known as the United Nations Commission on India and
Péücistan (UNCIP).

During the next month, a draft resolution

based on the consensus of opinions of the majority of the
members of the Security Council, was worked out jointly by
Canada and Belgium, calling for "the immediate cessation of
all violence and fighting, the withdrawal of all forces and
armed individuals who had entered the state, the return of
all citizens who had left the state, the establishment of an
administration commanding the confidence and respect of the
people, and the holding of a plebiscite accepted under UN
supervision at the earliest possible date" (Khan 1983).

The

UN mediation process finally brought the war to a close on
January 1, 1949.

The best estimate of casualties is a

combined total of 1500 dead (Singer and Small 1972).

The

war also led to a substantial loss of territory for India,
nearly 5,000 square miles (Lamb 1966).
This initial war between India and Pakistan should not
have been shocking to international observers at the time.
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Of four independent factors believed to increase the
likelihood of conflict and war between states, all four
forecast an intensification of hostilities in the IndoPakistani dyad in 1947. As noted earlier, the two's lack of
like alliance membership and geographic proximity both
pointed to conflict augmentation.

Additionally, Pakistan's

non-Democratic regime status, as well as the lack of regime
maturity in both Islamabad and New Dehli suggested that
tensions would escalate.
Table Four:

1947-48

Indo-Pakistani Conflict

Factor

Value

Escalation Imnact

Ally

No

INCREASE

Proximal

Yes

INCREASE

Democratic

No

INCREASE

Mature

No

INCREASE

Capability

NA

NA

Trade

NA

NA

Nuclear

No

NA

Outcome:

WAR

TéÈble Four provides a listing of all the independent
variables believed to intact escalation, as well as the
outcome of the conflict: interstate war. This eventual
outcome was to be expected based on the variables listed in
Table Four. There were no independent restraints on the
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Indo-Pakistani dyad and as a result it escalated into a
large war.
1965 Dispute Over Jasumu and Kashmir

In the period 1964-65, there was considerable anxiety
in Pakistan that its militeury advantage which had been built
up through alliance with the West could be eroded in the
wake of India's massive military rearmcunent by both the West
and the Soviet Union.

Indeed, by September 1965, when

military aid was halted to both countries, US economic aid
to India had exceeded aid to Pakistan by six billion dollars
(Thomas 1992) (India's population, however, was four times
that of Pakistan so that on a per capita basis, it received
only half as much as Pakistan). It was argued,
conspicuously by Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, that
Pakistan must act before the military balance tilted in
India's favor and the window of opportunity closed forever
(Lamb 1966).

The advocates of war were supported by General

Mohammed Musa, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, who
pointed out that despite an overall disparity because of
India's militeury build-up, Pakistan still had "theater
superiority" (Korbel 1966).

In other words, a localized war

fought specifically in Kashmir could still be won (Thomas
1992).

Thus it appears that fears over conventional

inferiority fueled Pakistan 's second war with India over
Jammu and Kashmir.
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The curtain raiser before the actual warfare In Kashmir
was played out In the dispute over the Rann of Kutch In the
spring of 1965.

Indian troops were decidedly disadvantaged.

All the local advantages were with the Pakistanis. The Rann
was well connected with roads from Pakistan and the border
was close to Pakistan's forward positions, making It easy to
move troops cuid supplies to the battle-front (Brines 1968).
Thus, when fighting broke out on April 9, 1965, the
Pakistanis launched a massive tank attack and had no
difficulty In routing the Indian outposts.

The Indians,

recognizing the overwhelming tactical dlsadvemtages, chose
to retreat rather than lose lives and equipment.

In

Pakistan the military "victory" confirmed Its perception of
India's lack of nerves (Hasan 1978).
The euphoric leaders of Pakistan completely misread
India's mood (Brines 1968).

They had tested India's nerve

and having found It wanting, now launched their plans for
"Operation Gibraltar" to recover Kashmir. A secret
committee headed by Bhutto decided on a Rann of Kutch type
local campaign confined to Kashmir. According to the plans,
Pakistan would send out 'Mujahlddln' and commandos across
the border with Kashmir.

Given the enormous popular

discontent In Kashmir, their very presence would encourage
the Kashmiris to rise In revolt.

Palclstan's army would then

appear to be seen as coming to the aid of the Kashmiris
fighting Indian brutalities.

The Kashmir dispute would be
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back on the table and India would be forced into accepting
arbitration as it had done in the Rann dispute (HascUi 1978).
The whole plan backfired because the two assumptions on
which "Operation Gibraltar" was based proved wrong.

Far

from the Kashmiri Muslims rising in rebellion, they actually
apprehended the "Mujahiddin" when they crossed into Kashmir
in August 1965, and promptly handed them over to the Indian
authorities.

The Indians refused to confine the fighting to

Kashmir and showed little hesitation in violating the
international frontier (Lamb 1966). The desperate but
daring move by India to cross the international frontiers
saved Kashmir.

The war which began on September 5th and

produced over 1,000 battle-deaths, ground to a halt 12 days
later as the US placed an embargo on arms to the
subcontinent.

Both sides accepted a Security Council

resolution for a cease-fire soon thereafter (Thomas 1992).^°

19. India also sought an active end to the conflict as
a result of Chinese threats of "grave consequences" unless
India dismantled certain fortifications China claimed it had
erected between Sikkim êuid Tibet (the Chinese also demanded
the immediate return of 800 sheep and 60 yaks which they
claimed had been removed from Chinese territory). This
ultimatum ultimately led to wêurnings from the superpowers
and the US cunns embargo (Ganguly 1986).
20. This was largely brokered by the Soviet Union as
the United States had alienated the two combatants with its
arms embargo. The Soviets arranged negotiations between
India and Pakistan in Tashkent beginning and concluding in
January 1966. The Tashkent Declaration produced important
territorial concessions by both sides. Thus the major
reason the war ended was because of superpower influence
(Ganguly 1986).
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Ganguly (1986, 92) concludes:
The 1965 war demonstrated the continuing inertance
of the irredentist/anti-irredentist factor in IndoPakistani relations. Pakistan had resorted to war
primarily because it believed that if it did not act
in a decisive manner, the state of Kashmir would be
integrated into India éuid international interest for
Pakistan's concerns would dwindle. Here we see the
continuing importance...of ideology. The Pakistanis
had maintained that without their Kashmir their nation
would be incomplete and simultaneously demonstrate the
success of Indian secularism.
As was the case with the 1947 tensions, the 1965 IndoPakistani conflict over Kashmir was replete with indicators
that it would escalate towards interstate warfare.
Table Five:

1965

Indo-Pakistani Conflict

Factor

Value

Escalation Imoact

Ally

NO

INCREASE

Proximal

Yes

INCREASE

Democratic

No

INCREASE

Mature

NO

INCREASE

Capability

.6921

INCREASE

Trade

47.522

MINIMAL

Nuclear

NO

NA

Outcome : WAR

21. This is a relative capability measure for military
forces between India and Pakistan. In the instance of
1965, Pakistan had 69% the capability of India.
22.

In millions of US dollars (Barbieri 1996b).
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Following the escalation formula put forward in the previous
conflict instance, all the main independent factors
indicated an escalation of hostilities (see Table Five ). In
the case of the 1965 conflict all six of the
variables applicable to this conflict promoted conflict
intensification between India and Pakistan.

In addition to

the two pervasive variables of "ally" and "proximity" the
dyad was again not a grouping of two democracies; it was not
a coupling of two mature regimes ; the two's relative
military capabilities were fairly high; and there was a
significant amount of trade between the two.z3 with all six
of these factors pointing away from a de-escalation of the
crisis, it is not surprising that tensions between the two
rivals ultimately resulted in interstate war.
Ultimately a wider and more protracted conflict was
prevented by superpower intervention. US arms embargoes on
both India and Pakistan and Soviet efforts to promote
negotiations between the two produced a rather rapid end to
this war. A number of observers have concluded that the war
effort could have been sustained by both sides for several
more weeks (Lamb 1966; Ganguly 1986; Thomas 1992).

Yet

outside pressure brought the conflict to a halt.

23.
With respect to trade this dissertation's findings
were ambiguous (as past studies have been) about trade's
effect on conflict. Again, there was a slightly significant
increase in the level of conflict between trading partners,
but no significant impact on the level of fatalities between
trading partners engaged in conflict with one another.
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Six yeéirs after the 1965 conflagration and seven
following China's ascendancy to nuclear capability, India
tested successfully a nuclear device of its own.

Former

Pakistani President Zia suggested in 1988 that after 1974
India's unclear nuclear status helped to foster deterrence
between the two South Asian rivals (Spector 1990, 100):
with respect to their [nuclear capabilities], if

they create ambiguity, that ambiguity is the
essence of deterrence. The present programs of
India and Pêücistan have a lot of ambiguities, and
therefore in the eyes of each other, they have
reached a particulcu: level, and that level is good
enough to create an impression of deterrence.
This suggests that contréLry to the queuititative evidence,
the asymmetrical nuclear relationship in the Indo-Pakistani
relationship did appear to play a positive role in deterring
conflict between the two states.

The twelve years of

nuclear asymmetry were relatively uneventful in Kashmir and
though tensions between India and Pcücistan remained
consistently strained, conflict levels never reached beyond
18 out of 22 on the MID index.

India and Pakistan remained

an asymmetrical dyad until roughly 1986, when it becéune
clean: to New Dehli that Islamaibad was a clandestine nuclear
power.

Pcücistaui enjoyed a status of "opaque" nuclear power

for a couple years after this time in the eyes of the United
States before Reagain administration officials finally
admitted that Pakistan was a de facto member of the nuclear
club (Spector 1990).

Thus, in future conflicts, both states

would enjoy nuclear capability.
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Major conflict over the
for a time after 1965.

J ammu

and Kashmir region abated

It might be asserted that Pakistan

learned through its interstate warfare failings with India
that such efforts were futile. Also, India's demonstration
of its so-called "peaceful" nuclear capability in 1974 may
have further atrophied Pakistani efforts at recapturing
Kashmir.

But in addition to the nuclear presence, the

bipolar structure of the Cold War period probably played a
role as well.

Neither the United States, nor the Soviet

Union were interested in an unstable South Asia.

Thus, as

was made evident in 1965, they would take the steps
necessary to curtail conflict between India and Pakistan.
But cultural competitions aire not so easily excised,
especially from neighbors, and so twenty-five years later,
following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
subsequent end of the bipolar international structure, IndoPakistani tensions were renewed over Kashmir.

Yet by then

Pakistan had developed nuclear devices of its own and the
world feared that the first war between nuclear powers was
inevitable.

However, the symmetrical presence of nuclear

weapons appears to have prevented an escalation of the
conflict in 1990.

Deterrence was forced upon the two

rivals, not by their superpower supporters as was the case
during the Cold War, but by the overwhelming destructive
cap«d)ility of their nuclear weapons.
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1990 Dispute Over Jammu and Kashmir

The Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir erupted for the
third time less than a decade ago.

Richard J. Kerr, deputy

director of the Central Intelligence Agency said of the 1990
dispute in South Asia:

"It was the most dangerous nuclear

situation we have ever faced since I've been in the U.S.
government.

It was far more frightening than the Cuban

Missile Crisis" (Hersh 1993).
However, some have suggested that the presence of
nuclear weapons actually atrophied the 1990 conflict,
arguing that the crisis adds additional support "to the
already inuressive evidence that the chief intact of nuclear
weapons is to deter war between their possessors" (Hagerty
1995/96).

It has also been suggested that the 1990 dispute

lends credence to proliferation optimists and not its
critics (Karl 1996/97; Burns 1998).
Again, New Dehli clearly understood Pakistan was now a
nuclear capable state having acknowledged Pakistan's nuclear
progress before 1990. General K. Sundarji, Indian army
chief during the conflict said four years previously in
1986:

"There are enough indicators to suggest that Pakistan

has achieved or is close to achieving a nuclear weapons
c a p a b i l i t y . S o while Pakistan maintained a somewhat

24.
The general's quote, appearing in India Today, 15
February 1986, p. 78, was the general consensus of most
strategic observers at the time. A US Special National
Intelligence Estimate found that, by 1986, Pakistan was a de
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opaque nuclear status to the International community atlarge, India assumed that It had the capacity to produce a
few nuclear devices.
The 1990 crisis saw Its development In February of that
year when Muslim Insurgents (typically supported by
Pakistan) sparked violence against what they perceived to be
the corrupt and repressive indleui rulers hip In Kashmir
(Perkovlch 1996). A war of words followed and escalated
rapidly.

By 13 March 1990 Prime Minister Bhutto had

traveled to Kashmir where she promised a "thousand year war"
In support of the Kashmiri mllltêuits.

VP Singh quickly

retorted that India would react decisively to any Pakistani
Intervention telling the Indian parliament (Manorahan 1990),
"There should be no confusion.

Such a misadventure would

not be without cost."" By 10 April 1990 Singh"s rhetoric had
become more harsh. Addressing the leadership In Islamabad
from New Dehli Singh said (Housego and Meraj 1990, 5):

'"Our

message to Pakistan Is that "you cannot get away with taking
Kashmir without a waur...those who talk edaout one-thousand
years of war should examine whether they will last onethousand hours of war." By this time, India had mobilized
troops Into the Indian controlled area of Kashmir.

Indian

diplomats claimed that forces on both sides were on a higher
state of alert, though they were "several levels lower than
would Indicate imminent hostilities" (Hussain 1992).
facto nuclear power with enough fissile material to produce
several nuclear weapons (Spector 1988).
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In fact India cmd Pakistan were far from escalating the
conflict past some minor border clashes Into the realm of
Interstate warfare.

The Stlmson Center In Washington DC

brought together some key US participants In the crisis
(notably the US ambassadors In New Dehli and Isleunabad, Bill
Clark and Robert Oakley), as well as Indian and Pakistani
diplomats, experts, and senior military officials In
February 1994 to review and analyze the 1990 crisis,

uday

Bhaskar (1997), an Indian defense analyst summarizes some of
the findings from the 1990 crisis as follows :
1. The threat of a nuclear confrontation was not
great, nor were India and Pakistan eager to have
another conventional war because of fears of
escalation.
2. During the crisis the Indian military leadership
deliberately refrained from moving armor associated
with Its strike forces out of peacetime canton
ments, and welcomed US defense attaches to confirm
this.
3. During the crisis the Pakistani military leadership
deliberately refrained from moving Its two strike
corps to the front and refrained from using forward
operating bases for Its air force — critical
Indications of an Impending attack.
In general, the Stlmson Center Report found, according to
Bhaskar (1997, 319), that the "sense of alarm over the
crisis was far greater In Washington than in Islamabad, and
It was greater In Isleunabad than In Dehli."
Yet why was neither side Interested In escalating the
conflict further? Mushahld Hussain (1992, 195), adviser to
then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, provides a powerful
summary to the 1990 conflict saying, "the only reason such
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(an) eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation between the Pakisteuii
and Indian armies did not convert into military conflict was
because of the nuclear factor.”
Again the factors believed to contribute to conflict in
the case of the 1990 Indo-Pakistani tensions are presented
in Table Six.

India and Pakistan displayed disparate levels

of democratic institutions during 1990. The Polity III data
set rates states' level of democratization from 0 to 10,
with 10 being the most democratic.

India scored an 8 on

this scale in 1990, while Pakistan managed only a 3.

This

disparity in democratization would suggest that the
likelihood of conflict escalating to interstate warfare was
higher in the 1990 Indo-Pakistani conflict than it would
have been if it had been a democratic dyad at the time.
The Indo-Pakistani dyad also did not contain two mature
regimes. The Islamabad government was edging slowly toward
democracy at the time but still had not stabilized itself,
jumping from military control to republican government again
and again.

As was demonstrated in the quantitative section,

this lack of stability suggests Pakistan might be more
likely to escalate conflicts.
Indeed all the factors, except for the presence of
nuclear weapons, point to an increased likelihood of
escalation in the conflict (see Table Six).

Yet the

conflict fizzled out with few casualties and a general sense
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that a larger conflagration had been avoided.

These

indicators, coupled with the long history of turmoil between
Table Six:

1990 Indo-Pakistani Conflict

Factor

Value

Escalation Imoact

Ally

No

INCREASE

Proximal

Yes

INCREASE

Democratic

NO

INCREASE

Mature

No

INCREASE

Capability

.64

INCREASE

Trade

185.4

MINIMAL

Nuclear

Yes

DECREASE

Outcome:

Clash

these two neighbors over Jammu and Kashmir, suggests that
the presence of nuclear weapons (the one factor new to the
dyad) may have promoted conflict de-escalation in 1990
between India and Pakistan.
Following the cessation of tensions between India and
Pakistan in 1990 a number of strategic analysts proclaimed
the success of nuclear deterrence on the Indian
subcontinent.

For instance, an «urticle whose authors

include two of India's prominent nuclear strategists (Morgan
et al. 1995, 164) states that, "India has been content to
demonstrate capability, put basic infrastructure in place,
and leave deterrence implicit and somewhat ambiguous... It
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appears that atomic capabilities on both sides in the IndoPakistani conflict have so far led to a moderation in
actions between the two states."

Indian nuclear strategist,

K. Subrahmanyam (1993, 184) also concludes:
The awareness on both sides of a nuclear capability
that can enable either country to assemble nuclear
weapons at short notice induces mutual caution. This
caution is already evident on the part of India. In
1965 when Pakistan carried out its "Operation
Gibraltar" and sent in infiltrators, India sent its
army across the cease-fire line to destroy the assembly
points of the infiltrators. That escalated into fullscale war. In 1990 when Pakistan once again carried
out a massive infiltration of terrorists trained in
Pakistan, India tried to deal with the problem on
Indian territo^ and did not send its army into
Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.
Elsewhere (Hagerty 1995/96, 109) fellow Indian nuclear
analyst K. Sundarji agrees with Subrahmanyeun, saying of
India's leaders:

"The reason why they've hesitated to take

recourse to their stated, avowed strategy of reacting in the
plains conventionally is because of the nuclear
option... I 've got no doubt in my mind at all." Pakistani
analysts concur with these views.

For instance, Abdul

Sattar (1994-95, 3) writes of the "indispensable
contribution" Pakistan's "nascent nucleeu: capability has
made to deterrence of aggression and maintenance of peace."
Pakistani generals Ishaq and Beg agree with this anêü.ysis,
with Beg saying, "Far from talk of nuclear war, there is no
danger of even a conventional war between India and
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Pakistan...As compared to previous years, there is no
possibility of an India-Pakistan war

n o w .

"^5

1999 Dispute Over Jmsmu and Kashmir

The 1999 Indo-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir put the
statements supporting nuclear deterrence in South Asia to
yet another test.

India bleuned the renewed conflict over

Kashmir on Pakistan, claiming Islamabad sent hundreds of
soldiers over the so-called Line of Control (LOG) dividing
Jammu and Kashmir between the two powers. Pakistan
maintained throughout the conflict that none of its soldiers
were involved.

Instead, Pakistan said that Muslim militants

from various countries chose Kashmir in their campaign to
bring the world's Muslim regions under religious rule
(Bearak 1999a).

Pakistan suggested that this campaign is in

part a legacy of the proxy war that the United States waged
against Soviet forces in Afghanistan during the 1980s.zs
During those years the United States trained and armed
thousands of Muslim guerrillas who opposed the Soviet troops
because they viewed them as anti-Islamic infidels.

Indeed,

25. From "General Beg Claims Country Conducted 'Cold'
Nuclear Test." FBIS. August 3, 1993: 56. For comments
from Ishaq see "Ex-President discusses Nuclear Program,
Politics." FBIS. July 26, 1993; 69-71.
26. Afghanistan is a popular whipping boy for
Pakistan. In the words of an anonymous high-ranking
Pakistcuii official, "Afghanistan is the source of 97% of our
problems" (Perkovich 1996, 419). Drugs, terrorism,
fundamentalism, and refugees are all Pakistani problems it
is content to associate with Afghanistan.
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many of the guerrillas were using not only tactics that
Americans had taught them, but also the weapons the United
States gave them (Dugger 1999a).

For instance, in June 1999

an Indian helicopter was shot down using an American-made
Stinger missile.Now, having succeeded in driving the
Soviet forces from Afghanistan and establishing a form of
religious rule there, Islamabad suggested that the warriors
were turning their attention to Kashmir (Bearak 1999a).
Tensions remained high between India and Péücistan over
the Kashmir issue for the next two months as the Indians
shelled the militants ' Kashmiri mountain-top holdings. Yet
again, tensions waned as Pakistan announced it intended to
cease support for the isleunic militants emd agreed to a
pullback. 28 India reacted favorably to this and the conflict
was de-escalated.
Clearly the threat of nuclear weapons was on the mind
of the Pakistani leadership during this crisis and probably
played an major role in the Pakistani withdrawal.

Pakistani

Prime Minister Sharif, following the announcement of the deescalation of the crisis and the pull-back of forces by both
sides, admitted in a televised address to his country that
27. US intelligence officers reportedly have admitted
that approximately one dozen Stinger missiles are
unaccounted for in this region (Bearak 1999a).
28. Of course what it was Pakistan was pulling back
remained unclear as Islamabad had stressed throughout the
conflict that none of its forces were involved. Even after
tensions had de-escalated Pakistan refused to accept the
bodies of slain soldiers India claimed were Pakistani
(Bearak 1999d).
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the nuclear aspect to the crisis had been an in^rtant
concern (Bearak 1999d, 6):

"People are not aware of the

anxiety we passed through during the past one and a half
months.

This is no secret that the threat of a big war with

India was looming by the way things had deteriorated between
India and Pakistan. Missiles with nuclear weapons were
directed toward us and our air force was put on alert."
The goal of the Pcücistani leadership seems to have been
to put the issue of Kashmir back on the front page.

In fact

opposition groups in Islamabad complained that as soon as
Kashmir was again the focus of the world. Prime Minister
Sharif appeared to wilt (Bearak 1999c).
some merit to these accusations.

There appears to be

There did appear to be a

shift in world focus (with the exception of Indo-Pakistani
publications) to the problems in Kashmir following the
relcLxation in tensions between NATO and Serbia in mid to
late June 1999 (Graham and Absse 1999).

Sharif attempted to

capitalize on this renewed South Asian focus by
participating in a hastily arranged meeting with President
Clinton in Washington to discuss the Kashmir crisis on July
4th.

Following the meeting, Sharif said that the President

assured him that he would take a personal interest in
settling the Kashmir situation.

In fact, in a written

statement. President Clinton did say that once the
"sanctity" of the cease-fire line is restored he "would taike
a personal interest in encouraging an expeditious resumption

93
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

and intensification" of the high-level talks begun between
India and Pakistan in Lahore during February 1999 (Graham
and Abse 1999, 15).z* Prime Minister Sharif responded by
saying that (Bearéüc 1999, 6), "an assurance by the leader of
a power like America is not insignificant."
The leading opposition party in Islamabad, the Pakistan
People's Peurty (PPP), called for the resignation of Prime
Minister Sharif following his decision to order a
withdrawal.

However, the PPP is itself in disarray and

unlikely to mount a successful challenge to Sharif's
authority.30

Pakistani military leaders, on the other hand,

appear to support Sharif's decision to reduce tensions.
This is important in Pakistan, where military support lends
stability and credence to a government fortunate enough to
garner it.
The 1999 crisis between India cuid Pakistan basically
had all the same elements of the previous crises, with the
continued presence of nuclear weapons and the addition of
democratic institutions on both sides (Table Seven). While

29. The statement also said that President Clinton
intended to "pay an early visit to South Asia. ” This after
the President had canceled plans to visit India and Pakistan
in 1998 following both side's testing of nuclear devices
(Graham and Absse 1999, 15).
30. The Pakistan People's Party leader is the former
Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, who lives abroad and faces
arrest if she returns because she has been convicted of
corruption.
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nuclear weapons likely played a large role in conflict deescalation in the case of the 1999 conflict, the impact of
democratic institutions cannot and should not be ignored.
Yet, ironically, democracy did not seem to support a
Table Seven:

1999

Indo-Pakistani

Conflict

Factor

Value

Escalation Imoact

Ally

NO

INCREASE

Proximal

Yes

INCREASE

Democratic

Yes

DECREASE

Mature

No

INCREASE

Capability

.64

INCREASE

Trade

NA

NA

Nuclear

Yes

DECREASE

Outcome:

Clash

cessation of the conflict in this instance.

Publics in both

India and Pakistan were fervently in favor of a continuing
engagement and even of escalating the crisis if necessary
(Dugger 1999b).

A 5 July 1999 poll by one of India's major

newspapers found 87.5% favored a continuation of the
conflict, 5.1% supported peace talks with Pakistan, 3.4%
desired a unilateral cease-fire, and 2.2% wanted to allow US
mediation fIndia Todav 1999, 1). This suggests that
democratic institutions, though present on both sides, might
not have led to a conflict de-escalation.
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Moreover, in the case of India, there was intense
pressure on the government to take whatever means necessary
to dislodge the insurgents.

India's ruling political party

at the time, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), received
severe criticism for not discovering the extent of the
guerrilla's incursion into Kashmir until May.

By that time,

the guerrillas had captured the high ground and dislodging
them was too much for ground forces alone (Bearak 1999a).
This pressure was notable especially because the BJP are
considered to be defense hawks and it is the BJP who have
chan^ioned India's nuclear testing and capabilities. With
elections set for the Fall, the BJP was chastised as
bumblers by their political opponents. Analysts suggested
that the BJP might seek to recapture its reputation through
escalating the conflict into a war.

George Perkovich, a

South Asian specialist, was quoted as saying (Bearak 1999a,
3), "There has been a fundamental assault on their [the BJP]
credibility.
confrontation.

The BJP can't afford to lose in this
They're under intense pressure to use their

military."
Yet again, given the first real opportunity to deescalate the crisis, the BJP took it and agreed to a mutual
withdrawal of forces (Dugger 1999a). The conflict easily
could have persisted on both sides based not only on
political and public pressure, but also in military terms.
Colonel SVE David India's army deputy commander at Dras said
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of Pakistani forces, "If you come 8,9 kilometers inside your
enemy's territory, why do you bloody run away like a dog
with its tail down? They should have fought it out longer.
They had the supply lines " (Bearak I999d, 3). Yet tensions
de-escalated in spite of this.
These factors, coupled with the clear awareness of
political and military leaders in both India and Pakistan of
the nuclear factor seems to indicate that these weapons
prevented their 1999 conflict over Jammu and Kashmir from
escalating further.

Without the deterrent aspect of nuclear

weapons both governments might have handled the increased
political and public pressure differently and mired
themselves in a protracted conflict costly to both sides.
Alternate

Explanations

for

De-escalations

At least three alternate explanations have been posited
regarding why the 1990 and 1999 conflicts did not escalate
beyond some minor clashes between Indian military forces and
Pakistani-backed guerrilla forces in Kashmir, one cirgument
suggests that both India and Péücistan "learned " that
conflict escalation leading to weir does not produce
beneficial outcomes to either side. While this may be
accurate in the case of Pakistan, \dio lost both previous
Kashmiri wars against India, it seems less plausible when
applied to India.

Indeed in some cases, India may have

learned that war with Pakistan does pay.

India won its 1965

war over Jammu and Kashmir with Péücistan with an aggressive,
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offensive maneuver.
regard:

Hagerty (1995/96, 111) suggests in this

"Their [India] lesson may have been that there are

certain intolerable circumstances under which the forceful
application of offensive military doctrines can ease the
security threat from a smaller but determined neighbor.
Thus... nuclear deterrence provides the most persuasive
explanation of vdiy New Dehli did not go on the offensive in
1990." Moreover, if Pakistan had "learned" that conflict
did not pay, then why was it the initiator in the two most
recent conflicts? The evidence suggests that this first
alternate explanation lacks predictive power.
A second hypothesis posited for the de-escalation of
Indo-Pakistani tensions in 1990 and 1999 was that
conventional, instead of nuclear capabilities deterred the
two rivals from a larger conflagration.

Yet both sides'

conventional capabilities, while in^roved from the two
previous instances of war, did not produce relatively more
conventional capability for either side than in the past.
In other words, their relative military capabilities were
similar to past levels. Again Hagerty (1995/95, 111)
argues:

"Elements of both conventional and nuclear

deterrence operated in 1990, but the sine qua non of
conflict resolution was the nuclear factor. " The same could
be said for the 1999 conflict as well.
Fineü.ly, a factor exclusive to the 1999 conflict was
the presence of democratic institutions.

This would seem to
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be the strongest argument for conflict abatement outside of
the presence of nuclear weapons in the dyad.

But as was

noted previously y public support was evident on both sides
of the border for a continuation of the conflict (Dugger
1999b). There was no strong public call for a cessation of
tensions.

Internally, the opposition party of consequence

in Pakistan called for the government to stay the course
with respect to the crisis and not to withdraw.

Though the

Prime Minister did appear to receive support from the
military leaders for his decision to withdraw, it seems
likely that their support of such a decision was because of
the nuclear threat posed by India.
So why did Islamabad begin the conflict at all? What
Pakistan seems to be engaged in with respect to Kashmir is a
sort of miniaturized proxy conflict with India.

Pakistem

supplies weapons and advisors to radical Islamic forces in
Kashmir to fight with India, but makes no overt effort to
engage Indian forces directly.

Such surrogate activity and

not direct confrontation could be construed as evidence of
the powerful nuclear stailemate atomic weapons have
engendered in South Asia.
Results

The results of this case study indicate support for the
theory that nuclear weapons have had a pacifying effect on
Indo-Pakistani relations. On the two occasions of conflict
where neither side had nucleeir weapons the turmoil escalated
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to a level of interstate warféire (22), while during the
occasions when India was open nuclear power and Pakistan was
an opaque one, as well as during the most recent discord
where both were out of the nuclear closet the level of
conflict did not rise above 18 (clash),

with respect to the

level of fatalities, the same pattern holds true (see Table
Eight). Much higher casualty levels were witnessed when
Table Eight :

Indo-Pakistani Conflict Over Jaasiu and
Kashmir

1947-48

1965

1990

1999

Ally

Mb

NO

No

NO

Proximal

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Dem Dyad

NO

NO

NO

Yes

Mature

NO

NO

No

NO

Capability

NA

.69

.66

.64

Trade

NA

47.5

185.4

NA

Nuclear

NO

No

Yes

Yes

22

22

18

18

> 1,500

> 1,000

< 50

< 500

Conflict
Level
Combined
Fatalities

neither side had nuclear weapons in comparison to when one
or both openly admitted to having such weapons.
Lending additional credence to the nuclear peace notion
in the case of the Indo-Pakistani dyad is the fact that so
many of the other independent factors surveyed pointed to an

100
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

increased likelihood of escalation on all four occasions.
The lack of alliamce structures, close geographic proximity,
the presence of one of more immature regimes, and relatively
similar military capabilities all serve to augment the
chances of conflict escalation towards war.

The absence of

a democratic dyad in every instance but that of 1999 also
increased the likelihood of conflict escalation in the case
of the first three conflict situations.
Further, as has been discussed in previous sections,
both India and Pakistan have taken extreme steps to ensure
that the other side would not view their own moves as
antagonistic.

In the two most recent crises when nuclear

weapons were present in the dyad, both India and Pakistan
deliberately refrained from operating from forward bases (in
the case of India) or from moving military strike corps to
the front (in the case of Pakistan ). Such action was not
taken in the two earlier conflict instances, when the
conflict escalated to the level of interstate war.
All of this suggests that nuclear weapons have had a
pacifying impact on the Indo-Pakistani dyad.

This is

fortunate, as the prospects for placing the South Asian
nuclear jinn back into its silo for good seem slim.
Prospects

for

Nuclear Reversal

The contrasts between states that have reversed their
nuclear programs and India and Pakistan are clear.

The most

important change for South Africa, Brazil, Argentina,
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Belarus, Ukrad.ne, and Kazakhstan was in security policy.
According to Neil Joeck (1997, 271), in the case of those
six states, "change became possible when national leaders
were convinced that the security threats to the nation did
not require a nuclear deterrent.

Coupled with that drcunatic

change in security perceptions was the incentive of economic
development and growth. All six states anticipated
substantial rewards if they gave up nuclear weapons, and few
economic rewards in keeping them." Nuclear weapons, or
nuclear weapons programs, were very important for security
under certain circumstances, but the penalty in keeping them
once the security issue had changed became equally
important.

Joeck (1997, 271) concedes, however, that

perception of threat was the overriding factor:
It would not be correct to conclude that national
security in these states singly had a price tag,
which the West finally paid. Even when the economic
hardships were severe, if the perception of threat
was high, the burden was accepted. But, it clearly
was the case that, once state security ceased to be
connected with nuclear weapons, the economic incentives
in reversing the nuclear programs became con%>elling.
For India and Pakistan, the security threat has not
changed, and the economic inducements to remove nuclear
weapons have not been persuasive.The psychological
investments that both sides have made in their nuclear
progrêuns also continue to be powerful incentives not to

31.
Admittedly, in India's case its nucleaur arsenal is
used for security not only against Pakistan, but also
against China.
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reverse course.

For India, the symbol of nuclear power, in

addition to the raw need for new reservoirs of energy,
provides a strong disincentive to cede to Western demands.
India, of course, could have as much nuclear energy as It
could afford If It were to sign the MPT, but that symbolic
retreat would probably be too great a polltlcaü. price to pay
for the Indian governments of the near future.

For

Pakistan, nuclear weapons are clearly more Important than
the rather unsubstantial energy addition provided by nuclear
power.

The nuclear program serves to bind Pakistanis

together In a way few other state symbols can.

Even Islam

divides the nation between Sunni and Shla.
Also, unlike other cases of reversal. In South Asia the
Issue of transition from authoritarianism to democratic
governance Is not a factor. As one of the world's oldest
democracies, India's nuclear policy Is popularly supported
and has survived numerous political transitions.

Although

relatively new, Pakistan's struggling democracy also has
supported the nuclear program and promises to continue to do
so.

This Is distinct from Argentina and Brazil, where

public debate had been suppressed under the military and
ultimately promoted the decision to reverse.

In contrast,

India's and Pakistan's programs enjoy strong public support
suggesting that a reversal of nuclear policy Is unlikely to
occur (Dugger 1999b).
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While most analysts seem to agree with the findings of
this dissertation that the presence of nuclear weapons In
the Indo-Paklstanl dyad has led to conflict pacification the
prospect of nuclear permanency on the Indian subcontinent
has left others nervous,

indeed, scmte analysts still pose

questions concerning the stability the Indo-Paklstanl dyad
will enjoy now that both states have become overt members of
the nuclear club (Erlanger 1998). Three potential
differences between the stable US-Sovlet nuclear dyad and
the newly formed Indo-Paklstanl nuclear dyad have been
posited.
First, unlike the US-Sovlet situation, India and
Pakistan share a common border.

The suggestion here Is that

a common geographic boundary breeds animosity between states
and Increases the likelihood of conflict.

In fact, as was

addressed earlier In the quantitative section of the
dissertation, the Impact of geographical proximity has been
shown In previous studies to be significant on the
escalation of hostilities between states (Bremer 1992; Diehl
1985; Russett 1993; Senese 1997).

Yet, since the

Introduction of nuclear weapons to the dyad, the strains of
geographic proximity In the Indo-Paklstéuil relationship have
yet to be felt In a magnitude greater than those of the
relatively geographically distal US-Sovlet relationship,

it

seems reasonable to suggest that nuclear weapons have dulled
conflict between India and Pakistan, as none of their crises
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since India first detonated a nuclear device in 1974 has
escalated to a level higher than 18 on the MID index.

In

the years before the introduction of nuclear weapons into
the Indian subcontinent the Indians and Pakistanis fought
three wars against one another.

Thus, nuclear weapons seem

to have lessened, if not negated, the escalation effects of
geographic proximity in the case of India and Pakistan.
Second, the relative dearth of nuclear weapons
possessed by either India or Pakistan has led some to
suggest that the lack of survivable nuclear forces on both
sides might promote a first-strike (Erlanger 1998).

The

United States and Soviet Union overcame such a threat to
deterrence by deepening their arsenals to achieve relative
symmetry, but more in^>ortcUitly by developing strategic
triads to diversify the locale of their weapons.

Both the

United States and the Soviet Union created a multiform force
structure by developing a range of delivery systems to
ensure the survivability of their nuclear forces.

The two

sides developed nuclear delivery systems which were landbased (ICBMs), air-based (bombers), and sea-based
(submarines ). India «md Pakistan have no comparable
strategic triad.

Such a diverse strategic insurance policy

may be developed in time, but at this point neither side
appears to have enough nuclear weapons to threaten an
initial attack.

This is very different from the US-Soviet

dyad where both sides had nuclear arsenals large enough to
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wipe the other side conqsletely off the face of the Earth.
India and Pakistan merely have sought to achieve a "minimum
deterrent" force (Burns 1998).

Such a limited force seeks

only to deter a nuclear attack and does not provide the
fire-power needed to enable either side to initiate a
nuclear exchange without fear of reprisal.
nuclear symmetry exists between the two.

Therefore, a
If the Indian and

Pakistani nuclear arsenals vastly deepen over time, then it
may be appropriate for a strategic triad similar to that of
the superpowers to be developed in these two countries.

But

for now, the absence of such a triad is reasonable and does
not lessen the intact of nuclear deterrence for either side.
Also the logic of preemption recently has been called
into question with empirical evidence.

Surveying all wars

since 1816, Dan Reiter (1995) found that only 3 of 67
(approximately 4%) were preemptive in origin.

The nuclear

era has seen at least one instance of preventative conflict
— that of the 1981 Israeli bombing of Iraq's Osirak nuclear
facility, though it was taken without fear of nuclear
reprisal.32

Hagerty (1995/96, 114) notes:

"In situations

where nuclear retaliation has been a possibility, no leader
of a nuclear weapon state has chosen to launch a preemptive
first strike."

32.
The Allied coalition's 1991 air war against Iraq
during the Gulf War might be a second instance, but here as
well there was no fear of nuclear reprisal by Iraq.
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Third, some fear that the fifteen years It took the
United States and the Soviet Union to develop a reliable
command and control center are not affordable In the IndoPaklstanl dyad.^^ Yet In the case of both India and Pakistan
the primary delivery systems for their nuclear weapons are
bombers (Albright 1993, 1998)

Such airborne delivery

systems remove the chances of an accidental missile launch
that the superpowers had to face during the Cold War and
still face today.

For Instance, In 1995 Russian warning

systems Interpreted the launch of a Norwegian scientific
rocket as a possible nuclear attack promoting President
Yeltsin to extract the nucleeu: launch codes from the Russian
equivalent of the "nuclear football." A disaster was
averted when It was realized In Moscow that the Norwegians
had months earlier notified the Kremlin that such a launch
was going to take place at the time specified.

India and

Pakistan have sought to avoid such an accident by not
en^loylng computerized delivery systems. Also, strict
command and control procedures prevent a Strangelovlan
scenario (Delpech 1998-99).
So while all three of these concerns may have some
merit, mostly their Inertance Is over-emphasized In the
context of the Indo-Paklstanl dyad.

The fact Is that

33. The former director of Pakistan 's Inter-Servlces
Intelligence Agency, has dismissed the survivability Issue
as a US preoccupation (Giles and Doyle 1996).
34. Both India and Pakistan are developing ballistic
missile capability however. (Singh 1998).
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nuclear weapons have existed in the Indian subcontinent
since 1974 and the instances of conflict between the two
have lessened since that time with twenty-seven conflict
instances occurring before 1974 and only nine since then
(Jones, Bremer and Singer 1997 ). The closest the two
countries came to war since 1974 was in 1990 and it is
generally agreed that in this instance, nuclear weapons
served to dull the escalation of the crisis (Perkovich 1993;
Arif 1995; Hagerty 1995/96; Karl 1996/97).
Conclusion

Conflict in general between India and Pakistan seems
unlikely to abate in the near future,
been a relationship of conflict.

indeed, theirs has

But with the introduction

of nuclear weapons to South Asia, this conflict has
diminished in magnitude.

Border incursions and clashes have

persisted and most likely will continue, but there is no
reason that the apparent nuclear peace which has kept both
sides from escalating in the past won't continue to maintain
at least a limited peace in the future.

Indeed, the Western

powers should accept the nuclearization of the Indian
subcontinent and work to promote a stable deterrence
structure, instead of attenqsting to stuff the nuclear genie
back into its bottle.
From the perspective of Indieui and Pakistani officials,
efforts to discourage the two South Asian states from
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adopting nuclear capabilities is attributcd>le to racism.
India's former external affairs secretary, K. Shaker Bajpai
(1993, 24) summarizes the feeling of the subcontinent:
East-west deterrence is said to have preserved world
peace for 40 years but the rationale is not always
considered safe for other confrontations : others
cannot be trusted to act as sanely, soberly,
Caucasianally. Even if the world's controlling powers
will not accept that deterrence would apply
universally, Péücistan and India provide one case where
it would.
Indeed, feaurs over the inability of regional powers to
control their nuclear weapons seem exaggerated.

As Martin

vaui Creveld (1993, 122) writes, "...there seems to be no
factual basis for the claims that regional leaders do not
understeuid the nature and implications of nuclear weapons."
Later, van Creveld (1993, 123) asserts:
An even more critical reason %diy regional leaders
tend to be at least as careful in handling nucleau:
weapons as those of the superpowers is the fact
that many of the countries in question are quite
small, adjacent to one each other, and not separated
by any clear natural borders; often they share the
same local weather systems and draw their water from
the Scune river basin. Sence the question of how
escalation, radiation, and contamination may be
avoided appears even more baffling in their case than
in that of the US and the former USSR, which used to
be located on different hemispheres and which for
decades prepared to fight each other on terrain
belonging to third parties. As agreements concluded
between India and Pakistan demonstrate, there can be
no doubt that regional leaders are aware of these
disincentives to the use of nuclear weapons.
In fact vem Creveld believes that the treaties amd regimes
to which the threat of nuclear proliferation has given rise
hide as their real objective the perpetuation of the "old"
nuclear powers.

Van Creveld (1993, 124) writes, "Regional
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powers and their leaders have been described as unstable,
culturally biased, irresponsible, and whatnot.

To this end,

weapons and technologies that used to be presented as
stabilizing when they were in the hands of the great powers
were suddenly described as destabilizing \dien they spread to
other countries."
Yet as the Indo-Pakistani dyad indicates, the leaders
of regional powers tend to be extremely cautious with their
nuclear capabilities.

Still, concerns over the stad)ility of

the Indo-Pakistani nuclear peace persist.

Geographical

constraints between the subcontinent's nuclear contenders
are by far the most demanding that have been encountered by
any nuclear antagonists on a permanent basis since the
advent of nuclear weapons.

For the first time, both

capitals être within four or five minutes of a missile
strike.

Washington and Moscow were within more than a half

hour of each other, while Paris and London were within a
dozen minutes of a Soviet strike.

Thus, the more

established nuclear powers should offer technology and
assistance to promote communications and peace-of-mind to
India and Pakistan.
There will always be the threat of an Indo-Pakistani
conflagration erupting into a nuclear exchange.

But at the

same time, this nuclear threat seems to be one major
component, if not the major con^nent, behind twenty-five
years of peace between these bitter rivals. As Shai Feldman
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(1995, 179), a senior research associate at the Jaffe Center
for Strategic Studies, suggests, "It is difficult to see how
escalation of the conflict over Kashmir could have been
avoided were it not for the two countries ' fear of nuclear
escalation." Nuclear deterrence seems to have worked in
South Asia.

Thus, while the likelihood of conflict

escalating out of control between India and Pakistan remains
a possibility, it seems unlikely at best.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
US EUCLEAR POLICY AMD
NAEAGED PROLIFERATICE

The nuclear club, whose membership began with the
United States over fifty years ago, today alarms policy
makers and the public alike with the prospect of its
continuing expemsion (Thayer 1994, 1995). As this
dissertation has displayed, there are at least nine existing
or former nuclear weapons ' states in the world today (see
Appendix A). The dissertation has examined the intact of
nuclecur weapons on conflict situations both qualitatively
and quantitatively and now the knowledge extracted from
those earlier chapters will be applied to advising what
policies the United States should adopt with respect to
nuclear weapons as the twenty-first century arrives.

Should

the United States continue its vigorous efforts to prevent
nuclear proliferation, or are changes in this policy
warranted? For instance, several scholars have advocated
openly the spread of nucleê&r weapons to Germany and Ukraine
(Hearsheimer 1990, 1993; Van Evera 1990/91; and Posen 1993).
They argue that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by these
two states would deter Russian aggression in the region.
Yet is a limited spread of nuclear weapons the correct
35.
Such continued efforts to prevent Russian
influence in Europe hearkens back to the Cold War saying
that for Europe to be stable NATO needed to keep the Germans
down, the Americans in and the Russians out. Expansion of
the nuclear club to Germany might only succeed in the third
element.
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course for the United States? This chapter will address
this question by exploring the potential intact of managed
nuclear proliferation to regional troublespots.
Specifically, the prospects for allowing or promoting
nuclecir proliferation to two dyads of great historical
tension will be analyzed in this chapter.

The two

prospective cases are the Korean dyad and that of Greece and
Turkey.

But before considering the potential merits and

shortcomings of the spread of nuclear weapons to these
dyads, US policy towards nuclear weapons is assessed.
US

Policy Towards Nuclear Weapons

As the United States prepares for the twenty-first
century it must consider what strategic course it will take
with respect to nucleeu: weapons.

Presently the United

states is embarked on a path focused on nuclear reduction at
home, and the strict prevention of the spread of such
weaponry abroad.^6 while it is clear that the US nuclear
arsenal is overbuilt from its Cold War competition with the
Soviet Union, US efforts to keep the spread of nuclear
weapons in aüseyance may not only be futile, but not even in
its best interest.

36.
In the 1950s the United States laid the
foundations of the current nonproliferation regime, with
President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace initiative. The
focal idea was that the promotion of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes could be used to gain nonproliferation
commitments from nations. This gave rise to the IAEA
(International Atomic Energy Association) in 1957, and
eventually to the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) in
1968.
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From the standpoint of nuclear proliferation, the
United States has nothing immediately to fear.^^

In the near

term, the use of nuclear weapons by an Nth country is
unlikely to endanger US territory, as no such country
possesses both long-remge nuclear capable delivery vehicles
and intentions or reason to harm the United States
(Schelling 1982; Leventhal and Alexander 1986; Karp 1996;
Vogele 1997).
The United States has fought vigorously to prevent the
spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear technology.

But

revelations of the breadth and depth of Irag's clandestine
nuclear program after the Gulf War served to strengthen
criticisms of the nuclear control regime and promoted
efforts aimed at improving it. Since these discoveries of
the covert Iraqi nuclear activities the United States has

37.
The real risk is if prospective proliférants are
sold weapons or nuclear weapons technology because nuclear
weapons are difficult to manufacture. The problems with
nuclear weapons lie not in their design, but in the
procurement of the plutonium, uranium and sometimes tritium,
which, depending on the particular type of nuclear reaction
one is seeking, are needed for the successful constitution
of a nuclear weapon. This aspect in the creation of a
nuclear device poses problems because none of these
substances exist in nature. Plutonium is created as a
byproduct of a nuclear reactor fueled with uranium (Spector
1990). Uranium-235 is present as only .7% of naturally
occurring uranium, which is predominantly con^sed of the
isotope uranium-238. The proportion of uranium—235 can be
increased (normally up to 90% or more for nuclear weapons)
through a process of "enrichment” which separates isotopes
on the basis of their mass (Spector 1990). The United
States no longer produces tritium, though we still need It
for our nuclear weapons for boosting purposes. The U.S.
still has a tritium stockpile from the Savannah Hiver
Reactor (which stopped producing tritium in 1986).
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redoubled its efforts to promote anti-proliferation
initiatives.

1995 saw the renewal without limit of the

Nonproliferation Treaty; the Missile Technology Control
Regime expanded to over twenty-five members with US
prodding; êuid the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was
completed in 1996.

Additionally^ the United States has

refocused some of its bilateral engagements directly around
the area of nonproliferation.

For instance, agreements with

China and North Korea have attempted to strengthen
nonproliferation rules and norms. Also, the United States
has threatened to adopt a more active anti-proliferation
enterprise known as "counterproliferation." Such an effort
would seek to position the United States "as global judge,
jury and executioner against weapons of mass destruction"
(Muller and Reiss 1995).3* The notion of such a proactive,
aggressive stance emerged in the Bush administration
following the Gulf War and has been espoused by the Clinton
administration as well as a means of coping with rogue
states such as North Korea (Pilat and Kirchner 1995).
However, US military action with the specific intent of
blunting the progress of a potential proliférant has yet to
occur. 39

38. Such a focus on pre-en^tive action is reminiscent
of the Israeli strike against the Iraqi nuclear facility in
Osirak (Spector 1990).
39. The post-Gulf War destruction of some of Iraq 's
nuclear production capabilities might qualify, but this
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So what Is the correct course for the US to take with
respect to nuclear weapons at home and abroad? Presently,
three potential US policy options with respect to nucleéur
proliferation could be considered.

First, the United States

could seek the complete abolition of nuclear weapons from
the plamet.

Yet the pacifying aspects of nuclear weapons

which this dissertation has presented suggests that such a
"nuclear free" option would be as foolish (Bailey and Barish
1999) as it would be infeasible to achieve.

Nevertheless,

such an idea does have its supporters (Gilpin 1962; Schell
1982, 1984; Ellsberg 1992) and a RAND study conducted in
1993 notes as the potential benefits of such a retro
international structure (Millet et al. 1993, 10):
Establishing a "no-nuclear" norm would legitimate
the highly intrusive challenge inspections necessary
to assure con^liance with nonproliferation and provide
wairning of potential breakouts from the regime. The
warning gained by intrusive inspections would give
the international community time to respond with a
graduated series of economic and political sanctions.
It would also provide an opportunity to build
international consensus for military operations by
the former major nuclear powers through the use of
advanced conventional weaponry against nascent nuclear
arsenals should that step become necessary.w

effort was mandated by the cease-fire agreement signed by
Iraq and enforced by the UN. Thus, this is hardly a
unilateral US military effort designed to hit an
unsuspecting proliférant 's nuclear production facilities
envisioned in the concept of counterproliferation.
40.
The notion of conventional war to preserve an
anti-proliferation agreement seems to defeat the purpose of
the deal. Lawrence Sigal (1998, 3) quotes Korean analyst
Donald Gregg as saying in this vein, "If you fight a war to
preserve the NPT, that's like burning a village in Vietnam
to save it."
116
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

All of this sounds remarkably unrealistic.

Now that the

nuclear genie has escaped its confines to venture out into
the world it is difficult to imagine a scenario allowing for
its re-corking.

In fact the goal of a nuclear free world

should not be to legitimize international inspections, but
to eibolish the need for them.

This would require a level of

international trust not seen before in the history of the
world.

In short, it seems like fantasy.

Second, the United States could persevere with its
current policy with respect to nuclear proliferation and
maintain a restrictive two-tiered international system of
"haves" and "have-nots."

This approach seeks to convince

the present "have-nots" that there is little reason for them
to join the exclusive nuclear club.

This is achieved

through extended deterrence security guarantees, and when
necessary, sanctions against potential proliférant states,
or potentially couterproliferation efforts.

It also

requires that the other nuclear powers assist in maintaining
the exclusivity of the club by not sharing nuclear
technology with the "have-not" states.
For some amalysts, however, international treaties the
United States and others have supported in an attempt to
curtail proliferation are not an effective route.

Fareed

Zakaria (1998, 28) argues:
International treaties usually reflect reality rather
than shape it. For the past fifty years the real
engine behind nonproliferation was the Cold war.
During their global struggle the United States and
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the Soviet Union had at least one goal in common:
maintaining their nuclear preponderance. To reduce
instability brought about by new nuclear chêLllengers,
they promised protection to some countries and
threatened punishment to others. It worked; despite
access to high technology, many countries chose not
to go nuclear.
Zakaria (1998, 28) goes on to suggest that the United States
must tailor its nuclear policy to individual countries,
noting, "Under international law, «Ü.1 states are alike.
the real world they are not."

In

For Zakaria, rogue states

such as Iraq and North Korea should be dealt with strictly,
while "stable, legitimate regimes" such as in Israel, India
and Pakistan (the latter two of which have achieved nuclear
prowess despite US efforts) should be allowed to achieve
nuclear capability.
Following through with this idea, as a third policy
direction the United States could opt for some form of
relaxation of its proliferation policy and permit either a
limited spread of nuclear weaponry to states deemed
acceptable, or it could step away entirely from
proliferation controls and allow the free spread of nuclear
weapons across the globe.

The latter end of this spectrum

of choice seems too radical.

Irrespective of the pacifying

intact of nuclear weapons the United States should not allow
a proliferation free-for-all because it will limit us
foreign policy options.

This is what nuclear deterrence

41.
Also, a rapid spread of nuclear weapons could lead
to an increased opportunity for nuclear terrorism (Pilat
1998-99; Stem 1998-99).
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succeeds In doing after all, preventing escalation by
limiting the rational options states might choose in dealing
with an adversary.

Consider the Gulf war, for instance.

Had Iraq had nuclear weapons in 1991 it seems unlikely that
the United States would have chosen to attempt to expel
Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

Instead, the US probably would

have acted as a shield for Saudi Arabia, preventing any
further Iraqi incursions over the Arabian peninsula. Thus,
while a US-Iraqi nuclear dyad would have prevented an
escalation, it would have limited US policy options by
creating a nuclear stalemate.
Therefore, the more reasonable policy course would be
for the United States to permit a "managed " spread of
nuclear weapons to select states.

Such a spread might be

limited to regionêü. trouble-spots and/or areas in which the
United States is not interested in operating.

While it

could be argued that such a permissive stance by Washington
might lead to new nuclear states whose regimes eventually
could be hostile to the United States, this would seem to be
a risk worth taking if it will lead to regional
pacification.
Two regional dyads of some tension where a policy of
"managed" proliferation might provide such dividends are the
Korean and Greco-Turk dyads.

These two regional rivalries

will now be examined to ascertain if they and the United
States might benefit from their nuclearization.
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Nuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula

The nuclearization of the Korean peninsula has been an
active fear of us policymakers for almost half a century.
US efforts to curb South Korean efforts to produce a nuclear
weapon led to a ten^rary Introduction of American nuclear
power to the region, though this was later removed In a
separate effort to hold North Korea's nuclear program In
abeyance.

Yet might the threat of nuclear Armageddon have

positive effects on relations between the two Koreas?

This

section explores their relationship and assesses the Impact
the threat of nuclear weapons has had and continues to have
on It.

The prospect of a nuclear race on the peninsula will

be examined not only within the context of North-South
relations, but also the proliferation effects It might have
on neighboring states (such as Japan and Taiwan) who greatly
fear North Korean nuclear capability.

Following a

historical review of the relationship between the two
Koreas, both North and South Korean efforts at manufacturing
nuclear weaponry will be examined.
Nuclear Nexus

In 1956 the recently formed North Korean state entered
Into an agreement with the Soviet Union on nuclear research
as part of which North Korean scientists were reportedly
shuttled to the Dubna Nuclear Research Institute for
training.

Five years later, following China's first

successful test of a nuclear device. North Korea established
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its first nuclear research center at Yongbyon with Soviet
assistcuice.

South Korea believes that China has shared

nuclear-weapons technology with Pyongyang as well (Spector
1990).
The 1960s witnessed sustained tension between the North
and South as the North's leader, Kim II Sung, sought
reunification with the South through subversion and
violence.

The most extreme action occurred in January 1968

when the North sent a 31 person commando team to Seoul in an
effort to assassinate South Korean president Park Chung Hee.
The team was captured only 500 yeirds from President Park's
residence (Spector 1990). A second assassination attempt in
1974 missed the South Korean president again, but killed his
wife.
These rising tensions spurred efforts by the South to
develop its own nuclear weapons program in the mid-70s.

US

pressure on Seoul to abandon such efforts led to its signing
of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1975, though
evidence suggests that South Korean nuclear production
activities may have continued up until 1979 (Shorrock and
Gadacz 1985).

Eventually, guarantees of a US nuclear

umbrella swayed the South Koreans from continuing a vigorous
program to develop nuclear weapons.
Meanwhile, in the North, Kim II Sung initiated efforts
to build the infrastructure needed for a nuclear weapons
program after 1980.

The major result of these efforts was
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the construction of an indigenous 30-megawatt reactor
(considerably larger than the Soviet-supplied reactor which
was in the 1 to 5 megawatt range) near Yongbyon by 1987
(Spector 1990).

Some time in late 1988 or early 1989 US

satellite intelligence photographs revealed that the North
had begun construction of a plutonium extraction plant near
the Yongbyon nuclear complex.

Because plutonium could not

have been used for North Korea's "peaceful" nuclear program,
it was assumed that the site was being used to produce the
material necessary for nuclear weapons (Chanda and Islam
1989).

US analysts were divided over how quickly North

Korea could have produced a bomb.

The Department of

Defense, using worst-case scenario projections, believed
that the North might have nuclear weapons capability by the
mid-1990s.

However, others in the intelligence community

felt that such an estimate greatly exaggerated the North's
scientific and technical con^tence, suggesting that
Pyongyang would not have the bomb before the end of the
1990s (Spector 1990).
Whatever the case, these efforts by North Korea
elicited attempts by the South in 1989 to promote exchange
and talks, and later that same year three-hundred visitors
from each side of the DMZ were allowed to cross the dividing
line for a brief visit for the first time since the end of
the Korean War (Chang 1993).
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The United States also was spurred to seek confidence
building measures with the North Koreans.

President George

Bush announced "good faith" policies in 1990 aimed at
attempting to sway North Korea into full adherence with the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (North Korea was a signer
in 1985) .42 Such adherence would have allowed for
inspections by members of the International Atomic Energy
Association ( I A E A ) T h e s e "good faith" policies promoted
by Bush were twofold:

first the United States pledged to

drop its force levels in South Korea from 44,000 in 1990 to
37,000 by 1992; second, the United States pledged to remove
its ground and sea-launched nuclear weapons from the area of
the Korean peninsula (Sigal 1998).
These actions by the Bush administration led to a
December 1991 North-South agreement on non-aggress ion,
exchanges, and cooperation, and even more inuressively, the
first policy-level talks since the end of the Korean War in

42. North Korea's signing of the NPT in 1985 was
considered by many at the time to be a significant
breakthrough in preventing it from nucleariz ing. By
signing. North Korea agreed to accede to inspections within
18 months, but by the deadline's passing in 1987 no
inspections had taken place and, as was previously
mentioned, US intelligence satellites discovered an
undeclared nuclear reactors at the Yongbyon Nucleeir Research
Center (Lehman 1993, 263).
43. The IAEA, founded in 1957, is a Vienna-based UNaffiliated organization with over 110 members. By the 1960s
it had begun a series of on-site inspections, audits , and
controls known as "safeguards." The goal of IAEA safeguards
is to deter the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful
uses to military purposes through the hazard of timely
detection (Spector 1990).
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January of 1992.

Despite the fact that events since then

have called into question North Korea's willingness to fully
comply with IAEA inspections, the west has witnessed more
openness by North Korea than ever.
Under an agreement (Agreed Framework) reached with
North Korea in March of 1994, the United States was allowed
visits to the remote mountainous site at Kumchangri, about
twenty-five miles northwest of Yongbyon, a nuclear research
center that has been under inspection by the IAEA for five
years.

In exchange for the supposed shutting down of their

nuclear weapons program and for cooperating with inspectors
the North Koreans were promised billions of dollars in
energy assistance, including two new nuclear reactors (Sigal
1998).

Such an agreement reflected not only the desperation

of the US in preventing a North Korean nuclear weapons
capcibility, but also apparent evidence that the Pyongyauig
government was hurting economically now that assistance from
the Soviets and China was drying up in the post Cold War
atmosphere (Sigal 1998).

North Korea, probably the most

jingoistic state in the world, was having to abandon its
philosophy of juche (self-reliance).
IAEA inspectors were allowed in and then kicked out of
North Korea over the next five years as Pyongyang postured
for economic assistance even as it threatened to become a
nuclear power.

In May of 1999 American nuclear inspectors

in North Korea discovered that an underground site that the
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United States suspected was being used for nuclear weapons
production was revealed to be only a "huge, empty tunnel"
(Shenon 1999).

There was no evidence that the "hole" was

being prepared for construction of a nuclear reactor.

This

suggested that the North Koreauis were not as capable of
developing nuclear weapons as analysts had feared.
Moreover, it seemed more evident that Pyongyang was using
the threat of nuclearization in an attempt to garner
economic assistance.
The North Koreans had initially demanded a payment of
$300 million (Shenon 1999) from the United States for the
right to conduct a one-time inspection of the tunnel.

But

they dropped the demand after the United States offered new
promises of food aid, which the State Department insists is
for relief purposes unrelated to the nuclear agreement.
Such an outpouring of effort to promote openness and
peace on the Korean peninsula likely would not have occurred
minus the threat of North Korea achieving a nuclear arsenal.
Indeed it seems that fecirs over the possible nuclearization
of North Korea spurred such efforts.

However, unlike the

Indo-Pakistani dyad, the nuclear threat posed by both sides
on the Korean peninsula remains opaque.

That is to say,

neither side clearly has nuclear capability.

In fact, it

appears that both sides presently do not have a nuclear
stockpile.

Nevertheless, the threat that a nuclear

capability by one or both sides may be achievable has
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promoted more efforts aimed at cooperation between the two
sides.
what is suggested by all of this is that nuclear
proliferation (or at least the threat of it) on the Korean
Peninsula may be an acceptable outcome for the united States
in the future.

This may seem a radical statement at first,

but relations between the North and South have never been as
docile as they have been in the 1990s when the threat of
nuclear proliferation to the area loomed largest.

Other

factors commonly associated with more peaceful dyadic
relations between states are also absent in this region.
For example. North Korea and South Korea are not alliance
partners; North Korea and South Korea have a history of
conflict; North Korea and South Korea are not both
democracies; and finally. North Korea and South Korea share
a common border.

In terms of militéury capabilities the

North has enjoyed a clear advantage in man-power since the
mid-1980s.

Currently the North has over one million man

army, while the South has about 650,000 in its army.
such a difference in size may be misleading.

Yet

David Kang

(1994-95, 343) suggests that the South has numerous military
advantages over the North:
Empirically, the South Korean military is larger,
better-equipped, better-trained, and more versatile
than the North Korean military. Numbers of troops
and tcuiks are crude metrics and do not reveal the
superior training, C^i, and logistical support that
the South enjoys over the North. Just as tellingly,
the North has virtually no amphibious capability.
Given the Inchon landing of 1950 and the inherent
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difficulty in moving straight down the peninsula,
it is quite likely that the North understands the
value of amphibious assaults, and presumably any
version of a northern invasion would presumably
include an amphibious assault, if only to draw off
forces from the MlZ. Yet this is not the case.
Paul Bracken suggests much the same in his analysis of
the two Korea's military capabilities.

But for Bracken (in

Mack 1993, 94), it is the logistical factors ^ich threaten
to curtail the apparent numerical strength of the North
Korean amny:
Another feature of the system in the North is the
undersized military support staff — logisticiams,
transportation experts, food suppliers, and armsmaücers...North Korea lacks the critical institutional
ingredients to pull these forces together to support
the middle line in its decision-making. There has
never been any attempt to logistical capabilities to
see if they would function in a crisis. North Korea's
road network north of the DMZ does not have the
capacity to carry the logistical forces necessary to
support the large operating corps of a million-man
army.
So a true military comparison between the two Koreas is
difficult to portray.*4 North Korea has a clear numerical
advantage, but the South seems to have an advcuitage in terms
of capabilities.

What this suggests is that the two Koreas

may be more militarily equal than is sometimes suggested and

44.
This dissertation, using COW data (see Chapter
Three military parity variable) ultimately assessed there to
be roughly a 2 to 1 advantage in favor of the North, though
this has lessened in the 1990s, with the North enjoying a
roughly 1.7 to 1 advantage over the South. Other analyses
support this diminution in the military balance between the
two Koreas. Masaki (1994-95) for instance, uses Armored
Division Equivalent (ADE) methodology, and finds a change in
the military balance between the two Koreas from 1.68 to 1
in 1980 to 1.36 to 1 by the mid-1990s.
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as has been noted previously, military parity tends to
increase conflict levels between states.
Thus, might the addition of nuclear weapons serve to
promote more peaceful relations on the Korean peninsula?
Review of Table Nine suggests that most of the independent
variables which tend to heighten conflict escalation are
present in the Korean dyad.

The lack of alliance

partnership, geographic proximity, the absence of a
democratic dyad, and the lack of a mature dyad (South Korea
has experienced a number of regime transitions) all increase
the likelihood of escalation should conflict arise between
the two neighbors.
Table Nine:
Escalation Factors on
the Korean Peninsula Post 1990

Factor

Value

Escalation Imnact

Ally

No

INCREASE

Proximal

Yes

INCREASE

Democratic

No

INCREASE

Mature

No

INCREASE

Capability

.62

AVERAGE

Trade

NA

NA

Nuclecir

Opaque

UNCLEAR

Outcome:

?

But nuclearization of the Korean dyad probably still is
not the appropriate course to take at this time.
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It is

undeniable that in spite of all of these factors a certain
level of peace has been kept between the two Koreas because
of the US military presence there.

Certainly us forces

stationed on the border with the North have had some
deterrent impact on Pyongyang (Sigal 1998).

So while the

threat of Northern nuclearization undoubtedly has helped to
maintain the peace there as well, the US military tripwire
is a factor with which North Korea is unlikely to risk
tampering.
Nevertheless, both the US and South Korea have been
responsive to North Korea's nuclear opacity (Sigal 1998).
What is important to keep in mind with respect to the Korean
situation is that, again, neither side has ever been proven
to be able to produce nuclear weapons, nor has either side
been shown to possess nuclear weapons.

Yet, still, the

pacifying intact of the threat of building such weapons
seems to have helped maintain civility between the North and
South.

Korean expert Bruce Cummings (1997, 5), when

speéücing of the relationship between the two Koreas,

s ums

up

the deterrent power of nuclear weapons even in a case where
neither side has been identified as having them:

"In the

realm of ambiguity, it is less important to actually possess
nuclear weapons them to foster the belief that you may
possess them, or may eventually possess them. " This is what
makes the Korean dyad a particularly unique case.

The

South, as well as their US partners, have responded not to
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the appearance of nuclear weapons in the North, but to the
mere threat of their appearance.

This suggests that the

deterrent capabilities of nuclear weapons are more farreaching than most expected.

Opacity may work in the sense

that while other states may not believe that a potential
proliférant has nuclear capability, they do not wcuit to
undertake conflictuel behavior which might lead said state
to accelerate its efforts toward nuclearization.

Thus the

opaque state is appeased by status quo powers in cui attempt
to prevent it from acquiring nuclear capability.
The implications of all of this for the Korean
Peninsula is that the nuclearization of North Korea need not
be encouraged because of the apparent positive effects of
its nuclear opacity and because of the US military presence.
Indeed, the effects North Korean nuclearization would have
on other neighbors would likely lead to the spread of
nuclear weapons not only to South Korea, but also to Japan
and Taiwan (Lehman 1993; Hughes 1996; Dibb 1997-98).

If

this were to occur US influence in the region likely would
be diminished as US security guarantees would be less needed
in Seoul and Tokyo.

This ultimately may be the direction

events in Asia take as the hegemonic status of the United
States is diminished slowly.

US internationalist efforts

will be refocused then exclusively to Europe as long as NATO
remains intact.
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Thus the best scenario for the Korean Peninsula, at
least for US Internationalists, would be for North Korea to
maintain an opaque nuclear status, thereby never officially
engendering a need for Its neighbors to develop nuclear
weapons of their own, while simultaneously benefiting from
the deterrent aspects of nuclear weapons.

Such a structure

would be tenuous, however, as It Is unclear how long North
Korea would maintain (as well as how long others would
tolerate It maintaining) a strictly opaque status.
Ultimately the US may turn Inward again and decide to
remove Its forces from the Korean Peninsula.

If such a

period of Isolationist fervor does recapture US foreign
policymakers, then nuclearization of the two Koreas might be
the proper course to follow.

Without the deterrent presence

of US forces, the escalatory factors present within the
Korean dyad would bode Inausplclously for future conflicts
between the two. Thus, at that time a symmetrical nuclear
dyad on the Korean Peninsula would be appropriate.
Turkey and Greece

A rivalry even more bitter and centuries older than
that of the Chicago Cubs and St. Louis Ccirdlnals, the
Greece-Turkey relationship has yet to be stabilized.
Historical antagonisms have persisted between the two
countries In spite of their status as NATO allies.

Neither

side has actively sought to procure nuclear weapons, but
what Intact would such weapons have on relations between the
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two? This section Intends to explore this Issue, suggesting
that the Greece-Turkey dyad Is similar In some notable
respects to that of both the indo-Paklstanl and Korean
dyads,

in all three cases there Is a history of animosity

and military action against one another as well as the
presence of a common border.
What sets the Greece-Turkey relationship apart Is the
duo's participation In a common alll«mce. Yet NATO
membership failed to prevent Turkey's Invasion of Greekcontrolled Cyprus In 1974. Might the presence of nuclear
weapons have produced a different outcome and might such
weapons prevent future escalations? This section Intends to
explore that possibility by exeunlnlng the Greece-Turkey dyad
more closely.

It will focus on the most contentious Issue

between the two, that of control over the Island nation of
Cyprus.

The Cyprus Issue led to Greece's teo^rary

departure from NATO In the mid-1970s and threatens today to
push these strained allies Into mllltciry action against one
another. Might nuclear weapons be of help, or are other
alternatives available?
Background

The relation between Greece and Turkey throughout
history has been an unamlable one to say the least.

The

United States, following World War II, took over from Great
Britain the formidable task of maintaining western Influence
In this part of the world, while keeping Greece and Turkey
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from trying to slaughter one cuiother. The U.S. used the
admission of the two Into NATO as a means to this end.

The

bipolar world of the Cold War also helped to maintain U.S.
Influence over the two, thanks to the threat of the looming
Soviet Union just next door.
President Truman on March 12, 1947, proclaimed American
readiness to come to the rescue of the two countries by
pledging financial aid for economic or mllltciry purposes.
The official policy statement, later known as the Truman
Doctrine, clearly recognized the threat : "the very
existence of the Greek state Is today threatened by the
terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by
Communists, \dio defy the government's authority at a number
of points, particularly along the northern boundaries."

As

for Turkey, Its "Integrity Is essential to the preservation
of order In the Middle East" (Lenczowskl 1980, 795).
As members of NATO, Turkey and Greece would be
Important to SACEUR (Supreme Allied Command In Europe) —
both as a deterrent to a Soviet attack and as a threat to
the Soviets ' southern flank.

If the region 's military

potential were Integrated Into a security framework, the
Soviet Union would have to commit significant forces to
protect Its southern flank. A security commitment to Turkey
therefore, would constitute a far more effective deterrent
than previous arrangements for resisting Soviet attack, not
only along the Middle East's entire northern tier — which
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provided a buffer for European and U.S. oil interests in the
Persian Gulf —

but in Europe as well.

But the Turks also felt that they needed to join.

As

President Bayar told Assistant Secretary of State George
McGhee, Turkey "wants to give a guaremtee, and it would like
to receive a guarantee” (Lenczowski 1980, 38). The deal was
done and both Turkey and Greece joined NATO in the 1950s to
everyone in the NATO's approval.
Greece and Turkey were in quite different circumstances
in the spring of 1947.

The Greeks were in the middle of a

civil war and thus, for the Athens government, the waning
support from Great Britain meant turning to a new western
source, the United States, a must.

The Turks, on the other

hand, while consciously seeking an American presence on
Turkish territory as a counter-weight to its ever-lurking
Soviet neighbor, were tougher negotiators.
The U.S. military and economic aid soon rocketed
upward.

Congress originally authorized $400 million in aid

for both countries in 1947.

This grew to well over $6

billion by the end of the 1960s (Couloumbis 1983).

American

45.
Turkish internal stability was quite good at the
time. Political cohesiveness and economic conditions were
"tolerable to good." The Turks thus, had less dependence on
the United States when compared to Greece at the time. At
the Scune time however, U.S. interest was first in supporting
Greece financially. The Truman Doctrine was prompt^ by
U.S. official perceptions that the "Communist rebellion" in
Greece would prove successful without massive American
intervention. Such a loss would then lead to the possible
isolation, encirclement, and loss of Turkey for the West.
See, latrides (1981, 256-258).
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military presence in the two countries followed the
acceptance of the two nations into NATO in September 1951 in
Ottawa.

Bilateral base agreements were signed in February

1953 and June 1954 that bound the United States with Greece
and Turkey, respectively (Harris 1972).*®
Turkey and Greece were of utmost importance for the
U.S. during the Cold War period.

Their stability however,

was not only put into jeopardy by expansionist Russia, but
by their own disputes.

These disputes have persisted into

the post-Cold War period.

Foremost among them is the

quarrel over the future of Cyprus, where a unilateral
attempt by Greek's of the island's majority population in
1974 to declare union with Greece prompted Turkey to invade.
The island is now partitioned between the two.
So incensed was Greece by NATO's failure to mediate
judiciously, as it judged it, between the two disputing
parties, that the Greek government withdrew from the
military structure of NATO between 1974 and 1978.

Turkey

was also upset because of a U.S. arms embargo of Turkey
between 1974 and 1977 as a mark of disapproval of the
Turkish invasion of Cyprus.

Those years, when Greece had

withdrawn from the military structure of NATO, mark the

46.
These agreements provided for America's right to
establish bases; to overfly Greek and Turkish territories;
and to provide for the legal status and local accountability
of U.S. forces in the host countries.
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period of NATO's greatest anxiety for the Integrity of Its
southern flank.
In August 1984, UN Secretary Javier Perez de Cuellar
arranged Indirect talks between the two Cypriot parties to
discuss the constitutional framework for a Federal Republic
of Cyprus.

The talks broke down, however, over the

questions of International guarantors and the timetable for
the phased-wlthdrawal of foreign troops, and the positions
of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots hardened.

Since 1994,

Turkey has maintained 30,000 troops on Cyprus (Jacovldes
1994).
Settlement of the Cyprus Issue Is unlikely.

Former

Turkish Prime Minister and current president, Suleyman
Demlrel says "Turkey will never give up Cyprus. "4? The
Turkish controlled section of Cyprus has voted for
Independence and Is now called the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus.

Currently, Turkey Is the only state to

recognize Northern Cyprus as a separate entity.

However,

should one of Turkey's new sister states of the former
Soviet Union choose to do so (as Ankara hopes), then
Turkey's claim to Cyprus will only harden.
Current relations between Turkey and Greece have
basically been shaped by the 1974 Invasion of Cyprus by
Turkey.

On July 20th of that year, Turkish troops burst

47.
Foreign Broadcast Information Service. (West
Europe), (FBIS-WEU), #93-187, (29 September 1993): 58.
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onto the Mediterrcuiean island, justifying the action by
espousing its goal as being to "re-establish the status quo"
(Stavrou 1986, 83).

The "status quo” according to the

Ankara government had been disturbed by a military coup
organized by the military junta controlling Greece at the
time.

Neither junta lasted and the Turks estctblished a

military presence on Cyprus.
The strategic value of both countries to the U.S. and
NATO is considerê&ble even today, but was especially so
during the Cold War period.

Both states bordered countries

unfriendly to the West (Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria in
the case of Greece; Bulgaria and the Soviet Union, in the
case of Turkey).

Turkey, by controlling the straits, held

back the Soviet naval presence in the Black Sea from the
Soviet fleet (the Fifth Escadra) operating in the
Mediterranean Sea.

Greece held the next level of defenses

separating the Soviet navy in the region by controlling the
Aegean and Dodecanese islands.
The end of the Cold War however, has not diminished the
strategic importance of the two nations to United States and
the West.

Turkey has already proven its worth in the 1991

Gulf War with Iraq. The Turkish contribution to the antiIraqi coalition included: moving 100,000 troops along its
border with Iraq, thereby posing the threat of a second
front to the Iraqis; effective closure of the Iraqi pipeline
to the Mediterranean (through which Iraq exported 54 percent
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of Its oil); extension until December 1991 of the Defense
and Economic Cooperation Agreement, which gives the United
States access to military bases in Turkey; and use of NATO
airbases within reuige of military targets in Iraq (Kuniholm
1991).*8
Greece does not have the record of cooperation with the
United States that Turkey possesses,but the U.S. and NATO
are continuing to militarily supply Greece, most likely as a
counterweight to Turkey.

Both Greece and Turkey have been

armed by NATO in the early 1990s, possibly in an attempt to

48. In return for Ankara's assistance, the U.S., as
part of the Southern Region Amendment assistance program
(which has allowed for transport of slightly outmoded
American weapons), along with Germany, have supplied the
Turks with military equipment as a quid pro quo. This arms
package included : 600 M-60 tanks, 400 Leopard tanks, 700
armored personnel carriers, 40 Phantom fighters, as well as
a compliment of Cobra helicopters, missile destroyers and
Roland surface-to-air missiles (Kuniholm 1991, 36-7).
49. In fact, Greece under Papandreou seemed to be a
U.S. enemy if one merely reviews the rhetoric. Papandreou
criticized the U.S. as being "the metropolis of imperialism"
and praised the Soviet Union and some of its political
stratagems. Greece refused to participate in sanctions
introduced following the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
and the 1981 Solidarity in Poland. And Greek officials,
including the Prime Minister, sided with the Soviet
explanation of why in September 1983, it shot down Koreéui
Air Lines Flight 007. Yet under Papandreou's leadership
Greece signed the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement
(DECA) with the United States. This agreement gave the U.S.
access to specified military facilities in Greece for a
period renewable every five years. Most recently, Greece
has not been supportive of the NATO effort in Kosovo. So
Greece seems to be saying one thing and then doing another.
Greece seems to be seeking to keep its Russian neighbor
happy while allowing the U.S. in to help protect it from
said neighbor (Haass, 1986).
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prevent the ethnic fighting occurring on both nations '
borders (In former Yugoslavia and Armenla-Azerbaljan) from
spreading southward. According to a 1994 published United
Nations register for conventional weapons, Greece and Turkey
accounted for 73% of the global army In^rts In tanks, 48%
of the armored personnel carriers, 42 % of the warships and
22 percent of the combat aircraft (Kokklnldes 1994) .so
Most recently the NATO conflict In Kosovo Illustrated
that Greece and Turkey tend to view the world from their own
unique cultural perspective.

Samuel Huntington (1997) has

written extensively concerning the cultural fault lines
emerging throughout the world as being the markers for
conflict In the post Cold War era.

In the case of Greece

and Turkey this takes the form of a clash between the
Christian and Muslim cultures, which according to Huntington
(1997), Is the fault line along which conflict Is most
likely to erupt In the twenty-first century.

As Huntington

would predict, Greece and Turkey had sharply different
Interests In the Kosovo tensions, dictated In part by their
unique cultures.

Turkey supported action to assist the

Kosovar Muslims, while Greece Identified more with the Serb
Christians. NATO served to constrain the two rivals'
50.
A major reshuffling of NATO forces has also led to
military hardware being shipped to Greece and Turkey. NATO
agreed In 1992 to give poorer allies In the Mediterranean
thousands of tanks, big guns and armored vehicles no longer
needed, according to NATO officials. In central Europe.
Around 4,000 pieces of equipment were given to Greece,
Turkey, Spain, Portugal, Denmark and Norway (Doughty 1992).

139
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

tensions in this case by keeping both states out of the
conflict, but whether it can continue to do so is uncertain.
Indeed future institutional constraint is of particular
concern now that there are serious questions concerning the
continued viability of the Atlantic alliance because the
threat it originally was created to defend against, the
Soviet Union, has collapsed.

Even if NATO does continue,

the bonds of alliance it created as a cooperative defense
structure against the Soviet Union no doubt will weaken over
time as long as an identifiable threat for it to rally
against fails to appear.

This, coupled with Greek efforts

to prevent Turkey’s entry into the European Union (EU) might
serve to diminish the pacifying intact of alliance on the
Greece-Turkey dyad.
In fact at least one analyst has argued that the
inclusion of Greece and Turkey in the NATO alliance proved
to be somewhat destabilizing to their relations.

Ronald

Krebs (1999, 369), speaking of the two's NATO membership,
suggests the following problems with it:
First, it externalized these small powers' security,
encouraging a shift in foreign policy focus from
the Soviet threat to regional interests, and
prompting the emergence of the conflict at the zenith
of the Cold War. Second, as Greece and Turkey engaged
in contest over Cyprus, alliance arms transfers helped
transform this limited conflict into a broader and
deeper enmity. Third, in the context of this
deteriorating relationship, those features of alliance
theoretically conducive to cooperation failed to
achieve that end.
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As NATO moves through a period of uncertainty, the idea
that Turkish involvement in the EU and full membership in
the WEU could serve to anchor and stabilize Turkish-Greek
relations could gain momentum.

This is an idea that has

been espoused for some time to no avail. For instance, lan
Lesser of Rand suggested in 1992 (iv):
Should Turkey remain isolated from the process
of European integration, the outlook for
peaceful relations in the Aegean (and in the
Balkans as a whole) will worsen. The prospects
for recapturing the spirit of the 1988 Davos
meetings and reinvigorating Turkish-Greek
détente will turn on the development of
confident political leadership in both
countries.
But the prospects for full Turkish participation in
emerging economic and security arrangements in Europe still
seem to be poor. As Europe moves toward a common foreign
and security policy, it will be less willing to accept the
burden of a direct exposure in the Middle East, which full
Turkish membership in the EU or WEU would

b r i n g . si

Thus,

Turkey will continue to share with the United States a
pronounced stake in the viability of NATO as a link to the
European security order.
51.
Turkey became and associate member of the European
Economic Community in 1963 with the understanding that full
membership would be granted after a certain transitional
period (Halefoglu 1986, 3). Feeling that its service as a
strong NATO ally had earned it the right to elevate its
status, Ankara applied for full membership in the EC in
1987. However, citing shortcomings in the level of
democratization and respect for human rights in Turkey, the
European Commission agreed in 1989 to defer consideration of
the application until at least 1993. Since that time it
Turkish membership into the EU has been denied continually.
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Ankara hoped to sway western support for Its entry Into
the EU by assisting coalition forces in the 1991 Gulf War.
Turkey hoped that its efforts in the 1991 Gulf War would
strengthen its position for entry into the European Union,
which Greece has adamantly opposed.

There were reports that

former Turkish President Turgut Ozal, following the Gulf
War, asked President Bush to plead Turkey's case with the
EU.

The Turks wanted him to stress their value to the West

in dealing with the Arab world. Ozal did so, though without
success.
Despite continuing efforts by Ankeira, Turkish admission
into the EU seems unlikely for at least a couple of reasons.
The EU's stated reason for postponement of Turkish entry was
the need to "deepen" the Community in its current form as
envisaged by the Maastricht Treaty.

However, issues of

human rights in Turkey have played a part as well.

Claims

of Turkish mistreatment of its Kurdish minority have been
trumpeted by Western Europe as reason enough to deny Turkish
membership (Krebs 1999).
Indeed, though Turkish trade with Europe dwarfs that
with other areas, many Turks feel the Europeans view them
with prejudice.

Europe still shows little interest in

Turkey's membership in the EU and many Turks believe that
this is because they are Muslims.

Then Prime Minister Tansu

Ciller herself suggested in the Winter 1994 issue of
Strategic Review that "organizations like the European
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Community should open themselves up to an applicant like
Turkey, rather than preserve the EC (In the words of one
European official) as

a Christian club. '

Here again the

tensions of cultural disparity were registered, likely
building additional resentment among the Turks for Christian
Europe (Huntington 1997).
Clearly, though, Turkey would be an economic burden to
the rest of the European Union. Horton Abromowltz (1993,
167), the U.S. ambassador to Turkey from 1989 to 1991,
pointed out In 1993 that as one of the poorest states of
Europe, Turkey would need a decade of rapid growth before
Its EU membership would be considered seriously.

Such

growth still has yet to occur for Turkey as It remains one
of the poorest Europeaui states (Krebs 1999).
Turkey Is facing Internal challenges as well.

The PKK

(Kurdish Workers Party) continues Its fourteen year long
guerrilla war against Ankara,

in Its beginnings, the PKK

totaled a meager 200 fighters and was not supported by the
Kurdish minority within Turkey.

Some early 1990s totals of

52.
See Ciller 1994, p. 9. Former Turkish Prime
Minister Tansu Ciller adopted the Idea of the EC being a
"Christian Club" as a theme, to pressure Turkey's
acceptance. Speaking on Ankara TV In 1993 she said, "If the
EC overcomes Its fear of being transformed from a Christian
club and accepts Turkey as Its full member. It will be
uniting dissimilar civilizations and therefore guarantee
that new walls will not be erected." Her efforts proved
fruitless however. From, Foreign Broadcast Information
Service. (West Europe), (FBIS-WEU), #93-203, (22 October
1993): 70.
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the PKK numbered it as having some 15,000 guerrilla forces,
all well-armed as a result of Syrian and Iranian support.
More of concern to secularist Ankara than anything else
though, has been the success of the pro-Islamist Welfare
Party (WP) in national elections.

The WP first made

electoral headway in the 27 March 1994 nationwide municipal
elections. The WP emerged as the biggest winner taking
mayorships in 30 of Turkey's 76 provinces.This was
followed by the WP winning more votes and seats in the
Turkish parliament in December 1995 elections.

Six months

later the WP created a coalition government with a
secularist party and assumed a short-lived control of the
country (Huntington 1997).

in 1998 the secularists took

control of Turkey again auid have maintained it, though the
threat of the WP remains real (Krebbs 1999).
Greece and Turkey are forced by geography into
remaining neighbors.
along.

They will both probably never get

Their historical differences bring too much baggage

53. More current fibres are not available. The
aspirations of the Kurds in Turkey are somewhat unclear.
Most observers seem to agree that those who are seeking
outright independence would settle for "normal democratic
rights in the West" — the right to bilingual schooling in
their native tongue as well as Turkish, to broadcast and
publish in Kurdish, to organize their own cultural
activities, etc. (Rouleau 1993, 122).
54. The WP won 18.4 % of the total vote, doubling its
votes since the last general election. However, former
Prime Minister Tansu Ciller's True Path Party still won the
most total votes with 22.5%. The vote did not affect the
composition of the parliament, where the WP held only 40 of
the 450 seats (Kohen 1994, 2).
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on behalf of both nations for one to ever believe that the
two will become cooperative friends.

The Turkey-Greece

relationship then is all about toleration.

NATO helped to

maintain this level of mutual toleration for fifty years.
Could nuclear weapons help to maintain it in the next
century?
Table Ten:

Escalation Factors for Greco-Turk Dyad

Factor

value

Escalation imoact

Ally

Yes

DECREASE

Proximal

Yes

INCREASE

Democratic

Yes

DECREASE

Mature

Yes

DECREASE

Capability

.91

HIGH

Trade

106.6

INCREASE

Nuclear

No

NA

Outcome:

?

Table Ten indicates that most of the independent
factors in the Greco-Turk dyad do not favor esceilation of
disputes.

Both cire alliance members, both are democratic,

and both are mature.

However, both are also neighbors, have

a high level of military parity and are solid trading
partners, all factors encouraging escalation.
evidence is mixed.

Thus the

In such an instance, where there is not

a strong inçetus for conflict control, nuclear weapons are
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not called for. What could change this situation in the
future would be the demise of NATO and the failure to
integrate Turkey into any other European institutional
structure.

Then a dyadic nuclear situation between Greece

and Turkey might prove beneficial.

Otherwise, the

introduction of nuclecu: weaponry to the Balkans seems
unnecessary and unwise.
US Policy Recommendation#
Having now surveyed both the Korean and Greco-Turk
dyads it is useful to summarize US policy recommendations
with respect to nuclear weapons for these two cases.

While

both dyads present a history of disdain and aggression, only
the Korean dyad reveals itself to be potentially benefited
by the introduction of nuclear weapons, though a continuance
of North Korea's opaque status and a US military presence is
what is recommended for the near term.

North Korean

nuclearization could possibly lead to South Korean, Japanese
and Taiwanese production of nuclear weapons, and though this
might further solidify cautious, pacific relations among the
major powers in the region, US influence would be diminished
greatly.

While this may be the ultimate direction of things

for Asia, most US internationalists are not eager to pull
back from the continent. The continued nuclear opaqueness
of North Korea would allow the United States to preserve its
influence in the region into the twenty-first century, while
simultaneously promoting pacific relations in the Korean
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dyad.

While this seems to be the best course to follow, it

is likely only a matter of time before nuclear weapons
spread in Asia, at %diich time the United States should
accept its lesser role after working to ensure that nuclear
symmetry is achieved in the region.
In the case of the Greece-Turkey dyad, further
integration of Turkey into western institutional structures
likely will ensure the stability of the Turkish economy, and
therefore, the continued success of Turkish secularism.
This probably will keep the two neighbors from escalating
future conflicts with one another.

Turkey's refusal to

develop nuclear capabilities may also assist in retarding
Iranian and other Middle Eastern states ' efforts at joining
the nuclear club by potentially forestalling a nuclear
domino effect in the Middle East.
Thus, in neither coupling should nuclear weapons be
actively promoted, but in the Korean dyad the addition of
nuclear weapons could be acceptable.

In the case of the

Korean dyad what remains to be seen is if North Korea is
truly serious about developing a nuclear capability, or if
it is merely posturing in order to gain international
assistance for its floundering economy,

with respect to

Greece and Turkey, neither state seems interested in
acquiring a nuclear capability anyway.
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CHAPTER SIX:

THE FUTURE OF HUCLEAR HEAPOHS

"There will one day spring from the brain
of science a machine or force so fearful
in its potentialities, so absolutely
terrifying that even man, the fighter, who
will dare torture and death in order to
inflict torture and death, will be appalled,
and so abandon war forever. What man's mind
can create, man's character can control."
— Thomas Alva Edison
This concluding chapter restates the findings of the
dissertation and examines the future of nuclear weapons.

It

explores some of the new military technologies that will be
emerging in the twenty-first century to determine if nuclear
weapons' importance will persist.
What this dissertation argues is that nuclear weapons
can have a significant intact on conflict by often serving
to de-escalate tensions between interstate dyads.

This

appears to present itself exclusively, though, in cases of
symmetrical nuclear dyads.

In other words, for the

beneficial deterrent aspects of these weapons to occur both
sides of the interstate dyad must possess the weapons.

In

asymmetrical conflict instances, the presence of nuclear
weapons displays no significant intact on interstate dyads.
On an individual dyad level the beneficial aspects of
nuclear weapons were evident in the case of the IndoPakistani pairing where escalatory factors such as a history
of conflict, geography, institutions, trade, and
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conventional military capabilities appear to have been
overcome by the addition of nuclear weaponry to the region.
Indeed since the introduction of atomic weapons to South
Asia, both sides appear to have exercised additional
restraint in their conflicts with one another.
Ironically, however, the weapons so feared in the
second half of the twentieth century may be playing a lesser
role by the second-half of the next century.

The lessons of

nuclear knowledge cannot be expunged from human learning,
but the future promises not only new weapons, but new ways
of conducting warfare which may leave nuclear weapons
antediluvian in comparison.

Thus, as the twenty-first

century arrives so too may a revolution in military affairs
(RMA) alter strategic thinking in the United States and
around the world.
RMA

Coined by Andrew Marshall, long-time Director of the
Office of Net Assessment in the Department of Defense, the
phrase "Revolution in Military Affairs " connotes a drastic
change in military affairs resulting from a combination of
55.
It should be noted that while this dissertation
argues that the RMA ultimately may make nuclear weapons
obsolete by rendering them moot by technological advance,
some strategic thinkers feeur that the RMA will promote
proliferation as weaker states strive to combat technology
with terror (Betts 1998; Carter, Deutch and Zelikow 1998).
Whatever the direction, though, it still seems likely that
conflict will lessen, either because technology makes
weapons so effective that warfare becomes a futile exercise,
or because the spread of weapons of mass destruction
accomplishes the same by deterring adversaries.
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technological changes and operational and organizational
innovation (Jablonsky 1994). Marshall's hypothesis that a
new revolution in military affairs may be in progress or
just over the horizon is based on the proposition that a
number of critical technologies are maturing now that, if
applied properly, might change the way wars are fought, and
whoever is quickest to identify and exploit such a
revolutionary potential could radically alter the military
equation in world politics.

If the US fails to exploit the

RMA, others might, thereby improving their military
positions considerably, perhaps at the expense of US
interests (Kipp 1996).
RMAs have come in various flavors over the centuries.
The major elements of this one are technological (Bartlett
et al., 1996).

The central theme that connects them is

their reliance on information (Toff1er and Toff1er 1993).
The details of the postulated elements of the RMA have
evolved somewhat over the years, partly because the ideas
have become more refined and peurtly as a result of petty
bickering among the military services over turf and budgets.
Four areas have emerged in the modern RMA:

precision strike

and delivery; information warfare; robotics and
nanotechnology ; and space technology.
Precision Strike

and Delivery

Precision strike is the ability to bring the right kind
of firepower to bear at the right time and place to destroy
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virtually êuiy kind of critical teurget. The concept is a
logical extension of the precision part of the Gulf War air
campaign and traces its antecedents at least as far back as
the use of laser-guided bombs in Vietnam (Davis 1996; Orme
1997-98). With more types of precis ion-guided weapons in
current inventories and in the works, more advanced guidance
and navigation schemes available, and critical supporting
technologies maturing rapidly, large inventories of very
accurate weapons should be within the reach of major
industrial powers and auiy other countries with the
wherewithal to purchase them in the relatively near future.
Equally critical are the intelligence collection,
communications, data processing, and command and control
systems necessary for large-scale, timely use of precisionguided weapons. Improvement in sensor technology, computer
hardware and software, and large-scale communications
technology might make possible precision strike on a scale
that would quantitatively and qualitatively change the
nature of warfare (Jablonsky 1994).

Adding "precision

delivery" acknowledges the importance of delivering things
other than weapons (e.g., humanitarian relief supplies)
accurately.
Conventional munitions have made remarkable advances in
lethality by combining real-time information with precisionguided technology.

Bombing has become so precise "that

weapons systems can routinely attack not just the building
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or the rooms, but the corner of the room that will bring
everything down — even the vent shaft that will put the
bomb inside the shelter" (Davis 1996, 46).
The effectiveness of NATO's air can^aign against Serbia
in 1999 evidenced the dominance of the superior technology
produced by the current RMA. NATO conducted over 34,000
sorties and deposited approximately 22,000 bombs on Serbia
(many guided by lasers) and yet NATO did not suffer a single
casualty in the seventy-eight days of the air campaign
(Gelman 1999).
Information

Warfare

New technologies make it possible to gather, process,
and move vast amounts of information very quickly.

In

future military operations, they may make it possible for
military commanders to know virtually everything about their
enemies as well as their own forces and be able to
continuously replan and direct forces in near-real time.
How much of this "situational awareness " and real-time
command and control is really valuable remains to be seen,
but the idea of being able to do better in this arena is
central to the RMA (Davis 1996).
Dependence on information technologies could create
vulnerabilities, however, that an adversary might be able to
exploit.

Protecting one's own information-related

operations while attacking an enemy's is likely to be even
more fundamental to military success than in the past.
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This

geographic expansion of the battlefield will con^l military
commanders to think more globally (Davis 1996).
The other major con^nent of Information warfare Is the
potential vulnerability of high-tech civilian societies
(banking and financial systems, telecommunications networks,
and con^uter reliant technologies) to electronic attack.
This could ultimately lead to an expanded conception of
national security (Davis 1996).
Robotics

and Hanotechnology

Robotic devices are no longer simply used for mass
producing automobiles.

Robotic weapons were used as

recently as the Gulf War.

Pioneer RPVs (small, unarmed

pilotless planes controlled by computer operators miles
away) flew some 330 sorties once Desert Storm commenced.
Pioneers tracked Iraqi mobile missile launchers as they were
returned to their bases, checked on bomb damage, searched
for mines In the Gulf, and surveyed Iraqi troop movements
(Toff1er and Toff1er 1993).
Yet the robotics of the near future will discover Its
most beneficial potential as It Is miniaturized to
microscopic levels.

The notion of molecular machines was

first put forward by the renowned Nobel physicist Richard
Feynman In the late 1950s (Feynman et al., 1965).®® The
56. By 1957 Dr. Feynman had concluded: "Principles of
physics, as far as I can see, do not speak against the
possibility of maneuvering things atom by atom. It Is not
an atten^t to violate any laws; It Is something. In
principle, that can be done" (Swain 1999).
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first scanning tunneling microscope, which can detect
individual atoms, was built in 1981 by Gerd Binnig and
Heinrich Rohrer^^ at the IBM Zurich Research Laboratory
(Roland 1991a).

Following this breakthrough, K. Eric

Drexler (1986, 1991) created the term "nanotechnology" to
refer to the technology of controlling matter at the scale
of nanometers — billionths of a meter.
Techniques of miniaturization have exploded in the past
decade with patents for micro-machines and nanobots
accelerating the potential benefits of robotics by shrinking
devices to incredible levels.

Researchers announced in July

of 1999 that they had discovered a method for creating
computer tremsistors at the molecular level (Markoff 1999).
Such an advance would increase the processing capability of
computers 100 billion times over their present 1999
capabilities.SB This research could lead to the production
of machines at the molecular, or even atomic level, which
could in turn create like devices.

Toff1er and Toff1er

(1993, 120) suggest of such machines: "If micro-machines are

57. The two scientists received a Nobel Prize for this
work in 1986. Later, in j^ril 1990, IBM researchers spelled
out the company name by moving individual atoms of xenon.
This proved the technological potential of nanotechnology to
custom-build molecules atom by atom (Roland 1991b).
58. Researchers at UCLA and Hewlitt Packard created
the so-called Rotaxane Molecule. The researchers suggest
that "this could lead to a world in which supercomputing
power is so pervasive and inexpensive that it literally
becomes an integral part of every mem-made object (Markoff
1999, lA).
154
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

small enough to manipulate individual cells, nano-machines
can manipulate the molecules of vAiich cells are built. "
According to a survey of twenty-five scientists working on
nano-tech, within the next ten to twenty-five years we will
not merely be able to create devices at the molecular scale,
but we will be able to make them self-replicating — meaning
we can breed them.

Thus, modern technology may soon produce

self-producing war machines.
121) note:

Toff1er and Toff1er (1993,

"a generation from now, says a physicist at RAND

Corporation, 'we start looking at sensors [the size of a
pinpoint] that...can burrow into communications systems, or
sensors that can lie there for twenty years, just ticking
away, ready to be remotely activated. "
What the ultimate product of nanotechnology may be is
difficult to say. Most researchers are very auspicious
about the technological benefits nanotechnology could
produce for society. 5»

Some have even suggested that it may

lead to the "'end of economics, ' ushering in an age of
almost unlimited abundance of marvelous new things"
1991b).

(Roland

It might also lead to a further devolution in

59. The potential benefits of nanotechnology are awe
inspiring, though caution with any future technologies seems
always a wise course. Nevertheless, a vast range of
salutiferous achievements could be realized through
nanotechnology if forecasters familiar with it are accurate,
including: the end of disease, inexpensive space travel,
and in the minds of the most sanguine seers, immortality
(Drexler 1986; Du Charme 1995; Kurzweil 1999).
60.

Sounds good to me.
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conflict, not only because of the economic boom such devices
could produce for states, but also because their destructive
potential would be greater than that of nuclear weapons and,
thus, so would their deterrent capability.
Space

Technology

Currently the most vital and yet least appreciated
facet of the new RMA Is the growing military dependence on
space technology.

While space systems have long been

Important to US national security, trying to Integrate them
Into routine military operations has been a source of
perennial frustration (Gray 1996).
Space offers both unique opportunities and requires
special skills and capabilities to exploit fully.

By their

very nature, space capabilities offer even modest nations
global capability to communicate and collect Information.
Moreover, with the burgeoning commercial markets for
satellite communications, navigation, and remote sensing,
the buy-ln price for even small countries (or, for that
matter, non-nation states) to take advantage of some of the
opportunities that space can offer Is likely to be greatly
reduced (Jablonsky 1994).
In addition to antl-satelllte technologies the most
evident effort at militarizing space has been US efforts to
acquire a ballistic missile defense (HMD) system.

The

original space-based concept of BHD arrived during the
Reagan administration In the form of the heavily lambasted
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strategic Defense Initiative. The lack of feasibility (both
monetarily cuid scientifically) of this project, coupled with
the demise of the Soviet threat gave way to a lesser BMD
system during the Bush administration known as Global
Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). GPALS purpose
was in its name: to provide global protection from limited
strikes, whatever their source.

It was unique from the

original SDI Phase One conception in that it was designed to
repel only limited strikes and not an all out nucleeir attack
from the Soviet Union.

It was more directed to the 1990s

world in which the threat of horizontal proliferation and
the possibility of limited attacks, (not a large-scale
nuclear strike by the Soviet Union), was the perceived
threat of U.S. policy-makers.
Such a space-based system was never developed and
deployed however. Future space-based interceptor systems
will face much the Scune fate unless the cost can be made
less prohibitive and a credible threat arises to push the US
Congress into some action in this regard.

The Clinton

administration's current course with respect to missile
defense is to develop ground-based intereceptors for theater
61.
GPALS is not deterrence, but protection of the
United States, U.S. forces deployed overseas, U.S. powerprojection forces — as well as U.S. friends and allies —
against accidental, unauthorized and/or limited strikes,
whatever their source (McDowell 1991) . Previously, the SDI
had sought defenses that could strengthen deterrence of a
massive Soviet ballistic missile strike. Thus, GPALS was a
major change in the role that strategic defenses were to
perform.
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and national defense.Such devices, while terrestrially
based, would employ space-based satellites to assist in
target acquisition (Jablonsky 1994).
The Icurger question of whether a BMD system would
damage the deterrent value of nuclear weapons is a serious
one.

It seems in principle that such a system would be

detrimental to nuclear deterrence as the side with such
defensive capabilities would hold a clear strategic
advantage over its adversary.

That thinking holds in

theory, but in reality there really is not much disincentive
for the United States not to procure a limited ballistic
missile defense capability.

A limited defense such as GPALS

would pose no threat to a large nuclear power such as the
Soviet Union because it has a powerful second-strike
capability which would keep nuclear deterrence strong
between itself and the United States.

A BMD system would

make a difference in US dealings with smaller nuclear
powers, but it would only remove the deterrent threat from
the weaker party, allowing more strategic options for US
policymakers.S3 Where ballistic missile defense would be
62. Such systems will be devised using kinetic energy
weapons (KEWs) such as Exo-Endoatmospheric Interceptors
(E21s)êuid Ground-Based Interceptors (GBis) equipped with
non-nuclear wairheads that destroy targets by the force of
their impact with the target (Cooper 1991, 5).
63. Indeed in 1993 former Secretary of Defense Les
Aspin declared (as part of the Clinton administration's 1993
Bottom-Up Review) that the primary threat to US security in
the twenty-first century stemmed from nuclear pariah states.
He concluded that "the new possessors of nuclear weapons may
not be deterrad)le" (Kcirl 1996). If this is the case, there
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detrimental is in regional situations where strategic
superiority could destabilize the dyad, such as in South
Asia, or in the event that the Korean Peninsula was
nuclearized.
Development of ballistic missile defense systems
outside of the United States is quite limited however.
Israel is the notable exception having been a strong partner
to the Untied States in developing Arrow interceptors.
Arrow interceptors are designed to intercept ballistic
missiles in flight and are somewhat similar to the Patriot,
but use a more advanced technology (Payne 1991).

Israel has

no nuclear-capable regional competitor, so their development
of defensive missile capabilities does not harm deterrence
in this case.
Ti m e '8 Arrow

The impact of these technological improvements on state
behavior could be profound.

What this dissertation has

indicated already is that the unique accomplishment of
splitting the atom assisted in promoting more cautious, and,
thus, more pacific behavior between states with that
technological capability.

It seems reasonable to envision

that as technology advances over the coming decades, so too
might constraints on escalation.

Of course it depends upon

the form this technology takes. As has been noted, advances
in defensive systems could potentially threaten regional
is all the more reason for the United States to develop a
limited nuclear defense.
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stability.

But the trend in technology suggests that this

will not be the case.

In fact, the process of evolving

technology tends to improve capabilities in an exponential
fashion, which tends to promote more order within the
system.

MIT professor Raymond Kurzweil (1999, 32) observes,

"Innovators seek to improve things by multiples.
is multiplicative, not additive..."

Innovation

Kurweil (1999) thus

concludes the following with regard to the evolution of life
forms, and of technology:
— An evolutionary process is not a closed system;
therefore, evolution draws upon the chaos in the
larger system in which it takes place for its
options for diversity; and
— Evolution builds on its own increasing order.
— Therefore,
increases

in an evolutionary process,
exponentially.

order

Figure Two:
The Law of Accelerating Returns as
Applied to an Evolutionary Process

Thus, technology, like cuiy evolutionary process, builds on
itself, and by doing so, increases order within the system
in which it operates.

Indeed, from a conflict perspective,

it seems reasonable to assert that as technology has been
inqproved, warfare has lessened in frequency within the
international system.

This notion is based on Correlates of

War (COW) data tracking the frequency and chciracter of war
in the international system since 1816.

By breaking time-

periods into roughly thirty year blocks until the end of the
Cold War the number of initiated wars declines precipitously
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over time in relation to the number of states in the system.
In fact, since 1918 the frequency of war outbreak "actually
declines from four per state per decade prior to World Weir
II to two per state per decade since [and even less since
the Berlin WcLll was dismantled in 1989 ]. And if we control
not for the number of states but the number of pairs, the
decline appears even more dramatic" (Singer 1991, 57).

As

Table Eleven clearly indicates, the frequency of warfare in
Table Eleven:

Years
1816-1848
1849-1881
1882-1914
1915-1944
1945-1988
1989-1994

War in the International System,
1816-1994

Period

# of Wars

Concert of
Europe
Wars of
European
unification
Resurgent
Imperialism
The Great
Depression
The Cold War
Post Cold
Weu:

Ava. Wars
# of States oer state

33

28

1.18

43

39

1.10

38

40

.95

24

59

.41

43

117

.37

2464

174

.12

the international system per state per yecir declines in
every approximate thirty year time-period occurring since
the Concert of

Europe.

64. Post Cold War figure adjusted for a thirty year
time period.
65. Such optimism has
who suggest that the proper
of wars that start, but the
way (Small and Singer 1982;

been challenged by some scholars
measure should not be the number
number of wars presently under
Wallensteen and Sollenberg
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Part of this may be attributable to the destructive
potential of nuclear weapons (at least after 1945), as well
as the growing accuracy and effectiveness of modem
weaponry.

As the Intensity, accuracy and effectiveness of

weaponry Is advanced and augmented by technology, so too may
be the likelihood of order In the International system.
While Interstate warfare and conflict unlikely will ever
abate con^letely, they probably will be lessened In
frequency and Intensity by the march of technological
progress.
Conclusion

In an evolving system, as Is the case with the current
state-centric International system, the passage of time
generally reflects the growth of order within the system.
Successful behaviors cure learned or mimicked as the system
members adapt to what has proven to be beneficial behavior
In the past. Thus successful Institutions are generally
adopted, as has been the case for democracy following the
victory of the democratic Institutional structures of the
West during the Cold War.
Indeed there Is a proliferation of democratic
Institutions throughout the world, which many have suggested
will lessen the chances for conflict between states.

This

1995). Still, as Kegley and Wittkopf (1997, 365) note, "The
so-called outbreak of peace In the post-Cold War [era] Is
not mythical, however, as only four large-scale wars were
under way between states In the 1989-1994 period
(Wallensteen and Sollenberg 1995, 345)."
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so-called End of History thesis, eloquently proposed by
Francis Fukuyama (1993), cirques that lesser states tend to
emulate more successful ones and because the West scored a
Pyrrhic victory in the Cold War, Fukuyama suggests that the
democratic institutions of the winners will be copied
throughout the world.

In fact, there is some evidence of

this institutional mimicry with democracy seeming to spring
up in every corner of the world.
Yet this appears not to be the solitary facet of
successful countries that states are seeking to copy.

Like

Fukuyama, Kenneth Waltz, as has been noted, argues for the
impressionability of states suggesting that states who are
successful are those that are best able to adapt.

This

Darwinian notion of state evolution suggests that democratic
institutions will not be the only aspect copied by others.
In fact a secondary proliferation has become one not of
institutions, but rather, weapons (specifically, nuclear
weapons).

Waltz (1995) notes, "Self-help is the principle

of action in an anarchic order, and the most important way
in which states must help themselves is by providing for
their own security."

Therefore the proliferation of

nuclear weapons is inevitable, as states strive to ensure
their own survivability. Thus with the international system
dictating a proliferation of nuclear weapons to more and
more states. Waltz (1995) argues that war will become less

163
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

likely because the weaponry (nuclear warheads) will be less
suited for waging it.
The evidence this dissertation has presented suggests
that there is merit to this argument.

But as was the case

with democratic states, such pacificity occurs only within
dyadic relations between like states.

That is, pairs of

nuclear states produce lower levels of conflict than other
types of interstate couplings.

Thus it is regional nuclear

asymmetries that should be of concern to US policymakers.
Should North Korea ever evolve from nuclear opacity to overt
nuclear capability the response to provide South Korea with
like capability should be swift.

And of more concern to US

policymakers than a dyad of two nuclear states such as India
and Pakistan should be interstate rivalries in which there
is only one nuclear capable state (such as the case of China
and Taiwan) or none at all (as might be evidenced by Iraq
and Kuwait in 1991).
Certainly, the proliferation of nuclear weapons should
not be taken lightly.

But doom and gloom forecasts about

the terrors these weapons will unleash on the world are
overstated. As nuclear weapons spread in the next decades
many fear that the likelihood of a nuclear mishap or
exchange will increase (Schelling 1982; Martin 1997; Beres
1998; Falkenrath 1998-99).

Yet, thus far, countries of

varying regime type, GNP, sizey and geographic locale have
possessed and continue to possess these weapons with none of
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the nuclear horror stories so often trun^ted having
occurred.

Gremted, the spread of nuclear weapons should not

be something to be wantonly encouraged, as the presence of
nuclear weapons in typically conflictual dyads may not be
warranted in every case (the current Greece-Turkey dyad for
instance ). But it is also not something that need be overly
feared.

Nuclear weapons have helped to maintain peace

within the international system since 1945, and they most
likely will continue to do so into the twenty-first century
until the next wave of innovation crashes over us and sweeps
them into the vast ocean of obsolescence in which swim so
many of the technological terrors of the past.
time, however, beati sunt possédantes.
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Until that
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Israel-Iraq
North Korea-US
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Sweden-USSR
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China-Philippines
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Nicaragua-US
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Sweden-USSR
US-North Korea
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US-Cuba
US-Iran
US-Iraq
us-Pananma
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China-Vietnam
France-Canada
France-Iran
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RSA-Zimbabwe
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Taiwan-China
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Canada-US
Comoros-France
France-Lebanon
India-Sri Lanka
Israel-Egypt
Pakistan-South Korea
Panama-US
US-Iran
Cuba-US
North Korea-France
Canada-US
China-Taiwan
Iran-US
Iraq-Israel(1)
Iraq-Israel(2)
Israel-Jordan
Estonia-USSR
Georgia-USSR
Sri Lanka-India
Papua NG-India
Sweden-USSR
US-Peru
USSR-Moldova
USSR-Ukraine
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1987
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APPBVDIZ D
SIGNATORIES OP THE

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

Afghcuixs-tan
Antigua and Barbuda
Albêuila
Algeria
Andorra
Angola
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahamas, The
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belarus
Belgium
Belize
Benin
Bhutan
Bolivia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Brunei
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Canada
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Comoros
Congo
Congo, Republic of (Zaire)
Costa Rica
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Djibouti

1970
1985
1990
1995
1996
1996
1995
1993
1973
1969
1992
1976
1988
1979
1980
1993
1975
1985
1972
1985
1970
1994
1969
1998
1985
1969
1970
1971
1969
1969
1979
1970
1971
1995
1992
1986
1995
1978
1970
1970
1992
1970
1993
1969
1968
1971
1996
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1969
1981
1972
1984
1995
1992
1970
1972
1969
1992
1974
1975
1994
1975
1970
1970
1975
1970
1985
1976
1993
1970
1971
1973
1969
1969
1979
1970
1969
1968
1975
1973
1970
1976
1970
1972
1970
1985
1985
1975
1989
1970
1970
1970
1970
1975
1978
1975
1995
1970
1986
1970

Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Estonia
Ethiopia
Fiji
Finland
France
Gabon
Gambiay The
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Grenada
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Holy See
Honduras
Hungary
Iceland
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Ireland
Italy
Ivory Coast
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kan^uchea
Kenya
Kiribati
Korea (North)
Korea (South)
Kuwait
Laos
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Liechtenstein
Luxembourg
Macedonia
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
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Maldives
Mali
Malta
Marshall Islands
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Micronesia
Moldova
Monaco
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar
Ncunibia
Nauru
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Norway
Oman
Palau
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Romania
Russia (USSR)
Rwanda
San Marino
Sao Tome and Principe
Saudi Arabia
St. Kitts and Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent and The Grenadines
Slovakia
Slovenia
Solomon Islands
Somalia
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Surinam
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland

1970
1970
1970
1995
1993
1969
1969
1995
1994
1995
1969
1970
1990
1992
1992
1982
1970
1975
1969
1973
1968
1969
1997
1995
1977
1982
1970
1970
1972
1969
1977
1989
1970
1970
1975
1970
1983
1988
1993
1979
1984
1993
1992
1981
1970
1987
1979
1973
1976
1969
1970
1977
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Syrian Arab Republic
Taiwan
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad emd Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistcui
Tuvalu
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Uzbekistcui
Vanuatu
Vietnam
Western Samoa
Yemen
Zambia
Zimbabwe

1969
1970
1995
1991
1972
1970
1971
1986
1970
1980
1994
1979
1982
1994
1995
1968
1970
1970
1992
1995
1982
1975
1979
1991
1991
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